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A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BWC PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS
Ambassador (Ret.) Donald A. Mahley
A number of articles – even books – have been written to
analyze the negotiations toward a Protocol for the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) during the period from 1994 to
2001. The various works have researched extensively views
of delegations, observers, and those responsible for managing
and directing the negotiations. Their arguments, evidence,
and analysis provide some valuable insights into the kinds of
problems that anyone contemplating pursuit of a legally-
binding international instrument to control the actions of
nations with regard to national security issues needs to take
fully into account. But some of the interactions and nuances
of those negotiations have either been ignored or downplayed
because the observers believed their understanding of the
motivations were too speculative. This short article will
attempt to raise some of those subjects, and perhaps to take
a slightly different (some will argue more biased) look at
some that inevitably are subjective and political.
The last session of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) was almost
ten years ago, and the international push to launch it focused
ten years before that. Twenty years is a generation or more
in the career patterns of those holding responsibility for such
security portfolios in governments, so perhaps recalling the
international context of the start of the negotiations is relevant,
at least to put the discussion in perspective.
Formal negotiations began in 1995, following a special
conference of States’ Parties in 1994 to establish the AHG.
But the impetus for a “verification protocol” to the BWC
began earlier. In the aftermath of the 1979 anthrax event at
Sverdlovsk in the then-USSR and assorted intelligence
concerns about “rogue state” BW programs as alternatives
to nuclear or chemical programs for “cheap” weapons of
mass destruction, a number of states decried the absence of
any “compliance or enforcement mechanism” in the BWC.
As the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) modified its safeguards
protocol to increase surveillance of nuclear facilities and the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations made
real progress toward agreement to include an extensive
verification mechanism, international clamor for a parallel
BWC mechanism intensified as the 1991 BWC Review
Conference approached.
In 1991 the United States resisted the pressure for a
straightforward agreement to commence verification
negotiations outright, but agreed to the establishment of a set
of international technical discussions to examine the feasibility
of technological capability to strengthen the BWC. This group
(“Verex”) convened five times over two years and submitted
a report whose adoption was the subject of the 1994
Conference. The report mastered indecision: there was no
consensus (and thus no recommendation) on how to
accomplish verification of the BWC; nonetheless, each of
the 21 measures examined by the group was reported to
have some characteristics that “could potentially strengthen
the BWC.”
Such wording vexed the participants in the 1994
Conference. The issue was supposed to be whether the Verex
Report formed a reasonable basis for initiating formal
negotiations on a legally-binding document to modify the
BWC. (Whether this would be a Protocol, an Annex, or a
revision was a question that persisted into the negotiations.)
The Conference was scheduled for two-weeks’ duration in
Geneva. The ambiguous wording of the Report meant that
to reject the concept of negotiating a legally-binding document
would require the participants in the 1994 Conference to reject
the work done over two years by the technical group – and
the 1994 Conference participants (or at least the decision-
makers) were drawn more from the political spectrum of
their respective countries than from technical bodies.
The United States faced a particularly difficult situation.
The US had long been the most skeptical country on the
question of whether a formal verification mechanism could
be devised for the BWC. (At the same time, the US was in
the forefront of charging various countries with violating their
obligations under the BWC by operating, or at least developing
the capabilities for, illicit covert offensive BW programs.)
The Clinton Administration, in a policy review prior to the
1994 Conference, had subtly but significantly altered the
overall US policy approach to international instruments on
WMD by declaring that it would be an objective of the Admin-
istration to strengthen the BWC. This policy document did
not propose a verification mechanism for the BWC – but it
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did propose to strengthen the Convention, and that was what
the wording in the Verex report had argued: that the proposed
measures had the potentialto strengthen the Convention.
So the question at the Conference quickly ceased being
whether there would be formal negotiations, and focused on
what the mandate of those negotiations would be. Discussion
surfaced a fundamental difference among groups of states at
the Conference, a fundamental difference that would remain
unresolved even in the final draft of a Protocol considered by
the AHG in 2001.
One group of states, principally but not entirely Western
states, believed the negotiation was about a security
enhancement to the BWC. There were significant differences
among those states about what the content of any security-
enhancing document should include, but all agreed the basic
aim was to make the BWC a stronger instrument against the
threat of biological weapons. The other group of states,
primarily but not exclusively members of the Non-Aligned
Movement, saw the negotiation primarily as one about
technology transfer: how advanced biological and
pharmaceutical knowledge and technology could be pried away
from those more developed states that were, in the eyes of
these developing states, monopolizing capabilities needed in
developing areas. The principle that disarmament instruments
should not be perverted into a rationale for suppressing
legitimate, peaceful development in the technology associated
with the document (e.g. nuclear, chemical, biological) had been
enshrined in the basic Conventions, but the proponents of
putting extensive means to “facilitate” technology sharing in
the Protocol argued that the principles in the basic Convention
text were being too narrowly interpreted by those states
possessing advanced technology.
If there had been no other significant stumbling blocks to
be overcome in the negotiations (and, in fact, there were a
number of other obstacles), this schism, enshrined in the very
mandate of the AHG, would have made successful outcome
of the negotiations nearly impossible. There was no way to
try to strike a consensus-based compromise between the two
camps, since some in each camp thought its area was the
primary purpose of the proceedings.
A second albatross around the neck of the BWC Protocol
negotiations, though it was not apparent at the outset, was
the CWC. The CWC, opened for signature in 1993, became
a model for the BWC Protocol in the eyes of many of the
most committed Western delegations. Thus, they believed that
the provisions of the CWC verification system, modified only
somewhat to account for differences in biological/
pharmaceutical production, would work and would be largely
acceptable to delegations for a BWC Protocol. This working
perception led delegations and NGOs supporting the
negotiation, including the US delegation, down a number of
what turned out to be blind paths with no effective solutions,
and perpetrated hundreds of pages of bracketed draft text
that could not even be modified to offer alternatives that had
a hope of either gaining acceptance or solving the issues they
were supposed to address.
Trying to catalog all the instances of false analogy would
take much longer in space and time than this short article.
However, a couple of examples may be useful. The CWC
set up an inspection system designed to deter clandestine CW
production. This appears to have worked thus far. But a crucial
element of the system is the limited number of places around
the globe where those chemicals either constituting chemical
weapons or immediate precursors of chemical weapons are
manufactured. And, before the advent of microreactor
technology and when the target was national chemical
weapons capability rather than terrorist chemical weapons
capability (which can be both much smaller and less efficient),
batch production of enough CW or precursors was both
expensive and created at least elements of a recognizable
footprint. All of this meant a reasonably affordable number
of reasonably competent CW inspectors could deter a
proliferator, or at least make a successful clandestine program
extremely expensive and subject to penetration by interested
national intelligence operations.
Contrast that picture to biology. There are no large-scale
reactions or significant stockpile accumulations required for
even a national BW program. Prophylaxis against infecting
the work force or the surrounding community can be
approached multiple ways with a low profile. There are no
potential catastrophic accidents of the magnitude of a Bhopal
(which was certainly not a chemical weapons accident, but
rather an indication of what can happen with those kinds of
chemical reactions even for peaceful and legitimate purposes),
or even necessarily like that of Sverdlovsk. Given the nature
of both research and production, along with the explosive
growth of legitimate civilian research, the number of facilities
capable of  handling BW-relevant materials is in the multiple
thousands and expanding almost daily. Even assuming some
way to identify all such locations, to staff an international
organization with enough even reasonably competent
inspectors to create an inspection probability able to function
as a deterrent would require a budget well beyond what any
nation or group of nations would (or even could) pay.
The inherent ambiguity between natural disease and
offensive BW creates another anomaly when compared with
the CWC. If one discovers Sarin, it is reasonable to conclude
there is a CW program there. If one discovers anthrax, is it
BW or a prophylaxis effort against endemic animal disease?
Probably the only truly clear instance would be smallpox – all
the others would lead to international argument at least
sufficiently ambiguous to allow those states who wished to
do so to ignore the violation.
Admitting such a requirement for a new conceptual base
is something that would have been easier for an extended
scientific ad hoc group to conclude than the politically based
and motivated AHG. But timing and the international perception
of momentum weighed strongly against such an approach.
Most states believed the “Verex” group established in 1991
was a transition to a negotiation, a belief reinforced by the
success of the CWC negotiations. Especially with the new
US administration in 1993 changing at least in part the
traditional US view of the BWC, the 1994 Conference was
viewed as the best, if not the only, chance to progress to
direct negotiations. So countries seized that opportunity,
imperfect as it was.
A separate, and not nearly so visible, obstacle to any
successful BWC Protocol negotiation was the relationship
between the US Government (USG) and the domestic
biological/pharmaceutical industry. A key element to the
success of the CWC negotiations was the very solid support
for a CWC provided by the US domestic chemical industry
from the outset to the conclusion. How such support was
achieved is a separate discussion, but without that support
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many of the US negotiating agreements would have been
impossible, and ratification would have been out of the question.
It is not clear whether parallel support for any BWC
Protocol could have been achieved from the US bio/
pharmaceutical industry. It is clear that such support was not
achieved. This does not mean relevant U.S industry (and
academia) was intractably opposed to any protocol from the
outset, and it does not mean the USG did not expend
considerable effort in outreach and consultation. But there
was no success equivalent to the CWC example.
There was not, in contrast to the CWC situation with
regard to US chemical industry, an initial impetus on the part
of the bio/pharmaceutical industry to bend over backwards
to be seen as actively cooperative to the negotiations. Rather,
there were reservations about the USG and its desire to protect
at least the interests, if not the rights, of industry. A part of
this attitude may have been a hangover from efforts to institute
parts of health care reform that drug manufacturers
considered prejudiced against them, but if so this was an
element that was never explicitly stated.
More directly, industry was apprehensive about what they
believed they knew from a different process of biological
inspection they had already seen. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and the USSR (later the Russian Federation)
had been involved in what is known as the Trilateral Process
of inspections of alleged or potential offensive BW facilities.
This process originated when the US and the UK obtained
sufficient hard and indisputable intelligence information about
the massive Soviet offensive BW program to demand on-site
inspections of relevant sites in order  to be assured that program
had been dismantled. The USSR demanded, and was granted,
so-called reciprocal rights to inspect (under the euphemism
of “visit”) US and UK facilities to “ensure” there was no
parallel US or UK program – despite the absence of any
evidence of such a program.
Because the Soviet program included both research and
production hidden in supposedly commercial facilities
(BioPreparat), the “visit” program parameters included the
possibility of visiting commercial facilities. These were not
dispassionate, routine activities. The US-UK teams went to
those facilities where there was convincing intelligence to
support the proposition they were part of the Soviet BW
program, and observed conditions almost impossible to explain
as being for any other purpose. That result created in the
reciprocal visits the premise that they be required to prove
the negative. That is, even given the inherently dual-purpose
nature of most things biological, could one demonstrate there
was no existing capability that could have, under the right
conditions and decisions, been diverted to BW activity? The
Soviet/Russian “visitors” were skilled and experienced. While
they did not explicitly charge offensive BW production at US
facilities, they were quick to say that they could not “rule
out” the “possibility” of capability diversion.
This was the experience of US industry in biological
“verification” exercises. Trilateral “visits” were constrained
to a very few US facilities. But those facilities and their
corporate management were willing – even eager – to share
this atmosphere with others. Coupled with some over-zealous
and, in fact, unsupportable, pressure and promises to corporate
management by some very senior USG officials, the result at
the outset of BWC Protocol negotiations was an industry group
fearful of the potential adverse publicity they perceived
possible from an inspection regime,  and a lack of trust that
parts of the US executive branch were in fact concerned
with protecting their interests.
The US Department of Defense also had reservations
about the dangers of Protocol inspections, informed at least
in part by the Trilateral experiences. While the US was not
pursuing offensive BW capability, we were (and still are)
pursuing both defense against potential BW acts either by
rogue nations or by terrorists, and, separately, against exotic
diseases in various parts of the world that might pose threats
to US service members. Depending on the attitudes of
inspectors, it would be equally difficult to prove the negative
about the capabilities inherent in either of those legitimate
investigations, in the latter case potentially resulting in the
loss of research facilities based outside the United States,
and materially increasing the potential risk to US personnel.
While this perception of the prospect of an adversarial
inspection regime and results might be partially alleviated by
the experience of a decade of CWC inspections, where
conceptually similar dual-use facilities have been inspected
without pointing fingers at capabilities which might under some
circumstances be converted into violations, there was no such
base of experience during the bulk of the time the BWC
Protocol was being negotiated, and by the end of the
negotiations too many other obstacles had presented
themselves to allow for re-evaluation of this premise.
Further difficulties in creating a cooperative working
relationship with industry arose from a variety of areas where
US facilities were operating so competitively and under such
constraining domestic regulations they simply did not
comprehend the nature of the arms control arena.
One incompatibility lay in the viciously competitive nature
of proprietary pharmaceuticals. In the CWC, serious
consideration was given to how to protect proprietary
information during inspections of commercial facilties. The
issue there was solved to general satisfaction by, for example,
limiting sampling to those places in the process flow where
proprietary catalysts were not present (acceptable because
it was a closed process) and restricting views of control panels
that might reveal temperature or pressure data about reactions
that was proprietary. Here again, the success of the CWC
model proved debilitating for BWC negotiations. Most of the
negotiators, especially those from countries without leading-
edge bio/pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities, worked
from the assumption that there were parallel means to provide
equivalent protections in the biological sciences that could be
drafted as general principles governing inspections. Such
equivalence proved illusory, at least in the case of US industry.
There were instances where manufacturers maintained
massive market dominance even after the lapse of patent
protection because their manufacturing process for the
proprietary name-brand drug provided purity improvement
over generic substitutes (in at least one case as little as three
per cent), which in turn provided demonstrably better patient
response. This caused most physicians to specify the
proprietary drug in prescriptions, resulting in significant
continuing profit for the proprietary manufactures. The
proprietary manufacturers argued that simple external
observation of the production line could disclose the means
for that purity differential, thus compromising their market. There
were other instances where simple process reroutings, visible to
even untrained observers who had seen other production lines,
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significantly extended campaign lengths, lowering considerably
the overall maintenance costs for lengthy production runs. Industry
never found sufficient justification in the potential Protocol to
endanger these and similar market advantages, relegating their
support for a Protocol to tepid if not cool.
Compliance with strict Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) standards (and unfamiliarity with some terminology
common to the international arms control community) also
created misunderstanding, if not outright misapprehension. The
Protocol negotiations were concerned principally with facilities
operating with the highest levels of bioprotection, since those
were the places (it was argued) that would be most suitable
to work with pathogens which could be used as biological
weapons. Draft Protocol text focused inspections on facilities
using BL3 and BL4 level protection. (NOTE: There is reason
to question this focus, since in the 1950s, when the US had an
offensive BW program, we operated BW facilities frequently
with only BL2 level conditions [to protect surrounding
communities] while ensuring that all personnel in the facility
had current immunization against the agent being produced.)
Seeing this draft text, most US manufacturers breathed a
sigh of relief, arguing that they only used BL2 levels of safety,
and did not work with those dangerous pathogens identified
in the negotiations as potential agents. Unfortunately, a series
of practice friendly visits by US negotiating team officials
cast doubt on that sense of relief.
What we discovered was that while facilities, both
production and research, were classified as BL2 (or perhaps
BL2+), the operating procedures they followed – usually to
ensure compliance with FDA standards for things like lot
purity and identification – actually corresponded to what the
World Health Organization would have classified as BL3-
level protections. That meant considerably more US facilities
would potentially be subject to inspection under a Protocol
than had been initially anticipated. This discovery led to anxiety
on the part of US industry about both the amount of
interference with operations and the potential risk to sensitive
information. It also made the US delegation realize that either
inspections would be almost exclusively limited to Western
states or the number of inspectors necessary for any
secretariat would be prohibitively high.
Whatever eventual safeguard procedures might have been
drafted to lessen the potential impact on operational efficiency,
on ethical reputation (perceived as critically important to
pharmaceutical manufacturers and the academic community),
and on sensitive information (both proprietary and security),
the negotiation never created an atmosphere capable of
generating enthusiastic support from either defense or industry
in the US – a crucial requirement for any prospect of ratifying a
Protocol in the US Senate.  By the time the US delegation was
able to convince other delegations in the negotiation of the
seriousness of US concerns in these areas and the inadequacy
of the attitude that “if everybody else will agree to them, the US
will come along in the end,” the other deficiencies in a Protocol
approach to the BWC had become transparent at least to the
United States, if not to others in the negotiations.
It is useful in examining the conduct of the negotiations
themselves to make a quick reference to the CWC
negotiations. Even though the US presented a draft Convention
to the Conference on Disarmament in 1984, along with a call
for intensified negotiations, the US did not start pushing
seriously for a conclusion to those negotiations until 1989.
(This was also after the Soviet Union had accepted some of
the basic premises on which the US approach was based, a
move that caught some elements of the US bureaucracy by
surprise. After all, if the Soviets were preventing any
substantial progress on all fronts, the US did not have to
address the underlying issues seriously, because there would
be no international solution without the Soviets.) Once the
US realized there was real opportunity for a successful
conclusion to the negotiations, it required a concerted effort
by the highest levels of the USG to force the extended
discussion in Washington to formulate and defend the decisions
– some of which were hotly debated over considerable time
with some bruising internal confrontations – that eventually
led to the successful conclusion of the Convention. I do not
imply that all the ideas in the CWC came from the US. In
fact, some of the most bruising debate was over how the US
could accept ideas that others had proposed and which some
elements in the US believed were dangerous to national
security. But there was enough concerted leadership in the
USG to force those issues to decision, and then to hold to
those decisions once made.
The parallel situation internally in the USG did not exist
during the BWC Protocol negotiations. Concluding a Protocol
was never a priority objective for senior political leadership in
the US Executive Branch. While the issue had a few avid
followers, it was not discussed in substantive detail, and
particularly not regularly, at senior (cabinet, or immediate sub-
cabinet) levels, and there was not government-wide cabinet-
level agency internal direction to devote the considerable
attention and resources necessary to formulate USG
alternatives to the approaches being espoused by other
countries. The results were debilitating to the negotiations,
both nationally and internationally.
Nationally, the shortcoming came as agencies did the
homework to determine that proposals currently being
discussed in Geneva – usually developed by trying to draw
parallels with the CWC, adapted by a country having fewer
complicating domestic concerns than the US – were not
satisfactory answers to the issues they attempted to address.
That allowed the US to act as a sharp critic of the proposals
under consideration. What did not happen was the necessary
effort to say “These ideas will not work. Now what ideas
can we develop and propose as alternatives that will work?”
In some areas, there simply were not viable alternatives.
Those concepts should have been abandoned early in the
negotiating process, to allow focus on those areas where there
was some prospect of improvement. But when the US,
arguably the most skeptical of the Western delegations from
the outset, could offer overwhelmingly only negative
assessments, the field was left open for the same people who
had proposed the original concepts to continue to pursue them,
even if modified, since the US offered no acceptable
alternatives. This is not to say the US did not offer proposals
– but we did so infrequently enough never to seize control of
the direction of the negotiation.
The other major disconnect during the negotiations was
the existence of an element within the USG who believed the
criticisms of and alternatives to existing proposals developed
during the regular interagency process were only internal
negotiating positions that could be further modified toward
acceptance if only the US position were rejected in Geneva.
This element, in repeated unjustifiable instances, would
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communicate directly to other delegations that the bottom line
presented by the US delegation in Geneva could, if rejected,
be reconsidered in Washington. Needless to say, this undercut
the negotiations in Geneva. And, since in the end the US
positions had wider and more senior support within the
interagency than the element believed, it resulted in other
countries holding to positions and awaiting US compromise
when a better use of the time and energy would have been
reexamination of the proposals to see if US objections could
somehow have been met.
This is not a comprehensive analysis of the negotiations.
It is an attempt to present some issues that have not, in my
exposure, been presented in the literature to date, and to
present some perspectives on a few of the issues that have
been raised.
This commentary should not be taken to mean that with
some modifications in approach or procedure the BWC
Protocol could have been completed successfully. Rather the
lesson from these observations, I hope, is that there should be
harder assessment of the desired and possible end result of a
negotiation before it is proposed, and then there should be
vigorous reviews of ongoing negotiations to ensure they have
not either outlived their utility due to a changing environment
or gotten so far diverted in content from their original
objectives that there are no longer useful outcomes available
to the existing approaches.
At the same time, the BWC Protocol negotiations from
1995-2001 should not be considered unmitigated failure. The
rejection of an unworkable and dysfunctional draft Protocol
is, in objective truth, a better outcome than trying to implement
it and spending even more time and resources in futility. In
addition, the repercussions of the end of the Protocol process
have turned out to be useful. The immediate reaction to the
US taking the correct but politically unpopular step in July of
2001 to terminate the negotiations was widespread (but
incorrect) negative opinion that the US was against the
underlying principle of effectively banning biological weapons.
To counter such reaction, the US proposed a set of measures
or conditions it believes would be more easily adopted and
would more effectively enhance global efforts against
biological weapons.
These proposals, after the eventual conclusion of the BWC
Review Conference, became the core of the BWC work
program that, with additional elements, continues to date. The
focus, on identifying national as well as international actions
to strengthen the already-present provisions of the basic
Convention, has proven both widely acceptable and capable
of creating palpable improvements in biology-related issues.
It also, presaging UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
identifies the locus for the most-needed actions in thwarting
WMD: national sovereign implementation of effective legal
and regulatory provisions to both outlaw illicit activity and
raise consciousness of both the legal requirements and the
mind-sets that must accompany biological activity to realize
the inherently dual-use nature of almost everything that is
done.
A lesson that hopefully will come from the Protocol
negotiations and be applied not only to biology but to other
areas of international concern is the inherent limitation of a
legally-binding negotiated approach to solving problems in a
world where the agility of the underlying science and the
imaginations of potential rogue proliferators simply outrace
the best efforts of enforcers. For one thing, only sovereign
states can accept and be bound by such legal instruments as
treaties. Today the threat of non-state actors clearly exceeds
the direct bounds of a treaty – though certainly treaties can
establish the requirement for whatever sovereign entity controls
the territory from which a terrorist organization operates has
an obligation to outlaw and prosecute the terrorist activity.
But that is an indirect approach through treaties that can be
better achieved by a more direct, if less formal, approach.
Protocols to existing treaties offer yet another obstacle:
they require independent ratification by those states already
party to the original Convention. This is, at best, an uneven
process that will take much longer in some states than others.
In the interim – which may linger for generations – there is
an uneven set of requirements among parties, which some
argue undercuts the universal applicability of the basic
requirements of the Convention itself. Amending a treaty or
a protocol is a very cumbersome process – as the six years
of inconclusive Protocol negotiations demonstrated in this
instance. Any protocol attempting to deal with current
conditions of science, technology, and manufacturing in a
discipline as explosive as biology will inevitably be outdated
long before it is ratified, let alone before any review
conference could examine how to try to bring it up to date.
Thus, I would conclude that the failure of the 1995-2001
BWC Protocol Negotiations is less the failure of the particular
effort than a demonstration of the wrong process with the wrong
premises addressing too many issues that were incompatible. A
great deal of work was done, and many ideas were explored –
but there was never an effective outcome available.
Ambassador Mahley is currently serving as Special Negotiator
for Nonproliferation, on an as-needed basis. Before his retire-
ment in April 2008, he was serving in the US State Department
as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export
Controls, and Negotiations, his responsibilities including chemi-
cal and biological weapons threat reduction.
This article is the third in a series of retrospectives by
Ambassador Mahley. For OPCW : Reflecting on the ModeI, see
the July 2009 issue of this Bulletin; for Controlling the BW Genie,
see the October 2009 issue.
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A TALE OF TWO RIOT CONTROL AGENTS:
UK ATTITUDES TO CS AND  CR IN WARFARE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 1969 -1975
John R. Walker
Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, UK FCO*
In December 1969 the then Labour government grappled with
the problem of the use of riot control agents in war and how
they were to be handled under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
The immediate issue at hand was how the riot control agent
CS should be treated: was it covered by the Protocol’s ban
on “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases”? This issue
was given added piquancy by extensive US use of this agent
in the Vietnam War. Harold Wilson’s government was coming
under pressure to state its views clearly on this matter.
A few years later and the then Conservative government
and its Labour successor grappled with the problems over
rules of engagement governing the use of CR as a last means
of defence in the event of prison break-outs in Northern
Ireland. We look at the main issues and arguments from now
de-classified Cabinet Conclusions and Memoranda, Ministry
of Defence (MOD) and Northern Ireland Office papers.1
What emerges very clearly from both episodes is the very
careful weighing of the scientific, political and legal arguments
and, in the case of possible domestic use, the need for strict
political control. The paper concludes with some observations
on the contemporary relevance of these episodes.
The CS case
The Prime Minister’s memorandum
The Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee had
reviewed the legal, foreign policy and defence implications of
the emergence of CS and its place under the 1925 Geneva
Protocol during 1969. Ministers concluded that there were in
practice two possible courses of action:
(a) to reaffirm the 1930 interpretation of the 1925 Protocol
without qualification (i.e. that whilst smokes were
excluded, tear gases were prohibited) while making it clear
that the UK would not object if any other state expressed
the view (as the US had) that the Protocol did not prohibit
the use in war of riot control agents; or
(b) to reaffirm the UK’s 1930 statement, but explain that the
use in war of recently developed riot control agents
(RCAs) such as CS, which the UK did not regard as
significantly harmful, were not in the UK view covered
by the Protocol.
The majority of the Committee favoured option (b), but
felt that the full Cabinet ought to discuss the issue before
endorsing any conclusion. Harold Wilson as Prime Minister
therefore submitted a note to his colleagues on 16 December
1969 setting out the arguments for and against the proposed
courses of action. He included memoranda from the FCO
and MOD, which set out contrary views as well as those of
the Attorney General on the legal aspects. The note said
significantly that, “it can be maintained that chemical
agents, whether regarded as lethal or incapacitating
(including harassing materials) are all toxic agents. The
term ‘lethal’ and ‘incapacitating’ agents are not absolute
terms but imply statistical probabilities of response.
Toxicity of these gases varies in different animal species
and in different conditions.Depending on circumstances,
not all individuals will die from an attack with a given
lethal agent, whereas, again depending on circumstances,
some might succumb to an attack with an incapacitating
agent.”
FCO Views
The FCO case emphasised that the UK Government had
taken the lead in 1930 in trying to establish that the Geneva
Protocol’s prohibition applied to the use of tear gas in war. If
the UK were to change its position, then it would lay itself
open to charges that it had done so in order to please the US
and because the UK approved of the use of RCAs in Vietnam.
The note went to state that any such change in policy would
“gravely prejudice our standing … and the position which
Britain now justly enjoys as the country which has taken
the lead in trying to deal with the growing menace of
chemical and biological weapons.” Although the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) recognised that RCAs
could in fact be used in war in order to save life, the manner
in which RCAs had been used in Vietnam – spray tanks, long
range artillery etc showed that the agents were not being
used with this sole intention. Moreover, in the FCO view RCAs
such as CS clearly were caught by the phrase “or other
gases”, which appears in the Geneva Protocol prohibition.
When used for domestic purposes RCAs such as CS were
used as an alternative to lethal force; in war the risk of it
being used to increase the effect of lethal weapons, or its use
resulting in escalation was so great that the wisest course
was to prohibit it altogether.
MOD Views
The MOD insisted that in scientific terms CS was a smoke
and not a gas and could only be brought within the terms of
the Geneva Protocol on the grounds that it was significantly
harmful or deleterious to man – an argument which it rejected.
If it were so, then its use for law enforcement, or to deal with
riots would be difficult to justify. In fact the use of CS had
saved innocent lives and gave the police and army a much
more humane option than batons, bayonets and bullets or
bombs. Science had provided a humane and harmless
alternative to older methods and had helped to keep down the
number of injuries and deaths in Northern Ireland during the
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Troubles, which had started in 1969. If the UK were to stick
with the 1930 interpretation this would focus attention on
differences with the US and in addition, would cause endless
difficulties over definitions of substances and the
circumstances in which they could be used.
The Attorney General’s view
The Attorney thought that tear gases were significantly
harmful and deleterious to man. The development of CS,
which was lower in toxicity than tear gases used in World
War I, did not place CS outside the Protocol. The interpretation
of the Protocol as prohibiting all gases which were significantly
harmful or deleterious to man applied to such gases in 1925
or developed later. CS despite its sophistication was still
significantly harmful or deleterious as witness its use in
Vietnam and in a recent Home Office warning to Chief
Constables. He went on to argue that interpretation of the
Protocol had to take account of the UK Government’s 1930
interpretation i.e. tear gases were covered. To take different
view would have required very convincing evidence to justify
a change and this did not exist. Although the matter was not
beyond some doubt, it was in law very much the better view
that tear gases, CS especially, were covered by the Protocol.
Cabinet Conclusions
This topic came to the full Cabinet at its 61st meeting in 1969
on 18 December. The Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart,
remained convinced of the arguments for sticking with the
traditional interpretation i.e. the option in paragraph 3 (a)
above. Stewart went on to rehearse the argument in the FCO
note. Denis Healey, Defence Secretary, then laid out the views
expressed in the MOD paper. He emphasised that to
announce that the UK regarded itself as prohibited from using
CS in war would strengthen the hands of those who argued
that it should not be used in peacetime. The UK’s 1930
statement had excluded screening smoke and since CS was
less toxic than such smokes it made no sense to include it in
the scope of the Protocol.
In discussion some support was expressed for the view
that the UK should reaffirm the 1930 statement without
qualification. The alternative of a qualified statement would
unite critics of the government’s Northern Ireland policy with
those who criticised its disarmament policy. It would lead to
charges that the UK was again “seeking to whitewash the
US.” However, the majority of Ministers thought that the
conclusion of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee
should be supported i.e. option (b) in paragraph 3 above. In
summing up the Prime Minister said that it would be necessary
for the qualification statement to be carefully drafted to make
it clear that in referring to gases such as CS, the UK had in
mind those of similar or lower toxicity. In addition, he thought
that an accompanying statement, explaining the reasons that
led to the change in the UK’s position should be prepared and
held ready to use in international or domestic discussion. The
Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Defence Secretary
and the Attorney-General, was tasked to prepare statements
on the lines indicated in the Prime Minister’s summing up. It
should be noted that this was a UK decision and no pressure
had been brought to bear from the US.2
The UK change in position - namely that CS was not in
fact covered by the Geneva Protocol - was announced in
Parliament by Michael Stewart in February 1970. He said
that, “…modern technology has developed CS smoke,
which unlike the tear gases available in 1930, is
considered to be not significantly harmful to man in other
than wholly exceptional circumstances; and we regard
CS and other such gases accordingly as being outside
the scope of the Geneva Protocol. CS is in fact less toxic
than screening smokes, which the 1930 statement
specifically excluded.” Interestingly enough this review also
concluded that CN and DM were within the scope of the
Geneva Protocol.3 In terms of how CS might be used by UK
armed forces, Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the FCO, in
an interview with Arthur Gavshon, the London Correspondent
of Associated Press, on 4 February noted that CS would only
be used, “with the object of saving life and taking
prisoners.”4 Later that summer the MOD gave the FCO a
clear statement on the circumstances in which CS might be
used by UK armed forces, “British troops will never use
substances such as CS or for that matter any other weapon
in a manner inconsistent with the generally accepted rules
of war as embodied, for example, in the 1948 Geneva
Convention for the “Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field”,
Accordingly, an enemy rendered hors de combat would
not deliberately be subjected to further acts of violence.
Furthermore, CS provides British troops with the means
of rendering an enemy temporarily hors de combat without
resorting to lethal weapons, thus saving lives.”  Instructions
to British soldiers on the use of CS were drafted in accordance
with these principles.5
Domestic and international reactions
Ronald Hope-Jones, head of the FCO’s Atomic Energy and
Disarmament Department (the lead department at that time)
was so appalled by this volte face that he resigned. In fact
this decision was not at all popular in Parliament, with NGOs,
the public and in Geneva at the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament. Between February and April some thirty
parliamentary questions were tabled. In the four months
following the announcement, the FCO’s Disarmament
Department had received more than 200 letters of protest
from MPs and the public. The Quakers and the UN
Association were vocal too in their protests. In Geneva,
Sweden and India were scathing; they argued that the decision
weakened the Geneva Protocol and they also questioned the
sincerity of the UK’s approach to chemical and biological
disarmament. 6 Alva Myrdal, Swedish Ambassador, said that
the “UK statement is most regrettable. It is particularly so
since it comes from a government which in the past as
well as in the present has shown such positive interest in
getting ahead with further arms regulation measures in
the field of biological and chemical disarmament.”7
At the change in government in June 1970, Edward Heath’s
Conservatives replaced Harold Wilson’s Labour in office. The
new Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home and his
Minister of State, Lord Lothian, were not fully convinced by
the change in UK policy. The FCO Disarmament Department
advised that, although it remained strongly of the view that
the policy was mistaken, there was little point in re-opening
the decision given the strength of MOD opposition to any
such move, which its initial soundings had revealed. Ministers
were not so sure. Home was worried that some “more
harmful gas could be used under cover of tear gas.” He
CBWCB 86                                                                  page 8                                                                 February 2010
decided that the MOD should be asked to reconsider. A
Private Secretary letter was duly despatched on 11 September
1970. Defence Secretary Lord Carrington’s Private Secretary
responded in negative terms on 6 October and made clear
that Carrington thought that the Labour government’s decision
had been the right one. The MOD argued too that the then
government had managed to ride out the storm of protest
over its change in policy. One of the other reasons cited for
maintaining the new policy was that from the point of view of
UK-US relations, it was surely better to stick to announced
policy which was in line with Washington’s.8 Although FCO
and MOD officials agreed a joint letter to the Attorney-
General’s office in December to seek a further formal legal
view, at the end of the day there was no change in the policy
as laid out by Stewart on 2 February. In fact Home and
Carrington agreed that their decision to stick with the Labour
line on CS would not be promulgated until, “the force of
circumstances requires it”.9 There were no further changes
in UK attitudes to the use of CS in war until the Chemical
Weapons Convention was signed in 1993 and entered into
force in 1997.
The CR case
Northern Ireland
The problem here was largely domestic and unrelated to
international treaties and their interpretation: how could the
authorities cope with an attempted mass break-out of
Republican prisoners from HM Prisons in Northern Ireland?
This question was all the more acute as the physical defences
of the prisons concerned – the Maze and Magilligan – were
weak and were in the process of being strengthened. A new
riot control agent, CR, was available and it offered an effective
solution. Safety and political considerations were however
significant countervailing pressures. Just how did the then
Conservative and Labour governments resolve these
dilemmas?
The problem: the Heath government’s approach
By early 1973 CR (dibenzoxazepine) had been under
investigation at the Chemical Defence Establishment (CDE)
since 1961 and both its effectiveness and its safety had been
extensively tested on animals and also human volunteers.10
During these tests (or DBO as it was initially known) was
found to be several times more effective as an irritant than
CS. Tests had suggested that it was safer than CS, although
examination of the carcinogenic and other long term medical
effects were not expected to be completed before early 1974.
CR was available in a liquid form, and had been studied at a
strength of 0.0025% by the Medical Committee of the
Chemical Defence Advisory Board, which operated under
the aegis of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council.11 It
was in this concentration that CR would be used in any agent
delivery system and in the first instance this meant SPAD - a
small aerosol container that fitted into a pouch and was
designed to be used at very close range – 3 to 4 feet.
The Army thought that CR in solution was the more
effective and less physically risky choice of the possible
alternatives such as baton rounds for dealing with rioting
prisoners or attempted break-outs. CR use in smoke rounds
was considered too hazardous in case it drifted off and affected
civilians living and working nearby. The prison guard force
itself would need to wear protection, which would have
operational implications for training and use of CR. HQ
Northern Ireland therefore recommended that SPAD should
be authorised for use as a last resort at the Maze in the two
eventualities of either a riot beginning to run out of control, or
of preventing escapes and arresting escapers.12 This request
was referred to a Cabinet sub-committee (GEN 79) following
agreement between the Defence and Northern Ireland
Secretaries of State that a joint paper explaining the issues to
Ministerial colleagues would be prepared by the
departments.13
William Whitelaw, Northern Ireland Secretary of State,
was particularly concerned by a subsequent MOD proposal
that the Commanding Officer of the military stand-by force
at the Maze should be authorised to use SPAD as a last resort
in the interim period until the question was considered by GEN
79. Although Whitelaw fully recognised the potentially
dangerous situation at the Maze, he was of the opinion that
any authorisation could place in jeopardy a political solution
to the troubles in Northern Ireland. He felt that it would be a
gift for Republican propaganda. The Prime Minister agreed
that any decision on possible use of CR should await
consideration and decision by a GEN 79 meeting.14
A GEN 79 meeting held on 13 September was in-
conclusive. Whitelaw remained concerned about the potential
adverse political implications following any CR use and there
were anxieties too over the agent’s safety. The Himsworth
(Medical Research Council) report Part II of 1971 on the
toxicological aspects of CS and its use for civil purposes had
made two recommendations for the introduction of new
chemical riot control agents. The first of these noted that the
effects of any chemical agents intended for use in internal
security operations should be studied in a manner “more akin
to that in which we regard the effects of a new drug.” The
MOD believed that this requirement was met by the Chemical
Defence Advisory Board’s Medical Committee in its study
of CR liquid. The second recommendation noted that, “if the
competent authorities feel it justifiable to release a
chemical agent for use in civil circumstances, the medical
and scientific research relevant to this decision should
straightaway be published in the appropriate scientific
journals so that informed medical and scientific opinion
may assess the situation itself.” Ministers and officials
believed that this requirement would be addressed when a
suitable report was published in the July 1973 edition of the
journal Medicine, Science and Law. This was delayed
however, which resulted in some GEN 79 members fearing
that the second Himsworth recommendation had not been
fully implemented.
The MOD, however, were quite sure that the Himsworth
recommendations had been adopted. Chemical Defence
Establishment had carried out a very extensive series of tests,
the results of which were assessed by independent medical
advisers who confirmed the MOD’s conclusions that CR was
safe under the conditions of proposed use. Although a rigorous
longterm study to determine if CR could have carcinogenic
effects was not yet quite completed, the evidence to date
from this and from an earlier pilot study indicated that there
was no cause for concern about possible long-term effects.
After examining the matter afresh, Ian Gilmour (Under-
Secretary of State, MOD) saw no reason to depart from the
statements made by him in previous minuting to the Prime
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Minister and by Lord Carrington  at the GEN 79 September
meeting that the requirements laid down by the Himsworth
committee for introducing a new chemical riot control agent
had been fully met, and he did not consider that those statements
in any way misrepresented the position.15
In light of this it appears that Whitelaw was prepared,
pending a further GEN 75 meeting, to reach an understanding
with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (GOC
NI) about the circumstances in which SPAD might be used.16
GEN 79 gave provisional approval for CR, but under strict
conditions: authority for deployment would only be extended
until completion of new security fences; it would be a last
resort for mass break out – of at least 100; and would not be
aimed at non prisoners aiding and abetting any escape.17
Whitelaw also told GOC NI that he should be consulted first
whenever possible. The MOD, although not disagreeing with
the terms of the decision, argued that it would not be easy to
translate these conditions into workable rules of engagement,
especially the point about “at least 100”. It could well be
difficult to count in some circumstances. Whitelaw finally
agreed to revised rules of engagement on 4 October 1973.18
Carrington took the view that as long as the possibility
existed and so long as the results of a successful mass escape
remained as daunting as they undoubtedly were at that time,
it would be quite wrong to deny the guard force the use of
CR in the last resort – in the form of SPAD until better systems
became available.19 Moreover, the MOD subsequently argued
that SPAD should still be available even after completion of
the new security fences. This did not go down too well with
Whitelaw and the Northern Ireland Office. They continued
to see considerable dangers in the proposal. Whitelaw felt he
had to oppose it believing that any disclosure that the use of
CR was authorised at the Maze would be extremely damaging
to the political progress towards some sort of settlement that
was then being made.20
By December 1973 Whitelaw, however, was no longer
Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, having
become Employment Secretary instead. His successor
Francis Pym noted shortly after taking up office that the
present authority on CR use should be continued under the
existing rules; but no public announcement specifically relating
to the Maze or to Northern Ireland should be made. In addition,
further efforts should be made to dispel the scientific doubt
about the effects of CR.21 The Prime Minister commented
that in light of what Pym had said the way was now clear for
the present authority for the use of CR to be continued under
the existing rules, subject to the further points made by the
Secretary of State.22
The Labour government’s approach:1974-1975
The key problem for the new Labour government under
Harold Wilson was what to do about rules of engagement
governing the use of CR in Northern Ireland: just how strict
should these be? Non MOD Labour Ministers displayed the
same degree of sensitivity on this matter as their predecessors.
However, by spring 1974, Ministers were much more confident
on the safety case. Defence Secretary Roy Masonstated in
a written answer to a parliamentary question that an intensive
testing programme into CR over several years was largely
completed and gave no cause for concern. The results were
being made available in reports to appropriate scientific
journals, some of which had already been published with others
awaiting publication or in the course of submission.23 Intensive
research had been conducted at the Chemical Defence
Establishment into the possible biological and environmental
effects of CR, including its toxicology, pharmacology,
carcinogenicity, teratology (effect on unborn children) and its
possible contamination of food and the environment. The
results of these tests were submitted to the independent
scrutiny of the Chemical Defence Advisory Board’s Medical
Committee. No long term or adverse effects were discovered,
and although some of the test programme elements were too
long-term to have been completed as of summer 1974, the
results thus far had given no cause for concern.24
Rules of Engagement (ROE)
The issue, as it had been for the previous government, boiled
down to the scope of the ROEs for the use of SPAD. Other
delivery systems were also coming into the picture, but for
the time being the focus was on SPAD. It was very clear,
notwithstanding the safety advice received, that Ministers were
still keen to control any use of CR at the prisons, the Maze in
particular. We can see these concerns in exchanges between
the Secretary of State for Defence and the Northern Ireland
Secretary in May 1974. Mervyn Rees, the Secretary of State
at the Northern Ireland Office, insisted that the ROEs make
clear at the outset that the use of SPAD was permitted only
on the authority of the GOC or, in his absence, the Commander
Land Forces and if possible after prior consultation with the
Secretary of State. Moreover, it had to be fully understood by
all involved that SPAD was only to be used as a last resort
and for the sole purpose of stopping a mass escape.
Knowledge of the authority for the use of SPAD was to be
limited to those with an absolute need to know.25
SPAD was to be deployed from secure storage only on
the authority of the Commanding Officer of the Guard Unit
at the Maze and could only be discharged on the authority of
the Commissioned Officer responsible for the action in the
area in which they were required. Use could only be authorised
when escaping prisoners reached at least the line of the inner
weld mesh fence and either were attempting to cross that
fence in such numbers that the available security forces would
otherwise be unable to prevent escape if the prisoners
succeeded in breaching or crossing the outer fence; or they
had got beyond the outer fence and there was no other means
of preventing them from making good their escape.26
As noted above, thought was being given to using additional
CR delivery systems for the guard forces. In July 1974 the
Defence Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland minuted the Prime Minister asking for his agreement
for deployment of additional CR delivery devices at both the
Maze and Magilligan prisons: these were water cannons and
an enlarged SPAD or vehicle mounted device. These were
still subject to approval by the Chemical Defence
Establishment’s Medical Committee.27 However, the Prime
Minister took the view that it was important that the Army
should not be authorised to use these devices at the prisons
until the Medical Committee had given its approval to the
enlarged SPAD and trolley or vehicle-mounted device.28 In
December 1974 Harold Wilson was informed that the Medical
Committee had concluded that the devices carried no risk of
serous injury, but as with the hand held SPAD, all devices
were to be subject to stringent rules of engagement agreed
between the two departments.
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The ROEs were too constraining for Lt Gen Sir Frank
King (GOC Northern Ireland). He felt strongly that delegated
authority was needed for a fast moving situation. In such
circumstances it would not always possible to get in touch
with Ministers quickly. Recent disturbances at the Maze had
highlighted this problem. Authority for CR to be deployed for
the first time had in fact been given to the Commanding Officer
of the Maze guard unit on the night of 15/16 October 1974.
However, as Brigadier Garret told the Northern Ireland Office
(NIO) on 1 November CR was not used.29 Nevertheless,
given the current prison threat the GOC was extremely keen
that the limits on CR use by the guard unit commanding officers
on their own initiative in an extreme situation should be
removed as a matter of urgency.30 Defence Secretary Roy
Mason urged Northern Ireland Secretary Mervyn Rees to
agree that they should accept the GOC’s request to modify
existing ROEs to the extent that if in the last resort the prison
commanding officer was unable to obtain the requisite superior
authority for the use of CR in time, he should be permitted to
do so on his own authority.31
The upshot of these exchanges was that Ministers acceded
to the military request. This meant a revision to the ROEs,
whose salient features were as follows:
• Commanding Officer (COs) should not use CR without
obtaining on any occasion prior approval of GOC; or
Commander Land Forces (CLF) or CO 3 or 8 Brigade if
neither previous two available;
• Whichever officers consulted, they should seek personal
approval from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
(anywhere in the UK), only in the unlikely eventuality that
he was not readily available should authority be sought
from the Duty Minister; if neither available then GOC,
CLF or COs 3 or 8 Brigade may do so;
• Only if the relevant CO was unable to contact either, or in
extremis a Minister direct, they may then approve CR
use;
• Only if the situation at the prison is desperate and every
second counts, may a unit commander himself authorise
the use of CR without first seeking higher authority.
This last point was emphasised by Rees as he wanted it to
be made unmistakably clear to the Commanding Officer
concerned that by a desperate situation he meant one in which,
for example, an uncontrollable mob of prisoners was using
violence and was about to escape.32 The Prime Minister
agreed to this arrangement on 2 January 1975.33 However,
this did not mean that soldiers could train how to use CR;
Ministers placed an absolute prohibition on any training since
they feared that this might leak and cause political trouble.34
HQ NI found that this imposed severe constraints.
Conclusions
So what are we to make of UK approaches to CS and CR?
What do these two cases tell us about UK thinking and do
the events of 1969 to 1975 have any resonance for the
contemporary handling and understanding of the riot control,
incapacitating chemicals, law enforcement chemical issue in
the CWC? We must be careful of course not to assume that
mindsets in one period are necessarily going to remain the
same in later periods separated by some thirty to forty years.
Science and technology have changed dramatically too since
1969, but perhaps some of the core concerns are the same
and still relevant today.
Arguments in 1969 over lethal and non-lethal agents, their
use in situations other than war, the humanitarian benefits,
the potential threat posed to existing treaties and attempts to
strengthen the CBW disarmament regime and the possible
impact on UK-US relations all have echoes today. We should
recall however that extensive US CS use in Vietnam gave
the debate a much higher profile in the late 1960s and in 1970.
Contemporary debates over incapacitating agents and the
CWC by way of contrast have a much lower impact than CS
and the Geneva Protocol did in its day. That said, given
scientific understanding and the pace of technological change
today in chemistry, genomics, proteomics, synthetic biology
and incapacitant chemicals the threat posed to the long term
health of the CWC is infinitely greater than the one posed to
the Geneva Protocol by CS.
As for CR, it is very clear that Ministers – both
Conservative and Labour – were acutely sensitive to both
the safety aspects and what both saw as the inevitable adverse
political consequences of any CR use in the prisons. The
insistence on exceptionally tight ROEs shows that it was only
ever to be used as the absolute last resort – political control
too was a key requirement with Ministerial authorisation to
be sought in almost every case and it should only ever be
used for escaping prisoners. General use in Northern Ireland
was never contemplated. Even training to use CR dispersal
devices was prohibited. The connection with CS was also
evident following from the Himsworth Committee’s
recommendation that any new riot control agent should be
subject to the same sorts of safety testing that would apply to
a new drug. Proposals to deploy CR to Northern Ireland
therefore could only be agreed once the various safety studies
had been completed and published and not before. Such testing
did not apply just for the agent itself, but also had to take into
account the different delivery systems that were becoming
available. One cannot help but conclude that despite the very
clear and conclusive safety studies, Ministers perhaps only
subconsciously, may still have harboured lingering doubts over
safety.
One might infer from this that in today’s climate, where
health and safety and liability concerns are very much greater
than they were in the early 1970s, Ministers and officials would
be even more sensitive to safety and ROE issues for any
chemical that might be considered for law enforcement or
riot control purposes. Although the political sensitivities
surrounding the use of a new riot control agent at the height
of the troubles in Northern Ireland were a special case, we
can still conclude that similar concerns as applied in 1973-
1975 would still in all probability obtain today. Indeed they
may well be even greater.
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Report from Geneva                                                                                                                   Review no.31
The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties December 2009
As reported in the Bulletin 85 (September 2009), the Meeting
of Experts of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) was held in Geneva under the
Chairmanship of Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada on
24 to 28 August 2009 to discuss, and promote common
understanding and effective action on:
(v) With a view to enhancing international cooperation,
assistance and exchange in biological sciences and
technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity
building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1)
for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying
requirements and requests for capacity enhancement;
and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and
international organizations, opportunities for
providing assistance related to these fields.
The Meeting of Experts produced a report (BWC/MSP/
2009/MX/3 dated 16 October 2009 – this and other official
BWC documentation is available at http://www.unog.ch/bwc)
to which was attached as Annex I a paper prepared by the
Chairman listing the considerations, lessons, perspectives,
recommendations, conclusions, and proposals drawn from the
presentations, statements, working papers and interventions
on the topic under discussion at the Meeting. The report, as
in the reports from the Meetings of Experts in previous years,
stated that ‘It was the Chairman’s view that the paper could
assist delegations in their preparations for the Meeting
of States Parties in December 2009 and in its
consideration of how best to “discuss, and promote
common understanding and effective action on” the topics
in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review
Conference.’ It should also be noted that, as at the Sixth
Review Conference and at the subsequent Meetings of
Experts and Meetings of States Parties, Richard Guthrie –
on behalf of the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) in
co-operation with the Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre (VERTIC) – provided daily reports on
the Meeting of States Parties that were made available in
hard copy to the delegations as well as electronically. These
reports can be found via http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html.
This provided the States Parties with an excellent starting
point from which to develop language to meet the requirement
of the mandate for the Meeting of State Parties in December
2009 to ‘discuss, and promote common understandings
and effective action’.
Preparation for the Meeting of States Parties,
7 to 11 December 2009
The Final Report (BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3 dated 16 October
2009) of the Meeting of Experts comprised a report of 5 pages
together with Annex I a 33 page listing of the considerations,
lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions, and
proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working
papers and interventions made by delegations on the topic
under discussion at the Meeting and Annex II, a 4 page listing
of the documents of the Meeting of Experts. Annex I with its
33 pages addressing a single topic was virtually three-quar-
ters as long as the comparable Annex I from MX08 with its
41 pages which addressed two topics; this reflected the very
active participation in MX09 in which all the available time
was taken up with presentations and statements from both
States Parties, international organizations and from guests of
the meeting.
The Chairman, Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada,
wrote to the States Parties on 15 October 2009 to say that, as
he had foreshadowed at the close of the meeting, and as had
been done in previous years, he had consolidated these
proposals and ideas, removing duplications and merging similar
concepts, to produce a synthesis paper. This synthesis, which
was attached, was intended as food for thought, to help guide
the States Parties in their preparations for the Meeting of
States Parties. It contained no new material, but simply
reflected the ideas put forward at the Meeting of Experts in
what he hoped was a reasonably coherent, concise and
accessible way. It was not intended to exclude any proposal
from consideration, and States Parties were of course welcome
to make additional proposals at the Meeting of States Parties.
The synthesis paper was a resource for States Parties to
draw upon in their preparations, and he encouraged them to
use it that way.
On the outcome of the meeting, he said that we should
aim for an action-oriented product that closely resembles
past reports and makes use of existing precedents and
practices. The common understandings that we reach
should be of practical assistance to all States Parties and
enable them to take effective action in building capacity
for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and contain-
ment. In particular, the outcome should be of use to those
States Parties that are not able to participate in our
meetings. I am convinced we must keep in mind the inter-
ests and needs of the entire membership of the Convention,
especially the smaller States Parties which are often those
most in need of assistance and encouragement.
To this letter was attached the 5 page synthesis document
subsequently issued, prior to the Meeting of States Parties,
as MSP/2009/L.1 dated 16 October 2009.
Ambassador Grinius subsequently spoke to the group
coordinators during the second half of November 2009 saying
that Throughout the year, I have repeatedly stressed the
importance of actually building capacity to deal with
disease. … I am keen to ensure that we do not focus solely
on a final document but continue to work towards an
action-based outcome as well. He also reminded the States
Parties of Paragraph 54 of Final Document of 6th Review
Conference, which encouraged States Parties to provide
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appropriate information on how Article X is being imple-
mented to the ISU, and requested the ISU to collate the
information for States Parties. The MSP would provide a
useful vehicle to make such reports.
In regard to universalization, Ambassador Grinius had
presented an interim report as part of his closing remarks to
the Meeting of Experts in August 2009.  As in previous years
an advance version of the report of the Implementation
Support Unit was made available prior to the Meeting of
States Parties.
In New York in the First Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly, Hungary, on 14 October 2009, introduced
a draft resolution (A/C.1/64/L.15) on the BWC which noted
with satisfaction the number of States that have become Party
to the Convention and in its operative paragraphs reaffirmed
the call upon all States not yet party to become so at an early
date, welcomed the information and data provided to date
and reiterated its call upon all States Parties to participate in
the exchange of information and data agreed at the Third
Review Conference. The draft resolution continued in its third
operative paragraph to say:
3. Also welcomes the successful holding of meetings
as part of the 2007-2010 intersessional process, and
in this context also welcomes the discussion aimed at
the promotion of common understanding and effective
action on topics agreed at the Sixth Review Conference,
and urges States parties to continue to participate
actively in the remaining intersessional process;
As in 2007, and 2008 and unlike previous comparable
resolutions, this one did not specifically address the topics to
be considered at the Meeting of States Parties in 2008 or
subsequently.
As expected, the First Committee adopted this draft reso-
lution without a vote on 28 October 2009. It was subsequently
approved by the General Assembly without a vote on 2 De-
cember 2009 as A/RES/64/70.
Other Preparations
On the weekend of 5-6 December 2009 before the Meeting
of States Parties, there was a workshop in Geneva of the
Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Conventions entitled Preparing for
the Seventh Review Conference. About 40 participants from
16 countries had a very useful and intense exchange of views
which focussed on preparations for the Seventh Review
Conference including preparing for a successful outcome,
improving the monitoring of the implementation of the
Convention, improving the CBM regime, the convergence of
chemistry and biology, as well as concrete measures from
the intersessional programme.
Meeting of States Parties, 7 to 11 December 2009:
Opening Plenary Session
The Meeting of States Parties began on Monday 7 December
2008 in a plenary session when the Chairman, Ambassador
Marius Grinius of Canada, welcomed the representatives from
the States Parties. He then moved on to the business of the
meeting which, as displayed on the screen in the meeting
room, had the overall aim of “From Communication to
Cooperation”. In regard to the adoption of the Agenda
(BWC/MSP/2009/1), he noted that this had been circulated
in all languages. This was adopted. The programme of work
(BWC/MSP/2009/3), which had been developed from that
attached to the Chairman’s letter of 15 October 2009, had
likewise been circulated. The Chairman said that the majority
of the time is devoted to agenda item 6, the topic for 2009.
Time had been set aside for the NGOs on Monday afternoon
and one aspect of agenda Item 9, the arrangements for the
meetings in 2010, would be dealt with on Monday morning.
He also added that most of the general debate would be held
on the Monday, although this would be re-opened briefly on
Wednesday at around midday to allow a senior representative
of one State Party to make a statement. With these under-
standings the programme was adopted. The Chairman then
noted that three papers had been issued. First, his synthesis
document of 15 October 2009 had been issued in all languages
(BWC/MSP/2009/L.1), and an advance copy of the report
(BWC/MSP/2009/2) on the Implementation Support Unit
(ISU) had been circulated as had an advance copy of his
report on universalization activities (BWC/MSP/2009/4). In
addition, as had been done in 2008, an additional background
document had been issued by the ISU on recent developments
in science and technology (BWC/MSP/2009/INF.1). He also
noted that as usual all Working Papers would be issued in
their language of submission only. Moving on to agenda item
4, adoption of rules of procedure, he proposed that as
previously these meetings should continue to operate under
the Rules of Procedure of the Sixth Review Conference
applied mutatis mutandis. However, he pointed out that formal
accreditation would not be required for the annual meetings;
registration would be sufficient. These Rules of Procedure
were agreed.
In regard to participation, he said that two States neither
party or signatory – Israel and Angola – had requested
observer status and this was so decided. Several international
organizations – the European Union, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) – had also requested observer
status and this was so decided. In regard to NGOs, the
Chairman said that a number had requested the opportunity
to address the meeting, and he proposed to suspend the
meeting on Monday afternoon at 4.30 pm to allow them to do
so. This was so decided. He also noted that there would be a
number of lunch-time events.
100 States Parties to the Convention participated in the
Meeting of States Parties as follows: Algeria, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic
of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia,
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Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic
of), Viet Nam, and Yemen. This was four more than at the
Meeting of Experts as 15 States Parties – Benin, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius,
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Niger, Panama, Rwanda,
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Viet Nam
– who had not participated at MX09 in August participated at
MSP09 in December whilst 11 States Parties – Albania,
Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Colombia, Equatorial
Guinea, Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Swaziland, Tajikstan, and Zambia – who had participated at
MX09 in August did not do so at MSP09 in December.
Six Signatory States participated – Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt,
Haiti, Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic
of Tanzania – two more than at MX09, as Côte d’Ivoire and
Egypt participated at MSP09 but did not at MX09. Two States
neither Party nor Signatory, Angola and Israel, were granted
Observer status; one less than at MX09 when Cameroon
participated. Four international organizations were granted
observer status: the European Union, the ICRC, the OPCW,
and the WHO. This was three less than in August when the
European Commission, the European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC), the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations (FAO), the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the World Or-
ganisation for Animal Health (OIE) participated and the Eu-
ropean Union and the OPCW did not. 14 Non-Governmental
Organizations and research institutes were present – three
less than at MX09. The Convention now has 163 States Par-
ties and 13 Signatory States, unchanged since the accession
of the Cook Islands on Friday 5 December 2008.
There were about 470 participants at the Meeting of States
Parties, of whom 418 came from States Parties, including
some 167 participants from capitals. This compared well with
the participation at the Meeting of Experts in August 2009
when there were just over 500 participants, of whom almost
420 came from States Parties, including over 205 from capitals.
Before making his introductory remarks, the Chairman
moved on to consideration of Agenda item 9, the arrangements
for the Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties in
2010, and in particular the nomination of the Chairman for
the 2010 meetings. As he understood that an Ambassador
with a particular interest in this matter was about to leave
Geneva, the item would be dealt with now. He went on to
recall that the Sixth Review Conference had decided that the
2010 meetings would be chaired by a representative of the
Non-Aligned Movement and Other States. He therefore
invited the coordinator of the group, Cuba, to nominate the
NAM candidate for Chairman of the meetings in 2010.
Cuba then took the floor and nominated Ambassador Carlos
Portales of Chile as Chairman of the Meeting of Experts and
Meeting of States Parties in 2010. This was put to the meeting
and agreed. Ambassador Portales then spoke thanking the
Meeting for appointing him. He said that he looked forward
to contributing substantively to the Seventh Review
Conference in 2011.
The Chairman then made his introductory remarks, noting
that The Meeting of Experts showed that States Parties
continue to approach our various challenges in a
collaborative, collegial spirit, and the wealth of material
presented at that meeting shows the impressive resources
we can muster when we work in concert. He went on to
say that We now have to convert the many ideas and
proposals discussed at the Meeting of Experts into a more
concise, focused product. We will be working on the same
basis as in previous years, on the same understandings
about the scope of our mandate. Our task is to “promote
common understanding and effective action”, not to
negotiate binding agreements. All views and perspectives
are welcome. We are not trying to exclude any points of
view. States Parties will have different priorities, but all
these can be reflected in a fair and transparent manner.
He went on to say that As Chairman, I am eager to
ensure that the outcome of our work this year makes a
lasting contribution to the efforts of States Parties – and
other relevant actors – to take practical steps to strengthen
the Convention by building capacity in the areas of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment. As I have
said, we are not attempting to negotiate binding agreements.
But I believe that we would make a significant and practical
contribution to fulfilling the objectives of the Convention if
we could develop a report which, for example:
• clearly acknowledges the role that improved inter-
national cooperation, assistance and exchange in
biological science and technology can play in strength-
ening the comprehensive implementation of the
Convention and reducing the risks posed to global
security by biological weapons;
• identifies challenges and needs in the area of capac-
ity-building, as well as practical means of meeting
these;
• lists ways and means of improving the coordination of
cooperation and assistance activities, of better integrat-
ing approaches to human, animal and plant diseases,
and of increasing the long-term sustainability of
capacity-building;
• encourages the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders, including governments, international
organizations, the scientific and medical communities,
commercial industry and academia; and
• lists practical measures that States Parties can consider
and draw upon when developing their own approaches
to our topic.
These are just examples: there are of course many other
themes and ideas that might usefully be included in our
report. But I do urge you take advantage of the
constructive atmosphere we have developed, to produce
a report that will be a useful and practical resource for
all those who share our goals of building capacity in
disease surveillance, enhancing international
cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological
sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, and
ultimately strengthening the Convention as an effective
barrier against the development or use of biological
weapons.
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He concluded by saying that he was looking forward to
a productive and focused meeting, and to working with
you all to deliver a useful, practical and concrete outcome.
He encouraged all delegations to contribute freely to the
debate, and he hoped that there would be a continuation of
the very constructive and creative spirit States Parties had
displayed at the Meeting of Experts.
General Debate, Monday 7 December 2009
The Chairman then moved on to open the General Debate.
Cuba spoke on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned
Movement and other States by saying that Our Group
recognizes the particular importance of strengthening the
Convention through multilateral negotiations for a legally
binding Protocol and universal adherence to the
Convention and reiterates its call to promote international
cooperation for peaceful purposes, including scientific
and technical exchange. He went to add that The Group
of NAM Countries and other States Parties to the
Biological Weapons Convention would like to emphasize
that the Convention forms a whole. It is critical to deal
with all of the issues interrelated to this Convention in a
balanced and comprehensive manner.
He continued by saying that The strengthening of the
Biological Weapon Convention cannot exclude inter alia
the verification mechanism for the complete elimination
of biological and toxin weapons through adopting a
legally binding protocol to comprehensively strengthen
the BWC. Furthermore The BTWC can not disregard the
differences between its States Parties regarding the level
of development and their national capabilities and
resources. Although one of the main purposes of the
implementation of Article X of the Convention is precisely
to narrow these gaps, the BWC lacks an adequate
mechanism for effective implementation of Article X.
The statement then went on to address Article X in more
detail by noting that our Group presented Working Papers
on the establishment of a mechanism for an effective
implementation of Article X which could be, among others,
a good basis for discussions on this matter. Allow me to
reiterate their main elements:
-- In our view any mechanism aimed at the effective
implementation of Article X of the Convention should
be open to participation of all States Parties to the
Convention; and all the obstacles hampering its full
implementation should be identified and overcome;
-- As a matter of priority, it will be necessary to mobilize
resources, including financial resources, to facilitate
the widest possible exchange of equipment, material
and scientific and technological information regarding
the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin agents
for peaceful purposes, in particular from developed
to developing States Parties;
-- The development of human resources in developing
States Parties in the implementation of the Convention,
taking into account the special situation faced by them
should be facilitated;
-- Coordination of cooperation activities with other
relevant international and regional organizations for
the financial and technological support of activities
for the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
agents for peaceful purposes will be needed; and
-- A sponsorship programme to support participation of
developing States Parties in the meetings and other
activities of the Convention should be established. This
programme could also be utilized, depending upon the
availability of resources, to enhance participation of
non States Parties in order to promote the goal of
universality of the Convention.
The Statement concluded by saying that The States Parties
of NAM have proposed this working paper as a
contribution for further consideration of this vital issue
in the Meeting of the States Parties and in the forthcoming
Review Conference. Our group is ready to consider this
and other proposals submitted by States Parties to the
Convention individually or as a group with the view to
advancing in the preparation of the Seventh Review
Conference, taking into account the experiences and facts
accumulated or agreements reached since the Convention
entered into force.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Cuba submitted a CBM in 2009]
Sweden spoke on behalf of the European Union and noted
that the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the
stabilisation and association process and potential candidates
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia,
as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, and
Georgia aligned themselves with the statement. He started
by saying that Non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is at the forefront of EU foreign policy.Under
the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction adopted by the EU Heads of State and
Government in 2003 and the new lines for action adopted
by the Council of Ministers in December 2008, the
European Union is committed to counter proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
on the basis of three principles: Effective multilateralism,
prevention and cooperation. He went on to point out that
The BTWC is the major multilateral treaty related to
biological and toxin weapons, hence the cornerstone of
multilateral efforts to tackle the risks posed by such
weapons. To tackle such risks, effective implementation
of the convention by its States Parties is required.
Effective implementation means adopting adequate control
measures, but also facilitating international cooperation
on peaceful uses of biological science and technology.
The statement went on to say that Looking forward to
the 2011 BTWC Review Conference and beyond, the
European Union recalls its commitment to the development
of measures to verify compliance with the Convention. It
continued by noting that The EU believes that it is important
that the work on BTWC issues continues between the
regular meetings of States Parties. Therefore, the EU
organized a workshop giving an opportunity for dialogue
with NAM countries in Brussels in November 2009. By
further discussing some of the main themes from the BWC
Meeting of Experts in August 2009, wehoped to help
develop common understandings and facilitate effective
action at the Meeting of States Parties. After describing
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other activities being taken by the EU to promote the
Convention including universalization and improving the CBM
submissions, the statement concluded by saying:
Finally, the EU believes that preparations for the 2011
Review Conference should be initiated as soon as
possible, including exploring options for strengthening
the Convention and improving compliance, taking into
account the risks from non-state actors. We should also
reflect upon how to improve CBMs. In the run-up to the
Seventh Review Conference, we look forward to
consulting closely with other States Parties on these issues
that will be decisive in shaping the way ahead of the
Convention over the next decade.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Sweden submitted a CBM in 2009]
Australia on behalf of the JACKSNNZ group (Japan,
Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway
and New Zealand) said that This year’s theme in the BTWC
Intercessional process has allowed member states to have
productive interaction regarding cooperation in the fields
of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment. The statement went on to add that Another
key element that has emerged from this year’s theme is
the close relationship between the BTWC and the public
health communities. There is much to be gained from a
coordinated approach to tackling the related threats of
both deliberate as well as naturally-occurring human,
plant and animal disease. The logical relationship between
the BTWC and public health allowed for the enhanced
involvement this year of international organizations such
as the WHO, the FAO and the OIE. Their involvement in
this year’s Meetings has proven valuable. Their
participation in next year’s meetings will also be welcome,
when the theme will be: “the provision of assistance and
coordination with relevant organizations upon request by
any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or
toxin weapons”.
The statement continued by saying that We have reviewed
the proposal from the Group of NAM and Other States
for establishment of a mechanism for the full
implementation of Article X. The JACKSNNZ support the
ultimate goals of improving coordination of assistance
and cooperation activities, developing capacity and
human resources in a sustainable manner, and sponsoring
the participation of developing countries to BTWC
meetings. Our experience has been that sustained efforts
by the States Parties, with appropriate support from the
Implementation Support Unit, are delivering real
achievements towards improved coordination of
assistance and cooperation activities. We note also that
recipient states’ focus on self-reliance and attention to
the sustainability of capacity building has proved
rewarding. We are committed to looking for continued
opportunities to work closely with countries to further
improve delivery of sustainable capacity building
outcomes. The JACKSNNZ also submitted a working
paper on this and we would be pleased to discuss this
further in the course of this meeting and in the lead-up to
the Seventh Review Conference in 2011.
After reviewing a range of capacity building activities
undertaken by JACKSNNZ members over the past 12 months
compatible with their article X commitments, the statement
concluded by noting The JACKSNNZ share with other
delegations an interest in the opportunity provided by the
Seventh Review Conference in 2011 to review and discuss
possible means for strengthening the BTWC. Toward this
end, the JACKSNNZ contribute for discussion at this
Meeting of States Parties and in the lead-up to the Review
Conference, the Canadian-sponsored discussion paper
“How to approach compliance issues in the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention: policy issues for the
Seventh BTWC Review Conference in 2011” .
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Australia submitted a CBM in 2009]
Switzerland then spoke, noting that the Meeting of Experts
highlighted that a maximum of cooperation and assistance
is necessary in order to address the transnational
challenges of modern biology. Switzerland fully
subscribes to strengthening international cooperation and
assistance for peaceful cooperation. He went on to thank
the Chairman for the synthesis paper and to say that My
delegation was reassured that cooperation can be
enhanced within the existing framework provided by
Article X. We are open and interested to elaborate
innovative ways to enhance full implementation of this
core pillar of the Convention. At the same time my
delegation is not convinced of the benefit and the
feasibility of launching negotiations on a legally binding
mechanism to implement Article X. We must keep in mind
that the BWC is primarily a disarmament and non-
proliferation instrument.
He then went on to look beyond the specific topic for this
year and made some more general comments. He said Next
year, we will conclude the second such process
[intersessional process (ISP)] and will officially start
preparations for the 2011 Review Conference. Emerging
from an at times difficult past, the Convention has
benefited tremendously from this process. … However, my
delegation is not convinced that a mere continuation of
more meetings in the existing format is the only and
necessarily the most effective way to implement the BWC
and to enhance its effectiveness. We should certainly build
on the successful ISP structure and continue to achieve
practical results in this constructive atmosphere. At the
same time we should create new formats and other
mechanisms to ensure this Convention is able to keep pace
with a changing security, political and technological
context. The fact that the Meetings of States Parties have
no mandate to take decisions limits their scope of action.
In the lead up to 2011, Switzerland would welcome a
discussion on the adoption of a more comprehensive
mandate for annual meetings.
He then said Let me briefly touch upon compliance and
verification, since the BWC covers an entire category of
Weapons of Mass Destruction but does not have such a
mechanism. Switzerland is of the view that this Convention
is in need of stronger mechanisms for resolving concerns
about implementation of, and compliance with, the BWC.
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In fact, Switzerland would welcome a legally binding
compliance framework. We are convinced that an informal
and forward-looking discussion is required on the kind
of compliance mechanism that is needed to address existing
and future challenges. In this regard, we would like to
refer to the food-for-thought Working Paper submitted
by Canada, on behalf of the JACKSNNZ. [BWC/MSP/
2009/WP.4]  The statement then concluded by considering
CBMs and saying We hope that in 2011 CBMs can be made
more universal and more effective and that such progress
can contribute to the overall strengthening of the BWC.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Switzerland submitted a CBM in 2009]
The Russian Federation then spoke, saying Intersessional
meetings of the States Parties to the BWC are an important
element in developing multilateral mechanism to
effectively strengthen the Convention. At this stage, we
should focus on comprehensively fulfilling the programme
of intersessional meetings and thus implementing the
decisions adopted by the Sixth Review Conference of the
BWC. A successful completion of this programme will
allow us, as a future activity, to look closely at issues still
demanding urgent attention both at national and
international levels. The statement went on to address the
topic being considered in 2009 and then noted that A wide
spectrum, of biological risks includes emerging infectious
diseases, industrial accidents and hostile use of danger-
ous biological agents and toxins. We think that the greatest
risk to the object and purpose of the Convention is
presented by the threats directly related to illicit develop-
ment, proliferation and use of biological agents and toxins
in contravention of the provisions of the BWC. The
ongoing globalisation increases possibilities for illicit
trafficking of dangerous microorganisms, toxins and dual-
use biotechnologies thus posing a challenge to inter-
national security as regards armed conflicts and terrorism
activity. In view of this, reaching universality of the BWC
remains a priority.
The statement concluded by saying We are confident that
international cooperation, confidence-building measures
and transparency may go a long way to reaching progress
in combating proliferation and implementing the Conven-
tion as a whole. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our
commitment to complying with all provisions of the
Convention and decisions of all its Review Conferences
without exception.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
the Russian Federation submitted a CBM in 2009]
China then spoke, saying that The international security
situation is undergoing complex and profound changes.
World multipolarization is intensifying and science and
technology are progressing rapidly. The far-reaching
implications of international financial crisis have emerged
before our eyes. Traditional and non-traditional security
threats are intertwined. Terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of massive destruction and prevalence of
infectious diseases constitute grave challenges to global
security. He went on to say that To strengthen disease
surveillance and control capabilities under the
Convention is of great importance to the protection against
bio-terrorism, the enhancement of global bio-security and
the improvement of the capacity for implementing the
Convention. The statement then set out China’s perspectives
on strengthening disease surveillance and international
cooperation.
The statement then concluded by noting that All provisions
including Article X of the Convention are equally
important and should be fully implemented. To strengthen
international cooperation helps improve the
implementation capability of States Parties, promote the
effectiveness of the Convention and finally enhance the
universalization of the Convention. International
cooperation and non-proliferation are not contradictory.
States Parties should not hamper the international
cooperation for peaceful purposes in the name of non-
proliferation. In this regard, China fully supports the
working paper submitted by the NAM and other States
Parties, entitled ‘The Establishment of a Mechanism for
the Full Implementation of Article X of the Convention’.
All restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of
the Convention should be removed. We are ready to engage
in participative discussions with rest of the States Parties
on the establishment of a mechanism for the full
implementation of Article X of the Convention, with the
aim of mobilizing resources, coordinating cooperation
among countries, overcoming the problems and
intensifying international cooperation.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
China submitted a CBM in 2009]
Japan then spoke, saying that Today’s growing bio-threat
is caused by a variety of factors, ranging from natural
disease outbreaks due to accidents or negligence to the
intentional abuse of biological agents. The statement went
on to add that The BTWC stipulates the importance of
international cooperation among the States Parties in the
field of bacteriology for the prevention of disease. My
delegation would like to stress the importance of the
capacity building through international cooperation
under Article X, which helps the States Parties in achieving
the objectives of the BTWC, that are disarmament and
non-proliferation. He continued by providing examples of
cooperation in which Japan had been engaged. He then said
that Based on these experiences, I would like to make a
few suggestions of prioritizing programs for effective
assistance. First, assistance should be tailored to meet
the differing circumstances of each recipient state, such
as their capacity for self-reliance and sustainability.
Second, such assistance needs to be carried out in a
manner that contributes to the non-proliferation of
biological weapons. Third, international cooperation in
the BTWC context should complement the activities of other
relevant international organizations. And lastly, we should
promote the bio-safety and bio-security through
assistance in education and training. On these points,
Japan prepared a working paper, which is supported by
JACKSNNZ. [WP.3]. The statement concluded by saying that
CBWCB 86                                                                  page 18                                                                 February 2010
The Seventh Review Conference is only two years ahead
of us, and we should bear in mind that the Meeting of
States Parties this year is an important step to create a
positive atmosphere towards the Review Conference.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Japan submitted a CBM in 2009]
Saudi Arabia then spoke, recalling that they had recently
organized an international conference which had produced
positive results on the important issues relating to the
Convention and the role that the international community could
play in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It also noted that Saudi Arabia had been among
the first states to sign and ratify the Biological Weapons
Convention of 1972.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Saudi Arabia had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
The USA then spoke, noting that the preparations by my
own government for this year’s discussions, as well as
the Expert’s [sic] Meeting, have revealed the importance
of engagement by a broad variety of stakeholders from
disparate communities. These communities include the
WHO, OIE, and FAO, and various regional associations,
professional societies, and commercial industry, to name
a few. The United States welcomed their participation in
the Experts Meeting, side-by-side with our national
experts. These discussions also reinforced for my
government that there is indeed an important role for our
BWC forum in bringing the security and health
communities together, including representatives from civil
society. He went on to say that The United States welcomed
the emphasis during the expert’s discussions of
cooperative approaches to disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment. These discussions
highlighted the value of assistance in building capacity,
and the fact that in very concrete and practical terms,
assistance provided to States is directly relevant to Article
X of the BWC. Capacity building is, of course, what we
call “a two way street.” It is a cooperative effort and
each State has a role to play. This could be to identify
needs and requirements and seek to partner with others,
or from those in a position to do so, to indicate their
willingness to cooperate, assist, and partner.
The statement concluded by saying We are also mindful
of the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC in 2011.
Like others, we are starting to think about this Conference
and possible deliverables, and such thinking has been
factored into our overall policy review. While it is
premature for me to say more at this juncture, I can
nonetheless assure you that we will be seeking ways and
means to use the BWC better to counter bio-threats, and
look forward to working with other States Parties to that
end. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reaffirm
the importance the Obama Administration attaches to the
BWC, and to this forum, as a primary venue for
international coordination of real-world efforts to counter
bio-threats. We understand that to build global capacity
to combat infectious disease, regardless of cause, prevent
bioterrorism and strengthen the BWC, we must all engage
actively on a variety of levels, including with the inter-
national health and disarmament communities. The United
States plans to continue its own significant contributions
to furthering these shared objectives. To this end, a senior
Administration official will address this forum mid-week
to explain the overall United States’ approach to counter-
ing the biological threat, one of President Obama’s top
national security priorities.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
the USA submitted a CBM in 2009]
Germany then spoke, saying that While we are equally
devoted to all multilateral disarmament and non-
proliferation instruments, my delegation believes that due
to the dramatic developments in all the fields of life-
sciences, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
may have to deal in future with greater scientific and
technological challenges than other WMD non-
proliferation treaties. Making best use of the developments
of biosciences and biotechnology by way of cooperation
for the benefit of the health and well-being of the people
can in our view help to raise awareness in all States Parties
for the need of preventing the misuse of life-sciences for
weapon purposes. He then went on to note that in regard to
this year’s topic, A database operated by the ISU describing
ongoing and planned assistance projects as well as points
of contact and application procedures of available
assistance and research programmes could contribute to
avoiding duplication of efforts. This is a topic that in
Germany’s view could be carried over as lesson learned
from the BWC 2009 meetings to the 7th Review Conference
in 2011, when the discussion of a new mandate for the
ISU will be on the agenda. The statement concluded by
saying that Transfer of knowledge, equipment, other
materials and cooperation between States Parties require
full transparency as to their destination and usage.
Confidence Building Measures are the Convention’s
means for creating such transparency, which in turn will
make trusting cooperation possible. Regrettably, however,
both the number and quality of annually submitted CBMs
do not in fact provide the degree of transparency that
would indeed facilitate good cooperation. Norway,
Switzerland and Germany, together with the Geneva
Forum, have started an informal process to review the
CBMs with the aim of increasing the participation in the
annual exchange by updating the existing CBM forms
and procedures. Representatives from all three regional
groups and NGOs are involved in this process. We hope
that in the margins of the meeting of experts 2010
proposals coming out of this process can be presented.
We are confident that a wider audience can be better
prepared for taking a decision on the future scope of
CBMs at the Review Conference 2011.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Germany submitted a CBM in 2009]
Nigeria then spoke, saying that Nigeria… remains consistent
and untiring in her efforts to ensure the full realization
of the objectives of the BWC. He then went on to say in
regard to the topic for 2009 that In its effort to develop
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human resources in the area of our assigned topics,
Nigeria would be organizing a regional workshop for
the west and central African region in the early part of
2010. The Workshop will help to train the needed
personnel as well as provide opportunities for contacts
and sharing of experiences between professional
institutions that would be in attendance. The workshop
will also include all those associated with disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment,
including technical managers and policy makers.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Nigeria submitted a CBM in 2009]
India then spoke, saying that India believes that norms
against biological weapons enshrined in the Convention
must be upheld, particularly in view of the threat of bio-
terrorism. India fully supports initiatives to strengthen the
Convention, ensure its full implementation by all States
Parties and to make it universal. We believe that only a
multilaterally agreed mechanism for verification of
compliance can provide the assurance of observance of
compliance obligations by States Parties and act as
deterrence against non-compliance. We believe that the
decision regarding strengthening of the BWC and its
effective implementation should be taken by the Review
Conference on the basis of consensus. States Parties
should also give consideration to preparations for the
next Review Conference. The statement then went on to
say that India believes that the promotional aspects of
Article X are a crucial element in strengthening the BWC
and in achieving universal adherence. While there are
several examples of international cooperation in disease
surveillance and control, it is also a fact that denial of
materials, equipment and technology related to peaceful
uses of bio-technology continue to exist and hamper
legitimate uses of biological materials and should be
addressed in the framework of the Convention, The BWC
State Parties should facilitate the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technical
information for the uses ofbacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. This would
benefit the developing countries to meet their development
needs, including improving public health and build a
robust biotechnology industry. It would also promote
universality of the Convention and would be instrumental
in establishing linkages amongst States Parties leading
to a higher level of confidence in the Convention. The
strengthened implementation of the provisions of Article
III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under
Article X is not abused.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
India had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Republic of Korea then spoke, saying that The Republic
of Korea shares the global concern that the international
spread of infectious diseases is resulting in an increasing
number of problems and challenges throughout the world
since they have no geographical boundaries. In order to
address these problems and challenges, the international
community should consider various ways to facilitate
international and regional cooperation by promoting
capacity-building in the field of infectious diseases. The
statement concluded by expressing the wish …  that we will
be able to carry forward the momentum created at the 6th
Review Conference and accelerated by the subsequent
success of the intersessional work programs toward
further progress at the 7th Review Conference in 2011.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
the Republic of Korea submitted a CBM in 2009]
Norway then spoke, saying that the regional workshop or-
ganized by Norway and Indonesia in Djakarta in June 2008
to address last year’s topics had been followed up in June
2009 by a workshop in Oslo. The statement continued by
saying that The BTWC is part of a broad political partner-
ship for promoting global health. As was also clearly stated
at the last review conference, the BTWC should note the
role of other agencies, such as the WHO, FAO and the
OIE. These are the bodies that survey and combat dis-
ease on a daily basis, to the benefit of the health and
security of us all. The point is that the BTWC must not
seek to duplicate efforts of other institutions, but rather
contribute to developing new synergies and building
stronger partnerships. This leads me to the next issue that
I would like to highlight, which is the need to sustain and
further strengthen the global norm to ensure that the ban
on biological and toxin weapons is effective. Important
in this respect is the full universalisation of the BTWC. In
order to ensure full universality, we must continue to en-
courage and assist States in the process of signing, rati-
fying and implementing the Convention. He then went on
to say The lead-up to the 2011 Review Conference pro-
vides us an opportunity to deliberate on ways to further
strengthen the BTWC, such as measures to verify compli-
ance to the Convention. As part of the exercise leading
up to the Review Conference we should consider how to
make better use of the confidence building measures
(CBM).
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Norway submitted a CBM in 2009]
Chile then spoke, saying that an effective verification regime
is needed to strengthen the Convention regime. The statement
went on to say that Chile was focusing on practical, realistic
and appropriate mechanisms and that a Bill had been prepared
to comprehensively implement the chemical and biological
and radiological treaties and regulations. Chile had a legal
instrument with control measures for chemical and biological
materials of which copies could be provided. National
regulatory frameworks for the peaceful use of biotechnology
were the only way to ensure implementation of the Convention
and such frameworks should be a priority task for the States
Parties. Developments in regulation and cooperation were
needed to meet the challenges, together with a system of
verification to strengthen cooperation.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Chile submitted a CBM in 2009]
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The Chairman then closed the meeting at the end of the
morning session by drawing attention to a lunch time event,
entitled International Cooperation, Biosecurity and the
Education of Life Scientists, organized by the US National
Academy of Sciences, the University of Bradford, the National
Defense Medical  College, Japan, and the Landau Network-
Centro Volta, Italy. He said that the general debate would
resume in the afternoon with a statement by Argentina.
General Debate: Afternoon Session,
Monday 7 December 2009.
Argentina said that they stressed the efforts being made
within the framework of the Convention in order to deal
with the terms of reference for international cooperation
which represent a variety of developments in terms of
scientific and technological process and your tasks must
be backed from several viewpoints. The statement went
on to add that The subject of this meeting is directly related
to the important obligations contained in Article X of the
Convention. We consider that that Article requires constant
strengthening but at the same time we need to avoid
dispersing or weakening the commitments entered into
by the international community in its search for scientific
development with peaceful purposes. Argentina attaches
great importance to cooperation intended to strengthen
national scientific institutions, to training national
capacity, as also to scientific and material exchange.
Without prejudice to this, this cooperation and exchange
should not generate obstacles to technological develop-
ment in the States Parties but nor can we accept actions
which affect the standards covering non-proliferation for
weapons of mass destruction and, more particularly, that
undermine the objectives of the Convention. The statement
then concluded by outlining some national initiatives
undertaken by Argentina.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Argentina submitted a CBM in 2009]
Mexico then spoke, saying that Mexico wishes to reiterate
its commitment to full compliance with the Convention,
the first multilateral instrument which prohibits a specific
type of weapon. Mexico is committed to complying with
Article X, which requests that States carry out an exchange
concerning equipment, material and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful use of
biological agents, as also for the development and
application of scientific discoveries to prevent diseases.
The statement went on to outline the activities that Mexico
had been engaged in nationally and with the WHO in regard
to the outbreak of the virus A(H1N1).
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Mexico had submitted a CBM in 2009]
Australia then spoke, saying All of us here recognise that
in the current, challenging international environment the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention plays a crucial
role. Building the capacity of the BTWC to detect, monitor
and respond to biosecurity threats is the shared objective
of all of us here. Australia recognises that effective
national implementation of the Convention and a robust
regulatory regime is fundamental to national and
international security. To this end Australia has strength-
ened its national regulation and continues to work closely
with regional partners in the area of biosafety and
biosecurity. The statement continued by noting that Effective
national implementation is reinforced through improved
transparency between States Parties. Australia remains
committed to providing early and full reporting on
domestic biosafety and biosecurity implementation. We
believe such voluntary declarations will assist all States
Parties, and states seeking to become States Parties.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Australia submitted a CBM in 2009]
Pakistan then spoke, saying that Pakistan fully associates
itself with … the NAM working paper regarding the
effective implementation of Article X of the BWC. Pakistan
is committed to the BWC regime and has always supported
its implementation in letter and spirit. We were actively
involved in negotiations of a Protocol on verification. In
2006, Pakistan, with the help and support of all States
Parties as well as international community, achieved a
successful outcome of the Sixth BWC Review Conference,
which has outlined the intersessional work programme
till the next Review Conference in 2011. We must build on
the outcome for the next Review Conference in 2011. The
7th Review Conference must also pick up the unfinished
work on the Protocol for effective implementation of the
Convention. The statement continued by noting that
However, we strongly believe in the need for greater bio-
security and bio-safety. But this is only one part of the
BWC bargain. The other pillar is international cooperat-
ion and assistance for peaceful purposes as envisaged
in Article X of the Convention. This year’s topic … is
related to the implementation of this Article. The statement
concluded by saying that Your synthesis paper summarizing
the discussions of the August meeting rightly recognizes
the importance of international cooperation and
assistance as a fundamental objective of the Convention.
The paper has also focused upon the needs and problems
in this regard. What we need now is to work on ways and
means to promote and enhance cooperation and
assistance. We also need to develop a mechanism to work
on these ways and means in a sustained and consistent
manner. The Non-Aligned Movement has submitted a
working paper suggesting to develop this mechanism as
well as identified ways and means in this regard. We urge
and encourage other States to support this initiative.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Pakistan had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
South Africa then spoke, saying that South Africa believes
that the strengthening of the implementation of the BTWC
is a core element to international peace and security. It is
imperative that our common goal of eliminating the threat
posed by biological weapons is achieved. The Convention
clearly does not only provide a means to strengthen our
security, but also contains an important technical co-
operation and assistance provision, which enhances the
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international community’s ability to combat the debilitating
impact ofdisease on our peoples and on the socio-
economic development of our countries. In order to
achieve the total eradication of biological weapons,
South Africa believes that greater international
coordination and assistance are required to alleviate this
burden of threat. Initiatives such as the exchange in
biological sciences and technology, the promotion of
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment of infectious
diseases, among many others, can be further explored.
The statement went on to add that South Africa also strongly
believes, in line with Article X, that its implementation
should not hamper economic and technological
development of the peaceful uses of the bacteriological
and toxin agents, but allow the beneficial elements of
these agents to be developed to aid humanity. In this
regard, Article X is very relevant to public health,
particularly in the developing world where resources are
often scarce and insufficient, and could provide the
overlap between international health, technological
advancement and the prevention of the spread of
infectious diseases worldwide. South Africa believes that
the inherent dynamism of Article X is that it has the
potential to better prepare the global community against
natural disease outbreaks and against the use of
biological weapons by encouraging instead, cooperation
amongst nations, the dissemination of valuable
information and resources, as well as the development of
advanced technologies in this field.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
South Africa had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Malaysia then spoke, saying that Malaysia recognises the
importance for States Parties to undertake serious,
persistent efforts as well as concrete actions to strengthen
national and international efforts and capabilities as
stipulated in the Convention. With regard to fulfilling the
aims of the Convention, Malaysia continues to take
measures to promote capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and
containment of infectious diseases, primarily through
enhanced collaborative efforts, regionally and inter-
nationally. The statement continued by noting that Malaysia
is of the strong view that given the increasing development
in the field of biological science, there is a growing need
for scientific and technological cooperation between
States. Article X of the Convention provides for this.
Malaysia firmly believes that Article X can be implemented
in such a way allowing States Parties to undertake, to
facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the use of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Whilst there is
no “one-size-fits-all” solution for national implementation
and approaches, such collaborative efforts certainly helps
in strengthening or complementing existing national
frameworks in place.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Malaysia had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Iran then spoke, saying that Multilateralism is a principle
[sic] policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The statement
continued by noting that Lack of Universality of the
Convention and the failure to establish a legally binding
Protocol to comprehensively strengthen the implement-
ation of the Convention and the actions which undermine
the international cooperation within the framework of
the Convention are among the issues that require to be
seriously considered by the States Parties. Since we are
approaching to the 7th Review Conference of the States
Parties to the Convention in 2011, we need to be more
focused on the issues and obstacles hampering the full
implementation of the Convention in order to enable the
Review Conference to take appropriate decisions. We
hope the negotiations would be resumed on a legally
binding instrument to comprehensively strengthen the
convention including in the area of international
cooperation for peaceful purposes. There is a vital need
to enhance the role of the Convention in maintaining
international and regional peace and security through
its universal adherence. This should be done with the
particular emphasis on the adherence of the advanced
ones in biotechnology and those in volatile regions whose
non-adherence to the BWC can pose a serious threat to
the regional and international peace and security.
The statement went on to say that The Islamic Republic
of Iran is of the view that facilitation of and participation
in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material
and scientific and technological information regarding
the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin agents,
and enhanced international cooperation in the field of
peaceful biotechnologies activities, aimed at economic
and social development, is a fundamental element in
strengthening the implementation of the Convention. The
statement continued by saying It should be pointed out that
the States Parties have a legal obligation to refrain from
imposing restrictions or limitations for transfer that would
hamper economic or technological development of States
Parties or international cooperation for peaceful
applications in the field of biotechnology. To this end,
the States Parties should undertake to review national
regulations governing international exchanges and
transfers in order to ensure its consistency with the
objectives of the Convention and specifically the
provisions of Article X. It went on to add that The Islamic
Republic of Iran strongly believes that any politically
motivated measures such as arbitrary export control
regimes which restrict transfer, development and
promotion of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological knowledge, would hamper the economic
and technological progress of States Parties and clearly
violate Article X of the Convention. My delegation
presented a Working Paper to the Expert Meeting in
August on the establishment of a standing committee under
the Convention to consider the casesof transfer denial
(BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.22). We believe a State Party to
the Convention should have the right to seek to redress
the situation and settlement of disputes through
institutionalized measure if it is denied by another State
Party for receiving equipment and materials for peaceful
application of biology and bio-technology. Therefore a
mechanism should be established to deal with the issue
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of settlement of disputes of transfer denial. We believe
that this idea would be discussed in our meeting and be
reflected in the final report of the present meeting. The
statement concluded by saying that Iran had prepared a report
on the implementation of Article X which would be distributed
by the ISU.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Iran submitted a CBM in 2009]
Turkey then spoke, saying that The States Parties have
addressed key topics since 2007. We wish to maintain
this momentum. The topic of 2009 is one of the
fundamental building blocks for the road to the Seventh
Review Conference in 2011. Promotion of capacity
building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis and containment of infectious diseases is key
to our work. This is in line with the international
cooperation and assistance provision of the Convention.
The statement went on to say that The language and spirit
of Article X provides a solid basis for international
cooperation. Enhanced implementation of this Article will
not only contribute to the development of capacities to
prevent and contain epidemics, but will also help to build
confidence. International cooperation has also a role in
our universalization efforts. Exchange of scientific and
technological information among States Parties will
promote transparency and thereby contribute to reducing
the risks of the use of biological agents and technical
equipment for purposes prohibited by the Convention.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Turkey submitted a CBM in 2009]
Morocco then spoke, saying that Cooperation and
exchange of information technology for peaceful ends is
one of the most important pillars of the Convention.
However, this still does not have an appropriate mechanism
to this end. Within this framework, my delegation would
like to launch an appeal to Member States in order to
take the necessary measures to strengthen North-South
and South-South cooperation and we hope that the
Seventh Review Conference takes a decision recommend-
ing the establishment of a mechanism for the full
implementation of Article X. The more and more urgent
need to have such a mechanism has been reiterated during
previous Review Conferences. The Sixth BWC Review
Conference reaffirmed that the existing institutional ways
and means for multilateral cooperation between Member
States need to be strengthened in order to promote
international cooperation for peaceful ends in the fields
relevant to the Convention, such as medicine, public
health, agriculture and the environment.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Morocco submitted a CBM in 2009]
Bangladesh then spoke, saying that Rapid advances in the
field of life science have made it even more imperative
than ever before to remain alert against the threat of
biological weapons. The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention remains key to mobilizing international efforts
to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling
of such weapons. The Additional Understandings reached
through the subsequent Review Conferences have further
strengthened the relevance and effectiveness of the
Convention. It is for our shared benefit that we must reach
common understanding on a legally binding protocol to
institute a sound verification regime for ensuring
compliance with the Convention. That the lack of a
permanent institutional framework for verification is
affecting the sound health of the Convention has been
felt for too long. We understand that negotiations on this
issue would take time. However, we must remain seized
with the matter, and use the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011 to make positive strides in this regard on the basis
of consensus. We also hope that the important lessons
drawn from the inter-sessional work programmes would
be adequately reflected in the Programme of Work due to
be adopted by the Seventh Review Conference. The
statement continued by noting that We strongly feel the need
to further strengthen the CBM mechanism by taking into
account the various proposals made relative to its reform.
At the national level, we would like to focus more on
strengthening data collection and inter-agency
collaboration to better comply with our CBM reporting.
We look forward to enlisting the support of ISU in
facilitating the process. We stress that the CBMs should
pave the way for instituting an effective verification
regime. The statement then added that While we underline
the need for a balanced and holistic treatment of all
aspects of the Convention, we attach particular
importance to the effective implementation of Article X
with accent on the needs of the developing and least
developed countries. We endorse the NAM Working Paper
on the Establishment of a Mechanism for an Effective
Implementation of Article X. We look forward to having
substantive discussions on this and other proposals during
the lead up to the Seventh Review Conference.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Bangladesh had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Senegal then spoke, outlining its position in regard to the
Convention and its national implementation. In this respect
the statement said that the Senegalese authorities have taken
an inventory of all the national laboratories and scientific
research units in the country and have placed them under
strict control to avoid any risk of an accident or
inappropriate use of biological substances or matters
available to them. Furthermore, in order to strengthen
the surveillance of our laboratories and research units,
a National Laboratory Network was set up by ministerial
decree. This Network includes 17 laboratories within the
Laboratory of the Pasteur Institute in Dakar which itself
is part of the WHO network. The statement went on to say
that However, Senegal still has challenges in terms of
financial, technical and technological infrastructure and
equipment capacity to prevent and react as effectively as
it would like to disease outbreaks. Our constraints in this
respect, which we share with other States Parties,
particularly countries in the South, can be overcome if
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appropriate measures are taken order to develop inter-
national cooperation for peaceful purposes. The BWC
from this viewpoint is the ideal framework to promote this
cooperation through transfers of technology between and
amongst States Parties for peaceful purposes. In
particular, it is important to take action to strengthen
national capacity for development with epidemiological
surveillance through promoting international coopera-
tion, including South-South cooperation. In ratifying the
Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons, the States Parties including Senegal have
committed under Article X to promoting exchanges for
peaceful purposes. A better use of this aspect of the
Convention, in other words scientific cooperation and
the transfer of technology would make it possible to give
a strong impetus to the universalization of the Convention
and its implementation.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Senegal had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Madagascar then spoke, saying that Madagascar does not
have the necessary scientific and technical capacities in
the field of epidemiological surveillance and in defence
against pathogenic microorganisms and toxins, as
recommended in the Convention. We would like to improve
our capacities in this field in order to strengthen the measures
of biological security and safety in our country. Here my
delegation would like to tell you about some of the activities
undertaken by the authorities of Madagascar within the
framework of United Nations Security Council resolution
1540 and the Cartagena Protocol on preventing biotechnical
hazards. At the present time, Madagascar is aiming to
strengthen its legal framework and its control system of
exports and border controls. In addition, a draft law is being
adopted in order to establish a national biosecurity structure
aimed at controlling imports, trade, possession and use of
biotechnological products that may cause harm to public
health and to the environment. The statement went on to note
that We endorse the recommendation of the Non-Aligned
Movement, in particular when it comes to establishing within
the framework of the Convention a sponsorship programme
to promote the participation of developing States Parties in
meetings and other activities under the Convention. My
delegation feels that the contribution to the discussions by
experts coming from the capitals represents a constructive
and fruitful progress in the implementation of the Convention.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Madagascar had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
This completed the statements made in the General Debate
on Monday 7 December 2009 and the Chairman then
suspended the meeting, in order to invite NGOs to make
statements. Two further statements in the General Debate
were made subsequently; one by Kenya in the session on the
afternoon of Tuesday 8 December and one by the senior
representative from the United States in the morning session
of Wednesday 9 December. These are reported here as part
of the General Debate before this report goes on the NGO
statements.
Kenya spoke on Tuesday afternoon, saying that The topic
of this year’s BTWC meetings, first discussed by the
meeting of experts in August 2009 whose report
recommendations are being considered by this convention
is of great importance to us. It addresses cooperation
among party states in capacity building in the areas of
Disease Surveill-ance, detection, diagnosis and
containment which continues to be a challenge not only
to Kenya, but majority of countries in the developing
world. The statement then went on to outline some of Kenya’s
experience and its needs in the area related to this year’s
topic. It also noted that in Kenya A National Biological &
Toxins Weapons Committee, which isnow in place, is fast
tracking on the implementation of BTWC’s agreements &
treaties.
[www.unog/bwc accessed on 12 January 2010 shows that
Kenya had not submitted a CBM in 2009]
Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, USA, spoke towards the end of the
morning session on Wednesday, saying that I have come here
today to share with you President Obama’s strategy for
preventing biological weapons proliferation and
bioterrorism.The United States intends to implement this
strategy through renewed cooperation and more thorough
consultations with our international counterparts in order
to prevent the misuse and abuse of science while working
together to strengthen health security around the world.
When it comes to the proliferation of bio weapons and
the risk of an attack, the world community faces a greater
threat based on a new calculus. President Obama fully
recognizes that a major biological weapons attack on
one of the world’s major cities could cause as much death
and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear
attack. And while the United States remains concerned
about state-sponsored biological warfare and
proliferation, we are equally, if not MORE concerned,
about an act of bioterrorism, due to the increased access
to advances in the life sciences. She went on to add that
Over the last several months, the Obama administration
has engaged in a thorough review of our approach with
scientists, academics, NGOs and government officials. We
have determined that we have made considerable progress
in recognizing and responding to a potential biological
attack or outbreak of disease, although we can do more.
More importantly, the Administration concluded that there
was no comprehensive strategy to address gaps in our
efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons
and scientific abuse. So just last week President Obama
approved a new National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats. Our new strategy has a clear,
overarching goal … to protect against the misuse of
science to develop or use biological agents to cause
harm.
The statement then continued to set out the broad goals of
the new strategy (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf and
without President Obama’s introduction and slightly edited as
MSP/2009/WP.12) as follows: First, we will work with the
international community to promote the peaceful and
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beneficial use of life sciences, in accordance with the
BWC’s Article Ten, to combat infectious diseases regardless
of their cause. … Second, we will work toward establishing
and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life
sciences. We need to ensure a culture of responsibility,
awareness, and vigilance among all who use and benefit
from the life sciences to ensure that they are not diverted
to harmful purpose. Third, we will implement a
coordinated approach to influence, identify, inhibit, and
interdict those who seek to misuse scientific progress to
harm innocent people. … Finally, and most relevant to
this body, we want to reinvigorate the Biological Weapons
Convention as the premier forum for global outreach and
coordination. The Biological Weapons Convention
embodies the international community’s determination to
prevent the misuse of biological materials as weapons.
But it takes the active efforts of its States Parties –
individually, and collectively – to uphold these
commitments that continue to bolster the BWC as a key
international norm.
She then went on to add: But I want to be clear and
forthcoming and I hope this will not be a surprise to
anyone. The Obama Administration will not seek to revive
negotiations on a verification protocol to the Convention.
We have carefully reviewed previous efforts to develop a
verification protocol and have determined that a legally
binding protocol would not achieve meaningful
verification or greater security. It is extraordinarily
difficult to verify compliance. The ease with which a
biological weapons program could be disguised within
legitimate activities and the rapid advances in biological
research make it very difficult to detect violations. We
believe that a protocol would not be able to keep pace
with the rapidly changing nature of the biological
weapons threat. Instead, we believe that confidence in
BWC compliance should be promoted by enhanced
transparency about activities and pursuing compliance
diplomacy to address concerns. The statement concluded
by looking ahead to the Seventh Review Conference in 2011
by providing some information on the US goals. This included
the statement that A key consideration related to any treaty
is the ongoing need to promote confidence in compliance.
We believe that greater emphasis should be placed on
voluntary measures to provide increased confidence. We
must also increase participation in the existing
Confidence-Building Measures. We should work together
to review the Confidence Building Measures form to
assess their effectiveness and identify areas for
improvement. The statement went on to add that In a gesture
of our transparency, I want to announce that the United
States will … Work toward posting future annual CBM
submissions on the public access side of the
Implementation Support Unit website and we will
encourage other Parties to follow suit.
NGO Informal Session
After the statement on Monday afternoon by Madagascar,
which completed the list of States Parties wishing to make a
statement on the first day of the Meeting of States Parties,
the Chairman suspended the afternoon session in order to
reopen the meeting in informal session to enable NGOs to
make short statements. Statements were made by the
following eleven NGOs:
• University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies –
Graham S. Pearson
• Biosecurity Working Group of the InterAcademy Panel
on International Issues –Jo Husbands
• The INES (International Network of Scientists and
Engineers for Global Responsibility) Working Group on
Biological and Toxin Weapons Control –Kathryn Nixdorff
• Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation/Scientists
Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons –
Marie Chevrier
• BioWeapons Prevention Project – Rocío Escauriaza Leal
• VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre) – Angela Woodward
• Research Group for Biological Arms Control, University
of Hamburg – Gunnar Jeremias
• National Defence Medical College of Japan and Univer-
sity of Bradford – Nariyoshi Shinomiya
• London School of Economics of the University of
London – Filippa Lentzos
• Pax Christi International – Trevor Griffiths
• European Biosafety Association – Ursula Jenal
Side Events
There were a number of side events during the Meeting of
States Parties – all but one were at lunchtime and the other
from 0900 to 1000 am prior to the morning session. The side
events were as follows:
Monday 7 December 2009: Lunchtime Seminar: US National
Academy of Sciences, University of Bradford, UK,  National
Defense Medical College, Japan, and Landau Network-
Centro Volta, Italy, entitled International Cooperation,
Biosecurity and the Education of Life Scientists.
Tuesday 8 December 2009: Lunchtime Seminar: European
Union, entitled Launch of the Guide to Participating in the
Confidence-building Measures of the Biological Weapons
Convention.
Wednesday 9 December 2009: Morning Seminar 0900-1000:
Canada/G8 Global Partnership, entitled International
Cooperation to Combat the Global Biological Threat.
Wednesday 9 December 2009: Lunchtime Seminar: Romania/
ISU, entitled Scientific Research and Exchange - Potential
Impact on Non-proliferation Measures for Biological
Agents.
Thursday 10 December 2009: Lunchtime Seminar: VERTIC,
entitled Regulatory Guidelines for National Implementation
of the 1972 BWC and Related Requirements of UNSCR
1540.
Friday 11 December 2009: Lunchtime Seminar: UNICRI
(United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute), entitled Biosecurity Risks and Assessment: Illicit
Trafficking, Intangible Transfers of Knowledge,
Biotechnological Advances.
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Tuesday 8 December 2009
The Programme of Work (BWC/MSP/2009/3) adopted on
Monday had the subjects Aims and Addressing problems,
challenges, needs and restrictions in respect of the topic
for 2009 scheduled for discussion in the morning and after-
noon sessions respectively. However, both of these subjects
were dealt with in the morning session of Tuesday morning,
and so the subject Developing mechanisms for building
capacity scheduled for the morning session of Wednesday
was brought forward to the Tuesday afternoon session.
Wednesday 9 December 2009
The Programme of Work (BWC/MSP/2009/3) adopted on
Monday had the subjects Developing mechanisms for build-
ing capacity and Developing the necessary infrastruc-
ture in respect of the topic for 2009 scheduled for discussion
in the morning and afternoon sessions respectively and the
subjects Developing human resources and Developing
standard operating procedures scheduled for discussion in
the morning session of Thursday. In the event, the morning
and afternoon sessions of Wednesday saw the completion of
all of these subjects apart from one intervention delayed until
Thursday because the expert concerned would not arrive until
then. The early running of the consideration of these subjects
arose from their inter-relationship so that States Parties could
readily make their inputs in a single intervention.
At the start of the afternoon session, the Chairman
distributed a Draft Report of the Meeting of States Parties
dated 9 December 2009 which was subsequently issued on
Friday morning in a slightly amended form – with expanded
versions of paragraphs 33 and 34 on universalization and the
ISU respectively – as BWC/MSP/2009/CRP.1 dated 11
December 2009. This draft report addressed the procedural
aspects of the meeting.
Thursday 10 December 2009
The morning session began with a final presentation related
to this year’s topic and then moved on to consideration of the
next agenda items: Agenda Item 7 Reports from the
Chairman and States Parties on universalization activities
and Agenda Item 8 Report of the Implementation Support
Unit (including report on participation in the confidence-
building measures) which had originally been scheduled for
the afternoon session on Thursday.
The Chairman’s report on universalization (BWC/MSP/
2009/4 dated 24 November 2009) noted that No States have
ratified or acceded to the Convention since the 2008
Meeting of States Parties, although Cameroon is reported
to have completed all internal steps and is preparing to
deposit its instrument of accession. The total number of
States Parties now stands at 163; a further 13 states have
signed but not ratified the Convention and an additional
19 states have neither signed nor ratified the Convention.
The report goes on to outline what is known about these 32
states. Of these, eight states are reported to be well advanced
in the ratification process, and a further four are reported to
have begun the process. The eight States reported to be well
advanced in the ratification process are Burundi, Cameroon,
Comoros, Kiribati, Mozambique, Myanmar, Tuvalu and the
United Republic of Tanzania (the same States as in the 2008
report with the addition of the United Republic of Tanzania)
whilst the four reported to have begun the process are Côte
d’Ivoire, Haiti, Namibia, and Nepal (the same States as in
2008 with the addition of Haiti). This report of some nine
pages again provides useful detail on universalization.
The Report of the ISU (BWC/MSP/2009/2 dated 10
November 2009 together with an addendum BWC/MSP/2009/
2/Add.1 dated 10 December 2009) is a 26 page report set out
in four sections dealing with each area of the ISU’s mandate
to: provide administrative support for the Convention; facilitate
its implementation; support the Confidence-Building Measures
(CBMs); and assist the Chair and States Parties in their efforts
to promote universalization. In regard to CBMs, the report
records that As of 1 November 2009, 62 states (38 per
cent of States Parties) had submitted CBMs to cover the
calendar year 2008, the same number as submitted the
previous year. Of these, 36 submitted their CBM on or
before the deadline of 15 April 2009. One State Party,
Gambia, submitted a CBM for the first time. Nine States
Parties which submitted CBMs in 2008 have not yet done
so in 2009. An analysis of the information provided in Annex
III to the ISU report shows that the 9 States Parties which
submitted CBMs in 2008 and which have not, as of 1
November 2009, submitted CBMs in 2009 are Bahrain, Chile,
Ecuador, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Nigeria, Thailand, and Ukraine. The Addendum shows that
as of 10 December 2008, Chile had submitted its CBM in
2009.
At the end of the morning session, the Chairman circulated
a draft text for the substantive paragraphs of the report
(Chairman, 10 December 2009). In circulating this text, the
Chairman reminded States Parties that the adoption of a report
text was not a negotiation and that there were no binding
commitments contained within it. He appealed to the States
Parties to trust his judgement as Chair. He noted that this
was the first of the annual meetings of the BWC devoted to
Article X of the Convention and therefore it would be
important to adopt a substantive document.
When the afternoon session opened it was evident that
some States Parties had some difficulties with the proposed
substantive paragraphs. Whilst some of the proposed
amendments were readily accepted the main point of difficulty
related to the use of the term mechanism. This had acquired
political significance in that the NAM had submitted a Working
Paper (MSP/2009/WP.2) entitled The Establishment of a
Mechanism for the Full Implementation of Article X of
the Convention – which was closely similar to the working
paper the NAM had submitted at the Meeting of Experts
(MSP/2009/MX/WP.24) with the same title. The paragraph
in the draft substantive text relating to mechanisms was
paragraph 30 ter which read as follows:
30 ter. Recognizing the need to monitor and sustain
progress on capacity-building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment, with
a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance
and exchange in biological sciences and technology for
peaceful purposes, States Parties noted that the Seventh
Review Conference could consider further specific
mechanisms to identify needs, identify and overcome
obstacles for capacity building, mobilize the necessary
financial resources, facilitate the development of human
resources, support the participation of developing States
Parties in the meetings and other activities of the
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Convention, and coordinate cooperation with other
relevant international and regional organizations.
Some Western Group States Parties such as the United
States considered such text could presuppose that such a
mechanism would appear on the agenda of the Review
Conference. The UK noted that the MSP report was to
highlight common understandings and that the proposal for a
mechanism did not meet this criterion. No other Western
delegation seems to have expressed a strong concern about
the reference. Some NAM States Parties indicated that they
would find it extremely difficult to agree to a Final Report
that made no reference to the mechanism proposal. A small
group of delegates met late into the evening in informal
consultations.
Friday 11 December 2009
Most of the final day of the Meeting of States Parties was
taken up with efforts to reach an agreed substantive text for
the Final Report.  This entailed informal consultations in side
rooms interspersed with short plenary sessions that reported
that some progress was being made. Discussion continued
on the use of the word mechanism until agreement was
reached on text which instead referred to current and future
proposals that could be considered by the next Review
Conference:
32. Recognizing the need to sustain progress on capacity-
building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis and containment, with a view to enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange in
biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes,
States Parties noted that the Seventh Review Conference
could consider current and future proposals on means of
better identifying needs, overcoming challenges to
capacity building, mobilizing financial resources,
facilitating the development of human resources,
supporting the participation of developing States Parties
in the meetings and other activities of the Convention,
and coordinating cooperation with other relevant
international and regional organizations.
Further discussion then focused on the balance of
references to Article X and to Article III of the Convention
within the substantive paragraphs.
Outcome of the Meeting of States Parties
During the Meeting of States Parties, 12 Working Papers
were submitted: two on behalf of the European Union (WP.1
and WP.6), two on behalf of JACKSNNZ (WP.3 and WP.4)
and one on behalf of the NAM (WP.2). There were two by the
USA (WP.10 and WP.12) and one by Cuba (WP.11), by France
(WP.5), India (WP.8), Iran (WP.7), and Pakistan (WP.9).
The EU working papers provided the Moderators’
summary of an international workshop held in Brussels,
Belgium on 11-12 November 2009 on improving cooperation
under Article X for disease surveillance, detection diagnosis
and containment [WP.1] and a paper on striving towards a
common format for reporting assistance opportunities and
needs from States Parties in areas with relevance for the
BTWC [WP.6].
The JACKSNNZ papers addressed international
cooperation under Article X of the Convention [WP.3] and a
paper outlining policy issues for the Seventh Review
Conference [WP.4] – although this paper is listed in Annex II
of the MSP Report as being submitted by Canada, the actual
paper makes it clear that it is a JACKSNNZ paper].
The NAM paper addressed the establishment of a
mechanism for the full implementation of Article X of the
Convention [WP.2] whilst the ones by the United States
addressed US efforts to support global implementation of the
IHR (2005) [WP.10] and the US strategy for countering
biological threats [WP.12], the one by Cuba addressed Cuba’s
national experience in disease surveillance for humans, animals
and plants [WP.11], the one by France addressed some
priorities in providing international assistance [WP.5], the one
by India addressed India’s experience in international
cooperation and capacity building in disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of disease [WP.8], the
one by Iran addressed technical assistance, exchange and
cooperation undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran under
Article X of the BWC [WP.7] and the one by Pakistan
addressed the needs, hurdles and challenges that need to be
considered in enhancing international cooperation and
promoting capacity building [WP.9].
The JACKSNNZ working paper on policy issues [WP.4]
for the Seventh Review Conference consists of some 21 pages
which provide considerable food for thought about the issues
that are likely to be considered at the Review Conference in
2011. It makes four proposals:
21. PROPOSAL ONE: A small group of states parties in
conjunction with each other and civil society should
undertake a review and audit of all the previous deci-
sions made at review conferences to identify which ad-
ditional understandings have been successful and ef-
fective and which have not in order to assist in the
development of future work priorities. This should be
done in the period March 2010 to March 2011.
26. PROPOSAL TWO: Each state party should submit a
comprehensive compliance report to the review con-
ference in 2011. A comprehensive report would require
states parties to consider in detail how they achieve
compliance nationally and, through the submission of
the report, demonstrate to other states parties imple-
mentation of the Convention. The report should be
precise and provide full details of implementation
mechanisms and activities.
29. PROPOSAL THREE: Conduct a national review of
implementation to develop proposals for the Seventh
Review Conference.
30. PROPOSAL FOUR: Arrange, or establish, actual or
virtual workshops involving states parties and civil
society to feed concrete ideas into the preparations
for the review conference. This might be coordinated
and facilitated by the ISU in Geneva.
It then goes on to identify a number of agreements might be
the outcome of the Review Conference:
-- Agreement on annual one week Meeting of Experts to
deal with technical and other information sharing
activities.
-- Agreement on annual formal political Meetings of
States Parties
-- Agreement on annual meeting on special topics
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This paper should be helpful in preparing the ground for
Seventh Review Conference.
Substantive Paragraphs in the Final Report
As already noted, the Chairman provided a first set of
substantive paragraphs in his paper circulated during the
Thursday morning session. This comprised thirteen paragraphs
as follows:
20.Recognizing the fundamental importance of enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange
in biological sciences and technology for peaceful
purposes, in the interests of achieving comprehensive
implementation of the Convention, States Parties
agreed on the value of working together to promote
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious
diseases. States Parties affirmed that building such
capacity would directly support the security and non-
proliferation objectives of the Convention, as well as
supporting the development of the peaceful
applications of biological science and technology in
accordance with Article X.
21.States Parties recognized that Article X is a useful and
appropriate platform for collaboration and that
through the full implementation of Article X, States
Parties can complement the activities of other forums
and promote maximum cooperation and assistance in
areas concerning disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases.
22States Parties agreed that although disease surveillance,
mitigation and response are primarily national
responsibilities, infectious diseases know no
geographic boundaries and neither should efforts to
combat them. States Parties noted that international
organizations, such as the FAO, IPPC, OIE and WHO,
have a fundamental role to play in addressing disease
and recognized the importance of these
intergovernmental organizations in supporting and
financing relevant national activities. States Parties
recognized the value of enhancing the capabilities and
coordinating role of these organizations.
23.States Parties recognized the importance of developing
effective infrastructure for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, including in
pursuit of requirements in other settings to establish
core national health capacities, such as those under
the revised International Health Regulations (2005).
Such infrastructure could include:
(i) Surveillance systems which are sensitive, specific,
representative, timely, simple, flexible and
acceptable, and which have capabilities for
continuously collecting and analyzing data from
various sources;
(ii)Capacity for rapid detection and identification of
pathogens, including improved access to high
quality diagnostics and expertise;
(iii)Primary health care services and veterinary and
phytosanitary services, such as laboratory systems
and disease management and treatment capacity;
(iv)Emergency and epidemiological response
capabilities;
(v)Communication capabilities, including for public
information and professional collaboration;
24.Recognizing that infrastructure is of little use if there
are not appropriately trained individuals to use it,
States Parties agreed on the value of developing human
resources for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis
and containment, including by:
(i) Making use of workshops, training courses and
conferences at the national, regional and
international levels;
(ii)Ensuring that training materials are available in
native languages;
(iii)Taking advantage of both computer-based and
hands-on training;
(iv)Fostering an interdisciplinary approach to infectious
disease problems, incorporating traditional biomedic-
al science with economics, social sciences, demo-
graphics and agricultural science;
(v)Engaging with all relevant human resources,
including technicians, managers, policy makers,
and health professionals;
(vi)Identifying ways to reduce “brain-drain”, where
individuals leave after they have been trained and
certified;
(vii)Providing the political leadership needed to ensure
training and personnel issues are given adequate
attention at the national level; and
(viii)If in a position to do so, providing sponsorship
for training, exchange visits, and travel to expert
meetings.
25.Recognizing the opportunities for building capacity
through sharing practices and procedures, States
Parties agreed on the value of implementing standard
operating procedures, taking into account their
national needs and circumstances, including through:
(i) Using standard operating procedures to enhance
sustainability, improve trust, build confidence,
contribute to quality control, and foster the highest
standards of professional performance;
(ii)Working at the national level with ministries of
health and agriculture and other relevant agencies
to develop relevant legislation, standards and
guidelines;
(iii)Developing and using best practices for
surveillance, management, laboratory practice,
manufacturing, safety, security, diagnostics, trade
in animals and products, as well as associated
procedures;
(iv) Strengthening international protocols for the rapid
sharing of information; and
(v)  Using case studies of biosecurity considerations,
risk assessment and the transportation of dangerous
goods and disease management to improve existing
practices and procedures.
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26.States Parties agreed on the value of ensuring the
sustainability of capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment, including through: pooling resources;
making funding processes longer-term and more
predictable (including through the use of mutually-
agreed exit strategies); ensuring ownership by the
receiving country and the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders; addressing needs for day-to-day
maintenance of core health capacity; tailoring
activities to meet the differing circumstances of each
recipient state; taking full advantage of existing
resources, networks and institutional arrangements;
utilising twinning programmes to strengthen networks
of reference laboratories; and using collaborative
projects to develop biosafety, biosecurity, basic science,
tools and core technologies thereby increasing
motivation and support.
27.States Parties agreed on the value of improving
integration of capacity-building activities so that
scarce resources are used effectively to combat disease
irrespective of its cause, including through: ensuring
effective communication and coordination among
human, animal and plant health sectors; using an inter-
disciplinary, all-hazards approach drawing on all
relevant disciplines; and improving how government
departments and agencies work with the private sector,
academia and non-governmental experts. States Parties
also noted the utility of public-private partnerships in
dealing with disease.
28. States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring
that there is effective coordination among relevant
activities to minimise duplication and ensure a more
comprehensive approach to building capacity,
including through: improved coordination and
information sharing among assistance providers both
internationally and among national departments;
enhanced communication among States Parties and
with international efforts to tackle infectious disease,
such as those undertaken by the FAO, IPPC, OIE and
WHO; taking advantage of all available routes for
assistance – bilateral, regional, and international –
to forge North-South, South-South and North-North
partnerships; and improving cooperation,
communication and networking among national
institutions, departments, agencies and other
stakeholders.
29.States Parties recognized that there remain challenges
to be overcome in developing international
cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological
sciences and technology for peaceful purposes to their
full potential, and that many States Parties face
considerable obstacles in building sufficient capacity
for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment. States Parties agreed on the value of
mobilizing resources, including financial resources, to
facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
to help overcome challenges to disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment. States Parties
agreed that all States have a role to play, calling on
those States Parties seeking to build their capacity to
identify their specific needs and requirements and seek
partnerships with others, and on those States Parties
in a position to do so to provide assistance and support.
30.States Parties recalled that the Sixth Review Conference
had emphasized that in the interest of facilitating the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the use
of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxin agents
for peaceful purposes, States Parties should not use
the provisions of the Convention to impose restrictions
and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent
with the objectives and provisions of the Convention
of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials. States Parties noted in this respect that full
implementation of Article III of the Convention would
help to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information in
accordance with Article X.
30 bis. States Parties affirmed the role of the
Implementation Support Unit in supporting the
capacity-building activities of the States Parties by
facilitating communication and partnerships, and
acting as a clearing-house for information on needs
for and sources of assistance and cooperation. In this
context, the States Parties recalled that the Sixth Review
Conference had encouraged States Parties to provide
appropriate information to the Implementation Support
Unit on their implementation of Article X, and
welcomed the reports on cooperation activities that
were submitted by States Parties during this meeting.
30 ter. Recognizing the need to monitor and sustain
progress on capacity-building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment,
with a view to enhancing international cooperation,
assistance and exchange in biological sciences and
technology for peaceful purposes, States Parties noted
that the Seventh Review Conference could consider
further specific mechanisms to identify needs, identify
and overcome obstacles to capacity building, mobilize
the necessary financial resources, facilitate the
development of human resources, support the
participation of developing States Parties in the
meetings and other activities of the Convention, and
coordinate cooperation with other relevant
international and regional organizations.
31.The States Parties further considered that in pursuing
the above understandings and actions, States Parties
could, according to their respective circumstances and
constitutional and legal processes, take into account
the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommend-
ations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the
presentations, statements, working papers and
interventions made by delegations on the topic under
discussion at the Meeting of Experts, as contained in
Annex I of the Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/
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MSP/2009/MX/3), as well as the synthesis of these
considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommend-
ations, conclusions and proposals contained in BWC/
MSP/2009/L.1, which is attached to this report as
Annex I. This annex was not proposed for adoption as
an outcome of the Meeting, and therefore was not
discussed with that aim. Thus, the annex was not agreed
upon and consequently has no status.
32. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh
Review Conference of, inter alia, any actions,
measures or other steps that they may have taken on
the basis of the discussions at the 2009 Meeting of
Experts and the outcome of the 2009 Meeting of States
Parties, in order to facilitate the Seventh Review
Conference’s consideration of the work and outcome
of these meetings and its decision on any further
action, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth
Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part III,
paragraph 7 (e)).
A further version of the first eleven paragraphs (para 20 to
30 ter) was issued at 17.45 on the Thursday afternoon. New
language is highlighted in bold and deletions indicated.
20.Recognizing the fundamental importance of enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange
in biological sciences and technology for peaceful
purposes, in the interests of achieving comprehensive
implementation of the Convention, States Parties
agreed on the value of working together to promote
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious
diseases. States Parties affirmed that building such
capacity would directly support the security and non-
proliferation objectives of the Convention, as well as
supporting the development of the peaceful
applications of biological science and technology in
accordance with Article X.
21.States Parties stressed the importance of
implementation of Article X and recalled that they
have a legal obligation to facilitate and have the right
to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the use of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to
hamper the economic and technological development
of States Parties. States Parties recognized that Article
X is a useful and appropriate fundamental platform
for collaboration and that through the full
implementation of Article X, States Parties can
complement the activities of other forums and promote
maximum cooperation and assistance in areas
concerning disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis,
and containment of infectious diseases.
OR
21.States Parties recognized that the Convention is a useful
and appropriate platform for collaboration and that
through the full implementation of all articles of the
Convention, including Article X, States Parties can
complement the activities of other forums and promote
maximum cooperation and assistance in areas
concerning disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis,
and containment of infectious diseases.
21 bis. States Parties were encouraged by and welcomed
the broad scope of assistance, cooperation and
partnerships already in place to support States Parties
in meeting their national obligations under the
Convention and in enhancing their disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment
capabilities.
22.States Parties agreed that although disease
surveillance, mitigation and response are primarily
national responsibilities, infectious diseases know no
geographic boundaries and neither should efforts to
combat them. States Parties noted that international
organizations, such as the FAO, IPPC, OIE and WHO,
have a fundamental role to play in addressing disease
and recognized the importance of these inter-
governmental organizations in supporting and
financing relevant national activities. States Parties
recognized the value of enhancing the capabilities and
coordinating role of these organizations.
23.States Parties recognized the importance of developing
effective infrastructure for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, taking primarily
appropriate action in the Convention, including in
pursuit of requirements in other settings to establish
core national health capacities, such as those under
the revised International Health Regulations (2005).
Such infrastructure could include:
(i) Surveillance systems which are sensitive, specific,
representative, timely, simple, flexible and
acceptable, and which have capabilities for
continuously collecting and analyzing data from
various sources;
(ii)Capacity for rapid detection and identification of
pathogens, including improved access to high
quality diagnostics and expertise;
(iii)Primary health care services and veterinary and
phytosanitary services, such as laboratory systems
and disease management and treatment capacity;
(iv)Emergency and epidemiological response
capabilities;
(v)Communication capabilities, including for public
information and professional collaboration;
(vi)An appropriate regulatory framework, including
available resources for its implementation and
surveillance activities;
(vii)Treatment of diseases, including availability of
diagnostic equipment, vaccines and medicines.
24.Recognizing that infrastructure is of little use if there
are not appropriately trained individuals to use it,
States Parties agreed on the value of developing
adequate infrastructure, equipment and technology
and human resources for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, including by:
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(i) Making use of workshops, training courses and
conferences at the national, regional and inter-
national levels;
(ii)Ensuring that training materials are available in
native languages;
(iii)Taking advantage of both computer-based and
hands-on training;
(iv)Fostering an interdisciplinary approach to
infectious disease problems, incorporating tradit-
ional biomedical science with economics, social
sciences, demographics and agricultural science;
(v)Engaging with all relevant human resources,
including technicians, managers, policy makers,
health professionals and academia;
(vi)Identifying ways to reduce “brain-drain”, where
individuals leave after they have been trained and
certified;
(vii)Providing the political leadership needed to ensure
training and personnel issues are given adequate
attention at the national level; and
(viii)If in a position to do so, providing sponsorship
for training, exchange visits, and travel to expert
meetings.
25.Recognizing the opportunities for building capacity
through sharing practices and procedures, States
Parties agreed on the value of implementing standard
operating procedures, taking into account their
national needs and circumstances, including through:
 (i) Using standard operating procedures to enhance
sustainability, improve trust, build confidence,
contribute to quality control, and foster the highest
standards of professional performance;
(ii)Working at the national level with ministries of
health and agriculture and other relevant agencies
to develop relevant legislation, standards and
guidelines;
(iii)Developing and using best practices for
surveillance, management, laboratory practice,
manufacturing, safety, security, diagnostics, trade
in animals and products, as well as associated
procedures;
(iv)Strengthening international protocols for the rapid
sharing of information; and
(v)Using case studies of biosecurity considerations,
risk assessment and the transportation of dangerous
goods and disease management to improve existing
practices and procedures.
26.States Parties agreed on the value of ensuring the
sustainability of capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment, including through: pooling resources;
making funding processes longer-term and more
predictable (including through the use of mutually-
agreed exit strategies); ensuring ownership by the
receiving country and the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders; addressing needs for day-to-day
maintenance of core health capacity; tailoring
activities to meet the differing circumstances of each
recipient state; taking full advantage of existing
resources, networks and institutional arrangements;
utilising twinning programmes to strengthen networks
of reference laboratories; and using collaborative
projects to develop biosafety, biosecurity, basic science,
tools and core technologies thereby increasing
motivation and support.
27.States Parties agreed on the value of improving
integration of capacity-building activities so that
scarce resources are used effectively to combat disease
irrespective of its cause, including through: ensuring
effective communication and coordination among
human, animal and plant health sectors; using an inter-
disciplinary, all-hazards approach drawing on all
relevant disciplines; and improving how government
departments and agencies work with the private sector,
academia and non-governmental experts. States Parties
also noted the utility of public-private partnerships in
dealing with disease.
28.States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring
that there is effective coordination among relevant
activities to minimise duplication and ensure a more
comprehensive approach to building capacity,
including through: improved coordination and
information sharing among assistance providers both
internationally and among national departments;
enhanced communication among States Parties and
with international efforts to tackle infectious disease,
such as those undertaken by the FAO, IPPC, OIE and
WHO; taking advantage of all available routes for
assistance – bilateral, regional, and international
multilateral, including through the Convention – to
forge North-South, South-South and North-North
partnerships; and improving cooperation, communi-
cation and networking among national institutions,
departments, agencies and other stakeholders.
29.States Parties recognized that there remain challenges
to be overcome in developing international
cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological
sciences and technology for peaceful purposes to their
full potential, and that many States Parties face
considerable obstacles have problems in building
sufficient capacity for disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis and containment. Keeping in mind Article
X, States Parties agreed on the value of mobilizing
resources, including financial resources, to facilitate
the widest possible exchange of equipment, material
and scientific and technological information to help
overcome challenges to disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis and containment. States Parties agreed that
all States have a role to play, calling on stressed that
those States Parties seeking to build their capacity
should identify their specific needs and requirements
and seek partnerships with others, and that those States
Parties in a position to do so should provide assistance
and support.
30.States Parties recalled that the Sixth Review Conference
had emphasized that in the interest of facilitating the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the use
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of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxin agents
for peaceful purposes, States Parties should not use
the provisions of the Convention to impose restrictions
and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent
with the objectives and provisions of the Convention
of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials. States Parties noted in this respect that
assistance must take place in the context of Article III
and that full implementation of Article III of the
Convention would help to facilitate the exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information in accordance with Article X.
30bis. States Parties affirmed the role of the
Implementation Support Unit, consistent with its
mandate, in supporting the capacity-building activities
of the States Parties by facilitating communication and
partnerships, and acting as a clearing-house for
information on needs for and sources of assistance
and cooperation. In this context, the States Parties
recalled that the Sixth Review Conference had
encouraged States Parties to provide appropriate
information to the Implementation Support Unit on their
implementation of Article X, and welcomed the reports
on cooperation activities that were submitted by States
Parties during this meeting.
30 ter. Recognizing the need to monitor and sustain
progress on capacity-building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment,
with a view to enhancing international cooperation,
assistance and exchange in biological sciences and
technology for peaceful purposes, States Parties noted
that the Seventh Review Conference could consider
further specific mechanisms to identify needs, identify
and overcome obstacles to capacity building, mobilize
the necessary financial resources, facilitate the
development of human resources, support the
participation of developing States Parties in the
meetings and other activities of the Convention, and
coordinate cooperation with other relevant
international and regional organizations.
OR
30 ter. Recognizing the need to monitor and sustain
progress on capacity-building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment,
with a view to enhancing international cooperation,
assistance and exchange in biological sciences and
technology for peaceful purposes, States Parties noted
that the Seventh Review Conference could consider
further specific mechanisms proposals for specific
mechanisms, including a proposal for establishment
of a mechanism for full implementation of Article X to
identify needs, identify and overcome obstacles to
capacity building, mobilize the necessary financial
resources, facilitate the development of human
resources, support the participation of developing
States Parties in the meetings and other activities of
the Convention, and coordinate cooperation with other
relevant international and regional organizations.
OR
30 ter. Recognizing States Parties recognized the need
to monitor and sustain progress on capacity-build-
ing in the fields of disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis and containment, with a view to enhanc-
ing international cooperation, assistance and ex-
change in biological sciences and technology for
peaceful purposes.
OR
30 ter. Recognizing the need to monitor review and sustain
progress on capacity-building, assistance and
exchange in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, with a view to
enhancing international cooperation, assistance and
exchange in biological sciences and technology for
peaceful purposes, States Parties noted that the
Seventh Review Conference could further specific
mechanisms to identify needs, identify and overcome
obstacles to capacity building, mobilize the necessary
financial resources, facilitate the development of
human resources, support the participation of
developing States Parties in the meetings and other
activities of the Convention examine opportunities for
facilitating progress in these fields and coordinate
cooperation with other relevant international and
regional organizations.
A further version of the first eleven paragraphs (para 20 to
30 ter) was issued at 21.00 on the Thursday evening in which
a single version of 30 ter. replaced the four alternatives in the
previous version.  New language is highlighted in bold and
deletions indicated.
20.Recognizing the fundamental importance of enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange
in biological sciences and technology for peaceful
purposes, in the interests of achieving comprehensive
implementation of the Convention, States Parties
agreed on the value of working together to promote
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious
diseases. States Parties affirmed that building such
capacity would directly support the security and non-
proliferation objectives of the Convention, as well as
supporting the development of the peaceful
applications of biological science and technology in
accordance with Article X. and would also contribute
to enhancing health security.
21. in this connection, States Parties recalled that the Sixth
Review Conference stressed the importance of
implementation of Article X and recalled that the States
Parties they have a legal obligation to facilitate and
have the right to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the use of bacterio-
logical (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful
purposes and not to hamper the economic and
technological development of States Parties. States
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Parties recognized that Article X is a useful and
appropriate fundamental platform for collaboration
and that through the full implementation of Article X,
States Parties can complement the activities of other
forums and promote maximum cooperation and assistance
in areas concerning disease surveillance, detection,
diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases.
22.States Parties agreed that although disease
surveillance, mitigation and response are primarily
national responsibilities, infectious diseases know no
geographic boundaries and neither should efforts to
combat them. States Parties noted that international
organizations, such as the FAO, IPPC, OIE and WHO,
have a fundamental role to play in addressing disease
and recognized the importance of these inter-
governmental organizations in supporting and
financing relevant national activities. States Parties
recognized the value of enhancing the capabilities and
coordinating role of these organizations.
23.States Parties recognized the importance of developing
effective infrastructure for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, taking primarily
appropriate action in the Convention, including in
pursuit of requirements in other settings to establish
core national health capacities, such as those under
the revised International Health Regulations (2005).
Such infrastructure could include:
(i)  Surveillance systems which are sensitive, specific,
representative, timely, simple, flexible and
acceptable, and which have capabilities for
continuously collecting and analyzing data from
various sources;
(ii)Capacity for rapid detection and identification of
pathogens, including improved access to high
quality diagnostics and expertise;
(iii)Primary health care services and veterinary and
phytosanitary services, such as laboratory systems
and disease management and treatment capacity;
(iv)Emergency and epidemiological response
capabilities;
(v)Communication capabilities, including for public
information and professional collaboration;
(vi)An appropriate regulatory framework, including
available resources for its implementation and
surveillance activities;
(vii)Treatment of diseases, including availability of
diagnostic equipment, vaccines and medicines.
24.Recognizing that infrastructure is of little use if there
are not appropriately trained individuals to use it,
States Parties agreed on the value of developing
adequate infrastructure, equipment and technology
and human resources for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, including by:
(i) Making use of workshops, training courses and
conferences at the national, regional and
international levels;
(ii)Ensuring that training materials are available in
native languages;
(iii)Taking advantage of both computer-based and
hands-on training;
(iv)Fostering an interdisciplinary approach to
infectious disease problems, incorporating
traditional biomedical science with economics,
social sciences, demographics and agricultural
science;
(v)Engaging with all relevant human resources,
including technicians, managers, policy makers,
health professionals and academia;
(vi)Identifying ways to reduce “brain-drain”, where
individuals leave after they have been trained and
certified;
(vii)Providing the political leadership needed to ensure
training and personnel issues are given adequate
attention at the national level; and
(viii)If in a position to do so, providing sponsorship
for training, exchange visits, and travel to expert
meetings.
25.Recognizing the opportunities for building capacity
through sharing practices and procedures, States
Parties agreed on the value of implementing standard
operating procedures, taking into account their
national needs and circumstances, including through:
 (i) Using standard operating procedures to enhance
sustainability, improve trust, build confidence,
contribute to quality control, and foster the highest
standards of professional performance;
(ii) Working at the national level with ministries of
health and agriculture and other relevant agencies
to develop relevant legislation, standards and
guidelines;
(iii)Developing and using best practices for
surveillance, management, laboratory practice,
manufacturing, safety, security, diagnostics, trade
in animals and products, as well as associated
procedures;
(iv)Strengthening international protocols for the rapid
sharing of information; and
(v)Using case studies of biosecurity considerations,
risk assessment and the transportation of dangerous
goods and disease management to improve existing
practices and procedures.
26.States Parties agreed on the value of ensuring the
sustainability of capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment, including through: pooling resources;
making funding processes longer-term and more
predictable (including through the use of mutually-
agreed exit strategies); ensuring ownership by the
receiving country and the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders; addressing needs for day-to-day
maintenance of core health capacity; tailoring
activities to meet the differing circumstances of each
recipient state; taking full advantage of existing
resources, networks and institutional arrangements;
utilising twinning programmes to strengthen networks
of reference laboratories; and using collaborative
projects to develop biosafety, biosecurity, basic science,
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tools and core technologies thereby increasing
motivation and support.
27.States Parties agreed on the value of improving
integration of capacity-building activities so that
scarce resources are used effectively to combat disease
irrespective of its cause, including through: ensuring
effective communication and coordination among
human, animal and plant health sectors; using an inter-
disciplinary, all-hazards approach drawing on all
relevant disciplines; and improving how government
departments and agencies work with the private sector,
academia and non-governmental experts. States Parties
also noted the utility of public-private partnerships in
dealing with disease.
28.States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring
that there is effective coordination among relevant
activities to minimise duplication and ensure a more
comprehensive approach to building capacity,
including through: improved coordination and
information sharing among assistance providers both
internationally and among national departments;
enhanced communication among States Parties and
with international efforts to tackle infectious disease,
such as those undertaken by the FAO, IPPC, OIE and
WHO; taking advantage of all available appropriate
routes for assistance – bilateral, regional, international
and multilateral, including through the Convention –
to forge North-South, South-South and North-North
partnerships; and improving cooperation, communi-
cation and networking among national institutions,
departments, agencies and other stakeholders.
28 bis. States Parties welcomed the range of assistance,
cooperation and partnerships already in place to
support States Parties in meeting their national
obligations under the Convention and in enhancing
their disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment capabilities.
29. States Parties recognized, however, that there remain
challenges to be overcome in developing international
cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological
sciences and technology for peaceful purposes to their
full potential, and that these challenges restrict the
ability of many States Parties have problems in building
to build sufficient capacity for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment. Keeping in mind
Article X, States Parties agreed on the value of
mobilizing resources, including financial resources, to
facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
to help overcome challenges to disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment. Recognizing
that all States Parties have a role to play, States Parties
stressed that those States Parties seeking to build their
capacity should identify their specific needs and
requirements and seek partnerships with others, and
that those States Parties in a position to do so should
provide assistance and support.
30.States Parties recalled that the Sixth Review Conference
had emphasized that in the interest of facilitating the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the use
of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxin agents
for peaceful purposes, States Parties should not use
the provisions of the Convention to impose restrictions
and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent
with the objectives and provisions of the Convention
of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials. States Parties noted in this respect that
assistance must take place in the context of Article III
and that full implementation of Article III of the
Convention would help to facilitate the exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information in accordance with Article X.
30 bis. States Parties affirmed the role of the
Implementation Support Unit, consistent with its
mandate, in supporting the capacity-building activities
of the States Parties by facilitating communication and
partnerships, and acting as a clearing-house for
information on needs for and sources of assistance
and cooperation. In this context, the States Parties
recalled that the Sixth Review Conference had
encouraged States Parties to provide appropriate
information to the Implementation Support Unit on their
implementation of Article X, and welcomed the reports
on cooperation activities that were submitted by States
Parties during this meeting.
30 ter. Recognizing the need to sustain progress on
capacity-building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, with a view to
enhancing international cooperation, assistance and
exchange in biological sciences and technology for
peaceful purposes, States Parties noted that the Seventh
Review Conference could consider means of better
identifying needs, overcoming challenges to capacity-
building, mobilizing financial resources, facilitating
the development of human resources, supporting the
participation of developing States Parties in the
meetings and other activities of the Convention, and
coordinating cooperation with other relevant
international and regional organizations.
The final version of the substantive paragraphs was circulated
at 15.00 on the Friday afternoon, 11 December 2009, and
adopted later the same afternoon. This contains some changes
from the third draft as indicated in the version provided below
with new language in bold and deletions indicated:
20.Recognizing the fundamental importance of enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange
in biological sciences and technology for peaceful
purposes, in the interests of achieving comprehensive
implementation of the Convention, States Parties
agreed on the value of working together to promote
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious
diseases. States Parties affirmed that building such
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capacity would directly support the security and non-
proliferation objectives of the Convention. and would
also contribute to enhancing health security.
21.in this connection, States Parties recalled that the Sixth
Review Conference stressed the importance of
implementation of Article X and recalled that the States
Parties they have a legal obligation to facilitate and
have the right to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the use of bacterio-
logical (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful
purposes and not to hamper the economic and techno-
logical development of States Parties. States Parties
recognized that the Convention Article X is a useful
and appropriate platform for collaboration and that
through the full implementation of the Convention,
including Article X, States Parties can complement the
activities of other forums and promote maximum
cooperation and assistance in areas concerning
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and con-
tainment of infectious diseases.
22.States Parties agreed that although disease
surveillance, mitigation and response are primarily
national responsibilities, infectious diseases know no
geographic boundaries and neither should efforts to
combat them. States Parties noted that international
organizations, such as the FAO, IPPC, OIE and WHO,
have a fundamental role to play in addressing disease
and recognized the importance of these inter-
governmental organizations in supporting and
financing relevant national activities. States Parties
recognized the value of enhancing the capabilities and
coordinating role of these organizations.
23.States Parties recognized the importance of developing
effective infrastructure for disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment. taking primarily
appropriate action in the Convention, including in
pursuit of requirements in other settings to establish
core national health capacities, such as those under
the revised International Health Regulations (2005).
(a)Such infrastructure could include:
(i) Surveillance systems which are sensitive, specific,
representative, timely, simple, flexible and
acceptable, and which have capabilities for
continuously collecting and analyzing data from
various sources;
(ii)Capacity for rapid detection and identification
of pathogens, including improved access to high
quality diagnostics and expertise;
(iii)Primary health care services and veterinary and
phytosanitary services, such as laboratory
systems and disease management and treatment
capacity;
(iv)Emergency and epidemiological response
capabilities;
(v)Communication capabilities, including for public
information and professional collaboration;
(vi)An appropriate regulatory framework, including
available resources for its implementation and
surveillance activities;
(vii)Treatment of diseases, including availability of
diagnostic equipment, vaccines and medicines.
(b)States Parties noted that developing such infra-
structure could also contribute to the fulfillment of
their other respective international obligations and
agreements, such as the revised International
Health Regulations (2005).
24.Recognizing that infrastructure is of little use if there
are not appropriately trained individuals to use it,
States Parties agreed on the value of developing human
resources for disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis
and containment, including by:
(i)Making use of workshops, training courses and
conferences at the national, regional and
international levels;
(ii)Ensuring that training materials are available in
native languages;
(iii)Taking advantage of both computer-based and
hands-on training;
(iv)Fostering an interdisciplinary approach to infectious
disease problems, incorporating traditional
biomedical science with economics, social sciences,
demographics and agricultural science;
(v)Engaging with all relevant human resources,
including technicians, managers, policy makers,
health professionals and academia;
(vi)Identifying ways to reduce “brain-drain”, where
individuals leave after they have been trained and
certified;
(vii)Providing the political leadership needed to ensure
training and personnel issues are given adequate
attention at the national level; and
(viii)If in a position to do so, providing sponsorship
for training, exchange visits, and travel to expert
meetings.
25.Recognizing the opportunities for building capacity
through sharing practices and procedures, States
Parties agreed on the value of implementing standard
operating procedures, taking into account their
national needs and circumstances, including through:
 (i) Using standard operating procedures to enhance
sustainability, improve trust, build confidence,
contribute to quality control, and foster the highest
standards of professional performance;
(ii)Working at the national level with ministries of
health and agriculture and other relevant agencies
to develop relevant legislation, standards and
guidelines;
(iii)Developing and using best practices for
surveillance, management, laboratory practice,
manufacturing, safety, security, diagnostics, trade
in animals and products, as well as associated
procedures;
(iv)Strengthening international protocols for the rapid
sharing of information; and
(v)Using case studies of biosecurity considerations,
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risk assessment and the transportation of dangerous
goods and disease management to improve existing
practices and procedures.
26.States Parties agreed on the value of ensuring the
sustainability of capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment, including through: pooling resources;
making funding processes longer-term and more
predictable (including through the use of mutually-
agreed exit strategies); ensuring ownership by the
receiving country and the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders; addressing needs for day-to-day
maintenance of core health capacity; tailoring
activities to meet the differing circumstances of each
recipient state; taking full advantage of existing
resources, networks and institutional arrangements;
utilising twinning programmes to strengthen networks
of reference laboratories; and using collaborative
projects to develop biosafety, biosecurity, basic science,
tools and core technologies thereby increasing
motivation and support.
27.States Parties agreed on the value of improving
integration of capacity-building activities so that
scarce resources are used effectively to combat disease
irrespective of its cause, including through: ensuring
effective communication and coordination among
human, animal and plant health sectors; using an inter-
disciplinary, all-hazards approach drawing on all
relevant disciplines; and improving how government
departments and agencies work with the private sector,
academia and non-governmental experts. States Parties
also noted the utility of public-private partnerships in
dealing with disease.
28.States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring
that there is effective coordination among relevant
activities to minimise duplication and ensure a more
comprehensive approach to building capacity,
including through: improved coordination and
information sharing among assistance providers both
internationally and among national departments;
enhanced communication among States Parties and
with international efforts to tackle infectious disease,
such as those undertaken by the FAO, IPPC, OIE and
WHO; taking advantage of all appropriate routes for
assistance – bilateral, regional, international and
multilateral, including the Convention – to forge North-
South, South-South and North-North partnerships; and
improving cooperation, communication and
networking among national institutions, departments,
agencies and other stakeholders.
29.States Parties welcomed recognized the range of
bilateral, regional and multilateral assistance,
cooperation and partnerships already in place to
support States Parties in meeting their national
obligations under the Convention and in enhancing
their disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment capabilities. States Parties recognized,
however, that there remain challenges to be overcome
in developing international cooperation, assistance
and exchange in biological sciences and technology
for peaceful purposes to their full potential, and that
addressing such problems, challenges, needs and
restrictions will help these challenges restrict the ability
of many States Parties to build sufficient capacity for
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and
containment. Keeping in mind Article X, States Parties
agreed on the value of mobilizing resources, including
financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible
exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information to help overcome challenges
to disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and con-
tainment. Recognizing that all States Parties have a
role to play, States Parties stressed that those States
Parties seeking to build their capacity should identify
their specific needs and requirements and seek
partnerships with others, and that those States Parties in
a position to do so should provide assistance and support.
30.Recalling the agreements on Article X and Article III
reached at the Sixth Review Conference, States Parties
recalled that the Sixth Review Conference had
emphasized that in the interest of facilitating the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the use
of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxin agents
for peaceful purposes, States Parties should not use
the provisions of the Convention to impose restrictions
and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent
with the objectives and provisions of the Convention
of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials. States Parties noted in this respect that full
implementation of Article III of the Convention would
help to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information in
accordance with Article X.
30 bis. States Parties affirmed the role of the
Implementation Support Unit, consistent with its
mandate, in supporting the capacity-building activities
of the States Parties by facilitating communication and
partnerships, and acting as a clearing-house for
information on needs for and sources of assistance
and cooperation. In this context, the States Parties
recalled that the Sixth Review Conference had
encouraged States Parties to provide appropriate
information to the Implementation Support Unit on their
implementation of Article X, and welcomed the reports
on cooperation activities that were submitted by States
Parties during this meeting.
30 ter. Recognizing the need to sustain progress on
capacity-building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and containment, with a view to
enhancing international cooperation, assistance and
exchange in biological sciences and technology for
peaceful purposes, States Parties noted that the Seventh
Review Conference could consider means of better
identifying needs, overcoming challenges to capacity-
building, mobilizing financial resources, facilitating
the development of human resources, supporting the
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participation of developing States Parties in the
meetings and other activities of the Convention, and
coordinating cooperation with other relevant
international and regional organizations.
The subsequent two further paragraphs that had been
unmodified throughout then continued in the final version of
the report.
33. 31. The States Parties further considered that in
pursuing the above understandings and actions, States
Parties could, according to their respective
circumstances and constitutional and legal processes,
take into account the considerations, lessons,
perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and
proposals drawn from the presentations, statements,
working papers and interventions made by delegations
on the topic under discussion at the Meeting of
Experts, as contained in Annex I of the Report of the
Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2009/MX/3), as well
as the synthesis of these considerations, lessons,
perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and
proposals contained in BWC/MSP/2009/L.1, which is
attached to this report as Annex I. This annex was not
proposed for adoption as an outcome of the Meeting,
and therefore was not discussed with that aim. Thus,
the annex was not agreed upon and consequently has
no status.
34. 32. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh
Review Conference of, inter alia, any actions,
measures or other steps that they may have taken on
the basis of the discussions at the 2009 Meeting of
Experts and the outcome of the 2009 Meeting of States
Parties, in order to facilitate the Seventh Review
Conference’s consideration of the work and outcome
of these meetings and its decision on any further
action, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth
Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part III,
paragraph 7 (e)).
Adoption of Final Report
The Meeting of States Parties met for the final time on the
afternoon of Friday 11 December 2009 and at that session
agreed their final report, issued as BWC/MSP/2009/5. In
addition to the substantive paragraphs as indicated above, the
final report contained a paragraph on universalisation and
another on the Implementation Support Unit:
35.The Meeting of States Parties reviewed progress
towards obtaining universality for the Convention and
considered the Report from the Chairman on
Universalization Activities (BWC/MSP/2009/4), as well
as reports from States Parties on their activities to
promote universalization. The States Parties reaffirmed
the particular importance of the ratification of the
Convention by signatory states and accession to the
Convention without delay by those which have not
signed the Convention, contributing to the achievement
of universal adherence to the Convention. In this
context, the Meeting took note of the reports, and
called on all States Parties to continue to promote
universalization, and to support the universalization
activities of the Chairman and the Implementation
Support Unit, in accordance with the decision of the
Sixth Review Conference.
36.The Meeting of States Parties also considered the
Report of the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/
2009/2), including the report on participation in the
confidence-building measures (CBMs). The Meeting
took note of the Report, and expressed its satisfaction
with the work of the Implementation Support Unit. The
Meeting noted with concern that participation in the
confidence-building measures had levelled off over
the past two years, and encouraged all States Parties
to make an annual CBM submission in accordance
with the decisions of the respective Review Conferences,
seeking assistance through the Implementation Support
Unit where required. The Meeting called on States
Parties to continue working closely with the Imple-
mentation Support Unit in fulfilling its mandate, in
accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review
Conference. Recalling the decision of the Sixth Review
Conference that the Implementation Support Unit
would be funded by States Parties for the period from
2007-2011, the Meeting requested the United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs to ensure, in
accordance with the terms of General Assembly
resolution 63/88, that the administrative arrangements
for the Unit, including employment contracts for the
staff of the Unit, appropriately reflect the full duration
of the Unit’s mandate.
Final Session
Later on the afternoon of Friday 11 December 2009, the
meeting met in plenary session to adopt the report of the
Meeting of States Parties.  The final item of business was to
decide on the dates of the Meetings in 2010.
As already noted, the Chairman for the 2010 meetings
had been nominated by the NAM and Other States Group
earlier in the week as Ambassador Carlos Potales of Chile.
The Meeting of Experts will be held on 23-27 August 2010
and the Meeting of States Parties on 6-10 December 2010.
The topic for discussion in 2010 is: ‘
Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant
organizations upon request by any State Party in the case
of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including
improving national capabilities for disease surveillance,
detection and diagnosis and public health systems.
The Chairman then closed the Meeting of States Parties
by making some concluding remarks which focused on the
three areas that he had addressed throughout the year – our
efforts to deal with disease: second, the exchange of CBMs;
and third, progress in expanding the membership of the
Convention – by looking back on them in reverse order.
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On universalization, he noted that although there had been
no new accessions, there were a couple of states teetering
on the edge of joining.
On CBMs, he said I have been pleased by our efforts
to make it easier to participate in the CBM process. I am
happy that we have managed to put out a guide for taking
part during my Chairmanship. I noted with considerable
interest plans for the future, including the EU’s support
to improve the BWC’s website for electronic submissions,
and the statement from Undersecretary of State Ellen
Tasucher that the US will work together with other States
Parties to review the CBMs.
On the topic of dealing with disease, he said that now that
the report has been agreed I think we should take a moment
to reflect on its comprehensiveness. I am sure that this
document will stand the test of time and act as a useful
bridge into the next review conference. I think it captures
where the common understandings lie between States
Parties on these issues. Our work this year illustrates that
States Parties do take all their responsibilities under this
Convention seriously and that a treaty that deals with
biological weapons can contribute to our efforts to deal
with disease.
As I have been prompting you all year, I was keen to
make sure that our outputs for this year were broader
than just our final document. I wanted to ensure we had
action-based outcomes. To that I end, the ISU have
produced several practical tools which I hope will help.
They have published a paper listing the contact details
of sources of assistance – making it easier to get in touch
with those who can hopefully provide what you need. The
ISU has also published details of national approaches, need
and offers in the Compendiums of National Approaches,
allowing you ongoing access to critical resources. Finally,
the ISU will naturally continue its role as a clearing house
for assistance under the Convention, and will therefore,
continue to be a useful first port of call.
He then went on to add: In my opening remarks, I noted
that I had not seen as many examples of brokering of
assistance as I had hoped to do. I am still convinced there
are opportunities we are not taking. I would encourage
all States Parties to reflect, in the lead up to the next review
conference, on the databases, common formats and
mechanisms that have been proposed throughout the
course of this year.
In conclusion, my experience this year has shown, that
we can find common understandings, and we can work
together, and that when we do, there is very little that we
cannot achieve. It was a real pleasure to be in the chair
when the BWC received its first high-level address since
2006 and I think it is fitting to leave you with one of the
remarks we heard here on Wednesday morning. It seems
to sum up very nicely what we have been doing here this
year, namely “increasing the availability and access to
knowledge and products of the life sciences to help reduce
the impact from outbreaks of infectious diseases whether
of natural, accidental or deliberate origin”.
The Meeting was then closed.
Reflections
The Meeting of States Parties with about 470 participants
had almost as many as the over 500 at the Meeting of Experts
in August 2009 – the number of representatives from the
States Parties was virtually the same: almost 420 at both
meetings. There was participation by 100 States Parties –
four more than at the Meeting of Experts. The meeting was
open throughout, as had been the Meeting of Experts in both
2008 and in 2009, thus enabling all those present to follow the
developments and to better understand the issues that
presented difficulties to some delegations. There can only be
benefit in all stake-holders being present throughout such
meetings as this significantly enhances the understanding of
all concerned.
The participation and statement by a senior member of
the US administration was of particular interest. This was
primarily to introduce the new US national strategy to counter
biothreats which was issued the same day by President
Obama. In regard to the BWC, the US national strategy
includes the following:
Revitalizing the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC)
The BWC is a uniquely important venue through which
we can promote and globally advance our objectives
for non-proliferation and risk management of
biological threats. The membership of the BWC,
however, is not universal and concerns remain that
some treaty partners may be developing biological
weapons. As the central international forum dedicated
to mitigating risks posed by the development and use
of biological weapons, the BWC can help focus
attention on the evolving nature of biological threats,
increase attention to and promote international efforts
to prevent proliferation and terrorism, and build tighter
linkages between the health and security sectors. We
will seek to utilize the BWC as our premiere forum for
global outreach and coordination on the full scope of
risk management activities by:
Promoting confidence in effective BWC implementation
and compliance by its States Parties, inter alia, by
promoting transparency about legitimate activities and
pursuing compliance diplomacy to address concerns;
Promoting universal membership in the Convention;
Ensuring that our participation in BWC meetings is
broadly inclusive of relevant departments and agencies
and headed by an appropriately senior representative;
Advancing a substantive agenda that emphasizes topics
and activities consistent with the objectives of this
Strategy with broad potential to enhance global risk
management;
Seeking to renew existing relationships while building
new, broader coalitions of “like-minded” BWC States
Parties; and
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Encouraging stronger partnerships between security
and public health communities by focusing on activities
that improve global capabilities to counter infectious
disease in a manner that mitigates risks from natural,
accidental, and deliberate outbreaks.
There are some useful ideas expressed in the strategy –
notably the undertakings to utilize the BWC as our premiere
forum for global outreach and coordination, and to renew
existing relationships while building new, broader
coalitions of “like-minded” BWC States Parties as well as
the goal of promoting transparency about legitimate
activities and pursuing compliance diplomacy. It is,
however, notable that although the national strategy document
makes no mention of the words verification or protocol or
legally-binding, the statement to the Meeting of States Parties
made it clear that The Obama Administration will not seek
to revive negotiations on a verification protocol to the
Convention. We have carefully reviewed previous efforts
to develop a verification protocol and have determined
that a legally binding protocol would not achieve
meaningful verification or greater security.  It is interesting
to compare this with what President Obama said at the Climate
Change Conference taking place in Copenhagen at the same
time, 7 to 18 December 2009, as the Meeting of States Parties
in Geneva.  In his Copenhagen statement, he said
Second, we must have a mechanism to review whether
we are keeping our commitments, and exchange this
information in a transparent manner. These measures
need not be intrusive, or infringe upon sovereignty.
They must, however, ensure that an accord is credible,
and that we’re living up to our obligations. Without
such accountability, any agreement would be empty
words on a page.
I don’t know how you have an international agree-
ment where we all are not sharing information and
ensuring that we are meeting our commitments. That
doesn’t make sense. It would be a hollow victory.
There would thus appear to be support at a high level for
an accountability framework such as that originally proposed
in the context of the BWC by Canada at the Sixth Review
Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/WP.1), and well worthy of
further consideration in the run up to the Seventh Review
Conference in 2011.
As the Chairman said in his concluding remarks Our work
this year illustrates that States Parties do take all their
responsibilities under this Convention seriously and that
a treaty that deals with biological weapons can contribute
to our efforts to deal with disease. The general climate at
the Meeting of States Parties was again positive and
constructive although it was clear in the final discussions that
there were differing views in regard to whether reference to
a mechanism in the final language could attract consensus. It
was evident that although the NAM Working Paper (BWC/
MSP/2009/WP.2) in its second paragraph made it clear –
Nevertheless we hope that a decision can be adopted in
the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011
recommending negotiations on a legally binding Protocol
to comprehensively strengthen the implementation of the
Convention including in the area of international
cooperation for peaceful purposes. – that the proposals
for a mechanism for the implementation of Article X were
again set in the context of a legally binding Protocol to
comprehensively strengthen the implementation of the
Convention, some delegations had concerns that there were
already a wide range of mechanisms and consequently the
negotiation of a mechanism solely for the implementation of
Article X would utilize resources and political will that might
be better spent elsewhere.
A good step forward was shown by the fact that all the
group statements (the European Union, the JACKSNNZ
group, and the NAM and Other States group) as well as over
half of the 29 States Parties that made a statement said that
they were looking ahead to the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011. In addition, some ten statements expressed views
about the strengthening of the implementation of the
Convention through a legally-binding mechanism. Thus, Cuba
(on behalf of the NAM) said The strengthening of the
Biological Weapon Convention cannot exclude inter alia
the verification mechanism for the complete elimination
of biological and toxin weapons through adopting a
legally binding protocol to comprehensively strengthen
the BWC.  Sweden (on behalf of the EU) said Finally, the
EU believes that preparations for the 2011 Review
Conference should be initiated as soon as possible,
including exploring options for strengthening the
Convention and improving compliance, taking into
account the risks from non-state actors. Australia (on
behalf of the JACKSNNZ group) said The JACKSNNZ share
with other delegations an interest in the opportunity
provided by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 to
review and discuss possible means for strengthening the
BTWC. Toward this end, the JACKSNNZ contribute for
discussion at this Meeting of States Parties and in the
lead-up to the Review Conference, the Canadian-
sponsored discussion paper “How to approach
compliance issues in the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention: policy issues for the Seventh BTWC Review
Conference in 2011”.
Switzerland said Switzerland is of the view that this
Convention is in need of stronger mechanisms for resolving
concerns about implementation of, and compliance with,
the BWC. In fact, Switzerland would welcome a legally
binding compliance framework. We are convinced that
an informal and forward-looking discussion is required
on the kind of compliance mechanism that is needed to
address existing and future challenges. India said We
believe that only a multilaterally agreed mechanism for
verification of compliance can provide the assurance of
observance of compliance obligations by States Parties
and act as deterrence against non-compliance. We believe
that the decision regarding strengthening of the BWC and
its effective implementation should be taken by the Review
Conference on the basis of consensus. Norway said The
lead-up to the 2011 Review Conference provides us an
opportunity to deliberate on ways to further strengthen
the BTWC, such as measures to verify compliance to the
Convention. Chile said an effective verification regime is
needed to strengthen the Convention regime. Pakistan said
The 7th Review Conference must also pick up the
unfinished work on the Protocol for effective
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implementation of the Convention. Iran said We hope the
negotiations would be resumed on a legally binding
instrument to comprehensively strengthen the convention
including in the area of international cooperation for
peaceful purposes. And Bangladesh said That the lack of
a permanent institutional framework for verification is
affecting the sound health of the Convention has been
felt for too long. We understand that negotiations on this
issue would take time. However, we must remain seized
with the matter, and use the Seventh Review Conference
in 2011 to make positive strides in this regard on the basis
of consensus.
It is apparent that the majority of the States Parties, who
are active in the annual Meetings of States Parties, are showing
that they are ready at the Seventh Review Conference to
start consideration of how best to strengthen the
implementation and improve the effectiveness of the
Convention. There is a widespread appreciation that such a
process needs to start from the Convention today and to seek
to build on areas in which there is consensus – it is not a
question of trying to go back to where the previous negotiations
ended and to carry on from there. The international situation
has developed over the past decade and it is time to start
afresh.
What is clear is that ideas on how to move forward need
to be put forward during the coming year, ideally as Working
Papers submitted to the Meeting of Experts in 2010. Some
ideas have already been put forward and it will be far better
for States Parties to respond to those ideas as well as putting
forward developments or modified ideas in Working Papers
this year. Leaving the putting forward of ideas and responding
to ideas already put forward until the start of the Seventh
Review Conference is unlikely to lead to consensus, and will
make the Review Conference a more difficult occasion on
which to make progress.
The steps being taken by Switzerland, Germany and
Norway to prepare the groundwork for the consideration of
the CBM mechanism and how this might be enhanced and
augmented at the Seventh Review Conference are
commendable. The Working Paper on policy issues for
consideration at the Seventh Review Conference submitted
by Canada on behalf of the JACKSNNZ group opens up a
range of topics for consideration. It is very much to be hoped
that the other groups – notably the EU, the NAM and other
States and the group of Latin American states – will consider
these topics along with any others that they consider important
and submit Working Papers in 2010 setting out how they see
them being taken forward by the Seventh Review Conference.
And the same is true for individual States Parties.
It is fair to say that the time for encouraging statements is
fast reaching the point at which concrete proposals need to
be put forward now so that all States Parties can start their
preparations for the Seventh Review Conference.
The www.unog.ch/bwc website created by the ISU
continues to be very useful. They are to be complimented for
the material that is posted both prior to, during and after the
Meetings – of particular value are the statements made by
States Parties in the order in which they are presented to the
Meetings, together with the Chairman’s remarks at the start,
during and at the end of the Meetings.
Overall the Meeting of States Parties had a successful
outcome that continued the momentum created by the suc-
cessful outcome of the Sixth Review Conference. It was
evident that many of the delegations have started to look for-
ward towards the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. It is
to be hoped that other groups of States Parties as well as
individual States Parties will follow the example of the
JACKSNNZ group and submit working papers in 2010, set-
ting out their ideas as to how the key issues to be considered
at the Seventh Review Conference can best be addressed.
This will help to ensure a successful outcome in 2011.
_______________________________________________________________________
This review was written by Graham S. Pearson,
HSP Advisory Board.
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News Chronology                                                                    August - December 2009
1 August Iranian Minister of Science and Technol-
ogy Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi says that Iranian intelligence
forces prevented a plot by anti-government forces to detonate
ten chemical bombs in a number of cities during the unrest
that followed the disputed presidential election in June. Zahedi
says the groups also “had plans to carry out chemical explo-
sions in several locations in Tehran on the day of the elec-
tion”. He adds that foreign agents, whom the government has
accused of inciting violence following the election, were be-
hind attempts to get young Iranians to launch a “velvet revolu-
tion” in the country. “This political movement started its prepa-
rations for overthrowing [the Islamic Republic] from nearly a
year ago,” says Zahedi.
2 August In South Africa, the shadow minister for
defence and military veterans of the main opposition Demo-
cratic Alliance party says that the National Conventional Arms
Control Committee (NCACC) has authorized a number of ille-
gal international arms deals, including the export to Libya of
glide bombs that could be used to deliver nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons. David Maynier says that in addition to
failing to meet regularly and produce regular reports as re-
quired by law, the committee had an insufficient number of
members present when it met to approve the deals. As a re-
sult, during the past thirteen months, “several dodgy deals
appear to have slipped through the cracks”.
Four days later, the ruling African National Congress is-
sues a statement rejecting Maynier’s accusations in the fol-
lowing terms: “Maynier clearly does not want the facts to get
in the way of a good story… The authenticity and/or legiti-
macy of his alleged sources is highly dubious. It is high time
that the [Democratic Alliance] backed up its conspiracy theo-
ries with hard facts.”
3 August In Glasgow, Scotland, the forty-second
[see 5-9 Aug 07] Congress of the International Union of Pure
and Applied chemistry (IUPAC) includes a symposium on ‘Eth-
ics, Science and Development’. Among those addressing the
symposium is OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, who
speaks on ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention and the role
of the OPCW in promoting international cooperation for the
peaceful uses of chemistry’.
3-7 August In Saratov, Russia, the first OPCW as-
sistance-and-protection course for Russian-speaking partici-
pants takes place.
3-12 August In West Java, Indonesia, there is a course
on sample preparation and trace analysis of compounds re-
lated to the CWC. The course is organized by the OPCW in
cooperation with the Research Centre for Chemistry of the
Indonesian Institute for Science.
4 August Indian Defense Minister Shri A K Antony
announces the release of the National Disaster Management
Guidelines on Management of Chemical (Terrorism) Disaster.
Amongst other things, Antony says: “Terrorists are getting
more and more aggressive in their activities the world over
and they are adopting newer techniques and technologies in
their operations.” The guidelines, compiled by the National
Disaster Management Authority, cover areas such as
counterterrorism, surveillance, environmental monitoring, and
prevention of hazardous waste smuggling. They also cover
medical management of casualties and highlight the role of
relevant disaster management authorities and various execu-
tive committees at the centre, state and district levels. [See
also 22 Aug 08]
4 August In the USA, Kenneth Brill, Director of the
National Counterproliferation Center, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, says the US intelligence community is
increasing its focus on spotting “over-the-horizon” WMD threats
and assessing the internal workings of potential proliferators.
In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Brill says: “The WMD proliferation challenge in the 21st cen-
tury is keeping states and nonstate actors from doing what
they can do if they choose to do so… If we focus our attention
only on the states or terrorist groups mentioned in those head-
lines, we are just asking to be surprised… If our capabilities
are focused solely on Iran and North Korea and al-Qaeda, we
will have done our policy-makers a huge disservice when an
‘over-the-horizon’ nation goes nuclear or a new terrorist group
starts putting the pieces together for a biological weapon.”
4 August In Oregon, lightning sets off a number of
wildfires at the Umatilla chemdemil facility as well as on adja-
cent property. The East Oregonian reports officials from the
depot as saying preliminary estimates show that several thou-
sand of the facility’s 19,729 acres have been destroyed; how-
ever, its stockpile of chemical weapons – which are in rein-
forced concrete, earth-covered igloos designed to resist fire
or other threats – have not been affected.
4 August The Honolulu Star Bulletin reports that over
the past two years the Army has, under a congressional man-
date, reviewed more than two million documents and spent $7
million in identifying the location of chemical and conventional
munitions dumped in three areas off Oahu, investigating their
effects on the environment, and assessing methods for their
removal. The Bulletin reports the Army as saying that be-
tween 1932 and 1944 agents such as lewisite, mustard gas,
hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride were dumped at two
locations near Pearl Harbor and one near Waianae. The Army
believes that the agents dumped include the dumping in 1944
of 598 tons of mustard gas contained in 16,000 M47-A2 bombs.
There are, however, no current plans to recover the agents.
Tad Davis, the Army’s deputy assistant secretary for the en-
vironment, safety and occupational health, is quoted as say-
ing: “[The deep-water survey] gave us a better understanding
of disposal techniques… The [disposal] vessel was moving
on a certain course and disposing of the munitions since they
were found in a line on the ocean floor.” [See also 29 Oct 08]
What follows is taken from issue 86 of the Harvard Sussex Program CBW Chronicle, which provides a fuller coverage of
events during the period under report here, and also identify the sources of information used for each record. All such sources
are held in the Sussex Harvard Information Bank, which is open to visitors by prior arrangement. For access to the Chronicle,
or to the electronic CBW Events Database compiled from it, please apply to HSP Sussex.
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4-5 August In San Francisco, the first Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) synthetic biology workshop takes place,
with the theme being Building Bridges Around Building
Genomes. The purpose of the event – which is organized by
the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate in coopera-
tion with the Department of Health and Human Services, and
the American Association for the Advancement of Science –
is to address the challenges in communication and cross-
agency education posed by the dual-use potential of develop-
ing synthetic biology.
5 August The US Department of Energy Office of
the Inspector General releases Special Report: Allegations of
Conflict of Interest Regarding Licensing of PROTECT by
Argonne National Laboratory. The report relates to allegations
made some six months previously that an exclusive licensing
agreement awarded by Argonne National Laboratory in July
2007 for the Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism (PROTECT)
was made subject to inadequate competition, conflicts of in-
terest, and other improprieties. PROTECT, a chemical and
biological warning system, was developed in response to the
sarin gas attacks in Tokyo [see 20 Mar 95]. The report con-
cludes thus: “[T]he competition and licensing process for
PROTECT had not completely satisfied Department [of En-
ergy] objectives related to ensuring that technology partnering
programs provide fair opportunities to interested parties… The
Department’s oversight of Argonne’s competition and licens-
ing activities was limited.”
5 August In the USA, the RAND Corporation releases
Public Health Preparedness and Response to Chemical and
Radiological Incidents: Functions, Practices, and Areas for Fu-
ture Work. The purpose of the report, which was prepared for
the Department of Health and Human Services, is “to character-
ize public health functions in chemical and radiological incidents,
examine current state and local public health department prac-
tices in the context of these functions, and identify areas where
further practice development may be warranted”.
7 August Russian Director of the Federal Special
Purpose Construction Agency (Spetsstroy) Nikolay Abroskin
says that Russia has now destroyed 37 per cent of its stock-
pile of chemical warfare agents and is on schedule to destroy
its entire stockpile by 2012. Speaking at a press conference
in Moscow, Abroskin says: “We will meet all deadlines… There
will be no delays in the implementation of the international
convention. Today, the state authorities regard the federal
program ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the
Russian Federation’ as one of the most successful programs
in the country.” [See also 16 Jun]
7 August Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko
survived an attempt to poison him five years ago [see 10 Sep
04] because benign lumps growing on his face and body iso-
lated the toxin away and so prevented it from attacking his
vital organs, so reports the New Scientist, quoting the derma-
tologist that led the team treating Yushchenko. Jean Saurat
says: “A new organ was created out of normal structures of
the skin, and the tissue expressed very high levels of dioxin-
metabolizing enzymes… They were made to detoxify the di-
oxin… A hamartoma is a new organisation of normal cells
that simply organise themselves differently… So skin can be
regarded as a detoxifying organ.” Saurat is quoted as saying
that at the start of his treatment Yushchenko had concentra-
tions of TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachlrodibenzo-p-dioxin) 50,000 times
higher than that the typical amount. “He’s not completely clean
yet, but we’ve got more than 95 per cent of it out now”, says
Saurat. The Lancet subsequently publishes an article by Saurat
and the rest of the team detailing their findings with regard to
the poisoning of Yushchenko. [See also 8 Aug 08]
8-10 August In Tehran, there is a regional training
course for CWC national authorities in Asia on training es-
corts for Article VI inspections conducted by the OPCW. The
course provides information about Article VI declaration re-
quirements, on the Article VI verification regime of the CWC,
on the identification of potentially declarable Article VI activi-
ties, and on the obligations of parties in facilitating the smooth
conduct of inspections. A mock inspection is also conducted
at the site of an Other Chemical Production Facility. Attend-
ing the course are more than forty participants from the fol-
lowing fifteen CWC parties: Bangladesh, Cambodia, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pa-
kistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
11 August In Washington DC, the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) holds a work-
shop on Building the Biodefense Policy Workforce. The event
brings together twenty-five experts in biosecurity from gov-
ernment, academia, and non-governmental organizations. Four
weeks later, AAAS publishes a report of the meeting, which
highlights the increased use of potentially dangerous patho-
gens, including select agents, in civilian research laboratories
throughout the USA.
12 August In Washington DC, the US Army says it
has unearthed an uncapped glass flask containing mustard
agent at a vacant property near the American University cam-
pus. According to the Associated Press, the Army Corps of
Engineers has, over the past fifteen years, conducted four
excavations of chemical weapons and related materials at
the site, which was used as a chemical-weapons develop-
ment and testing site during the First World War. The Corps
commenced the latest excavation nearly two years previously
[see 29 Oct 07]. Project Manager Dan Noble says: “We had
judged the likelihood of making a discovery like this was low
probability, but not zero probability… We have a high level of
confidence that there was absolutely no public exposure here.”
Seven days later, Washington, DC congressional delegate
Eleanor Holmes Norton says the Army has stated that chemi-
cal weapons found in the area pose no threat to the air or
water in the neighbourhood. “Our position is that the corps
must remain until there is an objective all-clear here… There
is no indication that the neighborhood is unsafe,” says Norton.
13 August Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signs
an executive order authorizing the Roskhimzashchita (Rus-
sian Chemical Protection) Corporation to, amongst other things,
further the development of protection against chemical weap-
ons and from terrorist attacks involving the use of chemical
weapons. According to the International Security Research
and Intelligence Agency, Roskhimzashchita was established
by a presidential executive order in October 2003.
13 August In Washington DC, around forty partici-
pants convene at the White House Conference Center to dis-
cuss “policies to prevent intentional biothreats”, so reports
Global Security Newswire. The discussion is led by Laura
Holgate, Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Re-
duction in the National Security Council, and by her deputy for
biodefense questions, James Petro. An “international analyst
who attended the session and spoke on the condition of ano-
nymity” is quoted by Global Security Newswire as saying the
meeting focused on three broad themes: biological threats to
the nation, existing international initiatives used to combat
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bioterrorism, and the role NGOs could play in the administra-
tion’s strategy. Also discussed are the approach the adminis-
tration could adopt with regard to the BWC and the 2011 Re-
view Conference; existing international biodefence initiatives;
and the role the United Nations or NATO might play in pre-
venting acts of bioterrorism. As regards domestic issues,
matters discussed include oversight of the life science com-
munity, including biosafety and biosecurity.
14 August In the UK House of Commons, Foreign
Secretary David Miliband presents his response to the For-
eign Affairs Committee report on Global Security: Non Prolif-
eration [see 14 Jun].
In response to the Committee’s recommendation that the
government should press for a new international convention
criminalizing the misuse of chemical and biological weapons,
Miliband says: “Unfortunately we have not detected a broad
enough constituency amongst other states in support of a
Criminalisation Convention; however, we would be prepared
to look at this again if it became clear that other states saw
utility in taking this idea forward. The UK has taken action
instead through the Biological Weapons Act, the Chemical
Weapons Act and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act
which include provision for UK nationals to be prosecuted for
committing offences overseas. Until such time as there is
more support for a Criminalisation Convention the UK will fo-
cus on encouraging other states to make similar provisions in
their national legislation. Also implementation of [United Na-
tions Security Council resolution] 1540 is helping to ensure
that states adopt and enforce appropriate legislation to pros-
ecute individuals engaged in criminal activities involving bio-
logical or chemical weapons.”
With regard to the request that the government set out its
efforts to help attain universality of the BWC, Miliband says:
“The UK works bilaterally and with the EU and other partners
to coordinate diplomatic action and assistance activities in
these areas. We have recently, for example, lobbied Burundi,
Guyana, Nepal, Syria and Tanzania and are encouraged by
the response that we have so far received… [The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office] is considering ways to engage the Com-
monwealth Office and other regional groups for leverage. A
particular priority will be to focus on those Commonwealth
countries that are CWC States Parties but have not acceded
to the BTWC…. The obstacles to universality are varied…
Offers of implementation assistance is an important way of
improving the national performance of many existing States
Parties as well as acting as an inducement for some states
currently outside the Convention to join. Current FCO-funded
activity is focused on legislative analysis and assistance to
states which do not have comprehensive national implement-
ing measures in place (including through a multi-year project
worth £623,000 delivered through the UK based NGO
VERTIC).”
Responding to the Committee’s recommendation that the
government work towards strengthening the BWC by way of a
verification protocol, Miliband says: “We share the commit-
tee’s view that a verification protocol for the BTWC should
remain a key objective for the UK. We remain ready to sup-
port such a verification mechanism as a long term objective.
But there are still no signs that international opinion is suffi-
ciently agreed on either the need for such a mechanism, or on
what it might contain… Any decision to re-open negotiations
on a verification mechanism could only be taken at present
by a Review Conference – the Seventh Review is scheduled
for 2011. Given the need for such Conferences to operate by
consensus this means that it would be, given prevailing diver-
gences of view, extraordinarily difficult to secure support for
any new work on verification. We have already discussed with
key partners some ideas on possible steps to strengthen the
Convention and plan to share further ideas with the US and
other partners during the autumn on what realistic options might
be available, which could attract widespread support.” On the
question of what measures the government intends to pursue
to strengthen the BWC at the seventh Conference, he says:
“At present we see prospects for progress on the role of the
Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and improving the efficacy
and utility of the [Confidence Building Measures] regime. We
intend to seek broad support for measures in these areas well
before the Conference convenes… We are uncertain of the
value of a formalised Accountability Framework at present.
However, we would wish to see an intersessional work pro-
gramme that required States Parties to report on their actions
to implement the Convention and explain any difficulties and
problems encountered… Effective national implementation of
the Convention is a key UK objective and we have contrib-
uted to programmes and projects designed to bring this about.
There has been reluctance in the BTWC context by some
States Parties to see adoption of an action plan comparable
to the one agreed by the First CWC Review Conference. We
will look again at this as an objective for the Seventh Review
Conference – at the very least we will wish to see proper weight
given to this topic in the Conference Final Declaration… We
have long held the view that the Convention needs a more
formalised and regular review mechanism for scientific and
technological developments. We made this clear in the 2002
Green Paper [see 29 Apr 02]. We would hope that this might
be an area where some progress might be possible at the
Seventh Review Conference and have started to identify pos-
sible options for consideration. One of the key issues to be
addressed here is the growing convergence between chemis-
try and biology, which is an issue that the UK flagged up in a
Working Paper for the Second CWC Review Conference.”
As regards the Committee’s recommendation that the gov-
ernment set out its proposals for ensuring that the BWC and
CWC keep pace with technological developments in accord-
ance with the general purpose criterion, Miliband says: “We
are […] looking at ways in which scientific review might be
made a more central element in BTWC meetings… We intend
to make science and technology a key element in our ap-
proach to the CWC in the years ahead, particularly with a view
to promoting a substantive debate and action on these issues
at the Third CWC Review Conference in 2013. To this end we
will draw on advice from the National Authority Advisory Com-
mittee and other bodies such as the Royal Society, as well as
industry and academia, through specially organised seminars
or workshops. We will also continue supporting the work of
the OPCW Director-General’s Scientific Advisory Board, in-
cluding through voluntary financial contributions.”
In response to the Committee’s request that the govern-
ment explain its position in relation to herbicides, defoliants
and incapacitants and their status under the BWC and CWC
and its recommendation that the government press for nego-
tiations on an unambiguous prohibition of their use as weap-
ons to commence at the next Review Conferences, Miliband
responds thus: “Herbicides and defoliants are not covered by
the CWC and we see no need to amend the Convention ac-
cordingly… Their position under the BTWC is more complex.
Herbicides and defoliants are generally held to be chemicals,
but such agents could be based on chemicals derived from
natural sources – such as hormones – a fact which would
make their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition
or retention for hostile purposes or in armed conflict a breach
of the BTWC. Anti-crop biological agents are already prohib-
ited if held contrary to the provisions of the BTWC’s Article I.
The Sixth Review Conference Final Declaration made clear
that the Convention’s Article I prohibitions apply to human,
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animal and plant agents… Development, production, reten-
tion, acquisition or use of ‘Incapacitating biochemical weap-
ons’ are prohibited by both Conventions. Use of the word ‘weap-
ons’ here is crucial. We must recall that although there is no
express prohibition on use in the BTWC, the Fourth Review
Conference in 1996 reaffirmed that the use in any way and
under any circumstances of microbial or other biological agents
or toxins that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or
other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I
of the Convention. This point was reiterated at the Sixth Re-
view Conference in 2006… There is less clarity under the CWC
in relation to chemicals that have an incapacitating effect and
are also intended for use for law enforcement purposes. How-
ever it is important to note that the rules of the general pur-
pose criterion apply – namely that as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with a permitted purpose, then there
is no problem in terms of compliance with the Convention. We
believe that in the long run greater clarity may be required on
how incapacitating chemicals used for law enforcement pur-
poses are to be treated under the Convention particularly in
terms of increasing transparency about States Parties’ activi-
ties involving these chemicals… We see no need for any ne-
gotiations to commence at the next Review Conference on an
unambiguous prohibition of the use of certain biological and
chemical agents, which are non-lethal or which target plants,
including crops and vegetation… As noted above, the BTWC
Fourth and Sixth Review Conferences affirmed that any use
(i.e. against humans, animals or plants) inconsistent with per-
mitted purposes would be an effective violation of the Con-
vention.”
In answer to the Committee’s request that the government
set out what action it is taking to mitigate the threat the UK
faces from terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons,
Miliband says: “The Government has already set out, in CON-
TEST, the UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terror-
ism […] [see 24 Mar], the actions taken to mitigate the Chemi-
cal and Biological threat as part of its programme of work to
counter the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
devices by terrorists.”
15 August In New York, health officials administer
preventive antibiotics to large numbers of civilians during an
exercise that involves responding to the simulated dispersal
of airborne anthrax particles. New York City Health Commis-
sioner Thomas Farley says the exercise, held in the gymna-
sium of Marta Valle Secondary School, “is aimed at getting
medication to a large number of people as quickly as possi-
ble”. According to the Associated Press, in the event of a real
anthrax attack, the city would establish around two hundred
‘points of dispensing’, each staffed by about a hundred peo-
ple, which would distribute medicine from stockpiles stored in
laboratories and warehouses around the city.
16 August The Indian Defence Research and Devel-
opment Organisation (DRDO) is testing hand grenades loaded
with Bhut Jolakia chilli peppers, so reports IANS news serv-
ice. Director of the DRDO Directorate of Life Sciences R B
Srivastava is quoted as saying: “The trials have been done
for the hand grenades. It gives out such pungent smoke that
it makes one come out of one’s hiding place… War scenario
is changing. Low intensity conflict is the norm of the day. The
paramilitary forces face the problem of forcing the terrorists
out of their hideouts… We wanted to find a non-lethal way to
tackle the insurgents and the mob during riot controls.” Ac-
cording to The (London) Daily Telegraph, the DRDO has con-
cluded that Bhut Jolakia chillies from Assam are the hottest
in the world, with a capsaicin potency of over a million Scoville
Heat Units (SHUs). The Red Savina Habaneros have a rating
of 350,000-580,000 (SHUs).
16 August Canada is to provide Kyrgyzstan with $27
million under the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction [see 26-27 Jun 02] to fund the
construction of a secure facility for the storage and research
of pathogens such as anthrax and plague, so reports the On-
tario National Post. Trevor Smith, who heads biological and
chemical non-proliferation programmes at the Canadian For-
eign Affairs Department is quoted as saying: “It’s a long laun-
dry list of security deficiencies. For facilities that are home to
some of the most dangerous materials that are naturally oc-
curring on this planet, that is simply unacceptable… Some-
one shows up at an institute with tens of thousands of dollars
in a briefcase, and says ‘I need five grams of anthrax or 5
[grams] of pneumonic plague or 5 [grams] of cholera, no ques-
tions asked,’ there would be a temptation, no doubt.” Smith
adds that during tours of the country, Canadian officials iden-
tified insufficient safeguards, such as doors with broken locks
held shut with string and wax seals; fences that had fallen
down, windows with no bars and no glass, and trees that had
overgrown perimeter security fences.
17 August The US Department of Homeland Secu-
rity and the Environmental Protection Agency submit draft
Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents
for public feedback. Under the guidance, officials would be
permitted to alter cleanup standards to fit the specific circum-
stances of a biological incident rather than being required to
meet established rules. The draft biological cleanup guide “ap-
plies to characterization, decontamination, clearance and res-
toration/reoccupance of a variety of public facilities, drinking
water infrastructure, and open areas” and “is intended to
achieve effective cleanup following a biological incident while
minimizing the expected total social cost, which includes hu-
man health costs, ecological and environmental damage, loss
of site utility and the economic costs of the actions taken”.
17 August In the USA, Time magazine publishes an
interview with International Atomic Energy Agency Director-
General Mohamed El Baradei, who says he deeply regrets
failing to take a harder stand on the question of Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq [see 20 Mar
03]. Responding to questions submitted by readers El Baradei
says: “I should probably, before the Iraq war, have screamed
and howled harder and louder to prevent people from misusing
the information that was made available by us… The most dis-
satisfying moment of my life, of course, was when the Iraq war
was launched… That hundreds of thousands of people lost their
lives on the basis of fiction, not facts, makes me shudder.”
18 August The Russian Voyenno-Meditsinskiy
Zhurnal publishes research of results from an inpatient study
of personnel working at chemical weapons storage and de-
struction facilities (CWDFs). The study evaluated the health
of 217 personnel at CWDFs and that of 28 individuals who
had previously had direct contact with chemical agents and
who had undergone inpatient testing and examination in the
military field therapy clinic of the Military Medical Academy S
M Kirov. Data obtained for the study show a significant in-
crease in morbidity of the cardiovascular, central and periph-
eral nervous system, and gastrointestinal tract for those work-
ing at CWDFs. The authors state that as a result of the study
they have refined the list of diseases for which examination of
a possible causal link to exposure to toxic chemicals classi-
fied as chemical weapons is advisable.
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19 August From OPCW headquarters, Director-Gen-
eral Rogelio Pfirter issues a note on the evaluation of the re-
sults of the twenty-fifth [see 1 Apr] OPCW proficiency test
which commenced on 4 April 2009 and concluded on 23 May
2009. The note states that all fourteen participating laborato-
ries met the adopted criteria for submission, timelines, and
reporting, and thus qualified for scoring in the test. No labora-
tories failed the test owing to reporting of false positive chemi-
cals. The Reference Chemical Laboratory Military Unit in
Slovakia failed the test owing to the absence of a statement,
comment, and sample preparation pages/flow charts for sam-
ples in which no scheduled chemicals and/or their degrada-
tion products were found. Three laboratories reported a total
of five non-scoring chemicals. Three laboratories identified all
of the deliberately introduced (spiked) chemicals used for scor-
ing, reported them, and included sufficient analytical data.
19 August In the USA, a lawyer representing five Iraqi
claimants announces that the lawsuit against one of three
companies [see 7 Apr] that supplied material to Iraq that Iraq
used to produce chemical weapons which were later used
during Operation Anfal [see 18 Mar 88], is to be dropped. The
Associated Press quotes the unidentified lawyer as saying
that after discussions with VWR International LLC it was de-
termined that the company was not the successor to a com-
pany allegedly involved in supplying such material to Iraq.
The lawyer says the claimants may yet pursue claims against
another successor company and will proceed with their claims
against Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc and Alcolac Inc.
19 August In Washington, DC, a federal court rejects
a request by a number of local community organizations
representing residents who live near the Alabama, Arkansas,
Oregon and Utah chemdemil facilites that the Army be ordered
to halt the incineration of chemical weapons at the facilities
[see 11 Mar 03]. In the lawsuit, the Chemical Weapons Working
Group, the Sierra Club, Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation and others claimed that that the Army violated the
National Environmental Policy Act as its 1988 environmental
impact statement and subsequent documents were outdated,
failed to adequately assess alternatives to incineration, and
failed to assess the impact of weapons, such as mustard
agents, containing mercury. In his ruling, District Judge
Richard Eaton says: “The court finds the plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate that there is significant new information
requiring the Army to prepare supplemental programmatic and
site-specific [environmental impact statements]… The court
finds persuasive the defendant’s decision not to test alternative
technologies at the four incineration sites because no practical
or feasible alternatives existed that were ready for immediate
implementation.” He adds that the plaintiffs had did not
demonstrate that “alternatives to incineration are readily
available and capable of destroying the quantity and type of
chemical warfare agents and munitions at the challenged sites”.
Speaking to the Associated Press, Chemical Weapons Working
Group head Craig Williams says that an appeal against the
ruling is possible. [See also 3 Nov 08]
20 August Indian Minister of State for Defence M M
Pallam Raju says India should be prepared for the “eventual-
ity” that chemical, biological and nuclear weapons may fall
into the hands of terrorists, whilst stressing that adequate steps
are being taken to counter any such threats. Speaking at a
Confederation of Indian Industry conference in New Delhi, Raju
says: “In future the potential is there that terrorists could get
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons towards which we
should take adequate steps… We should be prepared for any
eventuality. And nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is
something we are preparing for.”
21 August In Geneva, there is a workshop on the re-
vised International Health Regulations (IHR) [see 15 Jun 07]
at the Palais des Nations. The event – which is jointly organ-
ized by the World Health Organization in cooperation with the
BWC Implementation Support Unit – is aimed at familiarizing
delegations who will be attending the third BWC Meeting of
Experts in three days time with the IHR in advance of the
meeting. The event also includes a discussion of synergies in
IHR and BWC implementation, and considers the relationship
of the IHR to promoting capacity building in the fields of dis-
ease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment.
22-23 August In Jongny, Switzerland the Geneva Fo-
rum holds a workshop on Options and Proposals to Strengthen
the Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism of the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention. Among those making presentations
is Nicholas Sims of the London School of Economics and Jez
Litttlewood of Carleton University, Canada. A ‘Compendium
of Proposals to Improve the CBM Mechanism’ by Filippa
Lentzos and R Alexander Hamilton, both of the London School
of Economics, is also circulated.
24-28 August In Geneva, the third [see 18-22 Aug 08]
BWC Meeting of Experts takes place in accordance with the
decision taken at the sixth BWC Review Conference [see 8
Dec 06]. The topic for discussion at meeting – which is
convened under the chairmanship of Ambassador Marius
Grinius of Canada – is enhancing international cooperation,
assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology
for peaceful purposes; and promoting capacity building in the
fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and
containment of infectious diseases: (1) for BWC parties in
need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for
capacity enhancement; and (2) from BWC parties in a position
to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for
providing assistance related to these fields.
Participating in the meeting are the following ninety-six BWC
parties: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon,
Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the UK, the USA, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia. Also participating are Haiti,
Myanmar, Syria and Tanzania – all four of which have signed
but not yet ratified the Convention – but without taking part in
the making of decisions. Three states – Angola, Cameroon
and Israel – which are neither parties nor signatories to the
Convention – participate as observers. Also participating are
the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Institute for
Disarmament Research and the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute. Participating as
observers are the European Commission, the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control, the Food and Agriculture
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Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the International Science and Technology Center, the World
Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal
Health. In total, ten non-governmental organizations and research
institutes attend the meeting. Also, at the invitation of the
Chairman, ten scientific, professional, academic and industry
bodies, and one independent expert, participate as guests in
informal exchanges in the open sessions of the meeting.
At the end of the meeting the Chairman Grinius circulates
an interim report on activities to secure universal adherence
to the BWC, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Re-
view Conference. The meeting notes that the Chairman would
prepare the provisional agenda and programme of work for
approval and adoption at the Meeting of States Parties to be
held in December. The Meeting of Experts adopts its report
by consensus, as orally amended. [See also 21 Aug]
26 August The Colorado Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral announces that on behalf of the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment it has filed a second lawsuit
against the Army, alleging it needs to do more to protect the
public from chemical weapons stored at the Pueblo chemdemil
facility. The lawsuit seeks a court order requiring the Army to
comply with the Colorado Hazardous Waste Act and requests
unspecified monetary penalties for violating the Act. It alleges
the Army is violating the Act because the facility’s officials
“continue to operate without the required monitoring” of the
igloos where the weapons are stored. It also alleges that sev-
eral deadlines have passed without the officials “providing the
required documentation” to the health department describing “the
detailed procedures and equipment used at the facility to sam-
ple, analyse and monitor the waste chemical weapons in the
stockpile storage units.” According to the Chieftain, state health
officials have reportedly criticized the Army’s policy of only con-
ducting quarterly inspections of the storage igloos at the facil-
ity. Last year, the department requested a court order to estab-
lish what spokesman for the Colorado Office of the Attorney
General Mike Saccone is quoted as calling “an enforceable treat-
ment schedule” for the chemdemil of mustard gas.
Two weeks later, the Denver Post reports that the Army
plans to increase monitoring of the storage igloos. Commander
of the facility Rob Wittig is quoted as saying: “The state thinks
we should do it more frequently, so we’re going to work with
the state as best we can.” According to the Post, Wittig was
the previous day scheduled to tell state health officials that
the Army planned, by spring 2010, to initiate weekly igloo
checks and would begin operating twelve air sensors.
29 August Armenia used mustard gas against
Azerbaijani forces during the conflict between the two coun-
tries in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1993, according to the
Azerbaijani Today.az, quoting a Lithuanian military journalist
who covered the conflict. In an interview, Richardas Lapaytis
says: “During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict chemical weap-
ons were used in the territory of the Nakhchivan Republic.
The use of mustard gas was not a mass phenomenon. How-
ever, some Azerbaijani soldiers have died in that years rather
strange death. A strange rash and redness were discovered
in their bodies. I showed copies of examinations to the Lithua-
nian Ministry of Health where they officially declared: such a
death occurs as a result of mustard gas poisoning. And mus-
tard gas is a chemical weapon the use of which is prohibited
by all international conventions.” [See also 9 Sep 04]
31 August The Czech secret service (BIS) releases
its annual report which CTK news agency quotes as saying,
amongst other things, that Iran, North Korea and Syria at-
tempted to acquire Czech “chemical substances, equipment
and technologies that might be used for the development and
production of weapons of mass destruction”.
31 August In Brussels, NATO publishes its new stra-
tegic policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and de-
fending against CBRN threats. In a press release, Ambassa-
dor Jacek Bylica, Head of NATO’s WMD Centre says: “The
document is comprehensive in scope… It is guided by a clear
vision: that the Alliance – its populations, territory and forces
– will be secure from threats posed by weapons of mass de-
struction and related materials. It provides high-level political
guidance for our future activities in support of international
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and
regimes, as well as for military planning and capacity-building
for defending against the threats posed by these weapons…
In implementing this policy, NATO will foster cooperation with
partners, and international and regional organizations in order
to develop a common understanding of the WMD threat… It
will encourage participation in and compliance with interna-
tional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.”
The document was first circulated at the NATO Summit in
Bucharest in 2008 and was subsequently endorsed by Heads
of State and Government at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in
April this year. The document is published the following day.
31 August The US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) announces that following a multi-year review, it has
concluded that the Army’s closure of the Johnston Atoll Chemi-
cal Agent Disposal System (JACADS) has “met all of its per-
mit requirements for closing the facility”. EPA Director of the
Pacific Southwest Region’s Waste Management Division Jeff
Scott says the approval of the closure assures protection for
the ecology and environment of the Johnston Island National
Wildlife Refuge, which is now part of the new Pacific Remote
Islands Marine National Monument. In a letter dated 18 Au-
gust 2009 EPA Region IX official John Beach wrote that “EPA
finds that the Army has fulfilled the requirements of its JACADS
Permit” and that the EPA “accepts the Army’s closure of the
facility as a clean closure.”
1-3 September In Mexico City, Mexico, the tenth [see 6-
8 May 08] regional meeting of CWC national authorities in
Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) takes place. The
meeting gives participants the opportunity to present their
needs for assistance in relation to implementing Article VII of
the Convention, as well as any support they may require for
their Article VI obligations, and to demonstrate what support
they can offer to other parties in the region. It also helps the
OPCW to determine how it can best enhance the assistance
it offers to relevant parties. [See also 26-28 Mar 08]
3 September In Khirbet Salem, southern Lebanon, an
explosion recently occurred at a Hezbollah underground arms
depot, resulting in three members of the group dying from the
effects of chemical weapons and eight from the blast itself,
according to a report in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyasseh, which
is cited by a number of media outlets. The allegations of the
incident on 14 July were reportedly referred to in intelligence
briefings and despatched to European capitals and NATO of-
ficials some five days ago, and are based on information re-
ceived from intelligence sources of European units acting in
conjunction with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) peacekeeping forces. The briefings reportedly state
that, via airports in Syria, Iran has sent Hezbollah new types
of weapons, thousands of gas masks to protect against chemi-
cal and biological weapons, and an alert system against weap-
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ons of mass destruction. Since December 2008, Hezbollah
has reportedly been in possession of chemical weapons stored
in warehouses throughout the Beqaa valley and in the south
of the country near Tyre. As regards the explosion, Al-
Seyasseh quotes unidentified Lebanese sources as saying
local residents prevented UNIFIL from investigating the scene
of the explosion following the incident. During the briefings,
however, it was reportedly stated that chemical leaks occurred
following the explosion and that it was in fact Hezbollah op-
eratives who prevented the Lebanese army and UNIFIL from
investigating the area for twenty-four hours, while attempts
were made by Hezbollah to remove traces of chemicals from
the area. The report Al-Seyasseh refers to, however, states
that UNIFIL forces did find evidence of chemical residue in
soil samples surrounding the area in question. According to
The Media Line, Israel has accused UNIFIL of having knowl-
edge that Hezbollah was storing weapons at the depot, but
chose to do nothing about it. However, speaking to The Media
Line, an unidentified spokesman for UNIFIL is quoted as say-
ing that there had been “no serious violations” of Security
Council resolution 1701. .
Five days later, DEBKA-file reports that on 1 September
unidentified “intelligence sources” stated that Hezbollah had
recently boosted its military capabilities with a supply of chemi-
cal shells and short-range missiles with chemical warheads,
and was about to receive biological weapons as well.
5 September In Urumqi City, Xinjiang province,
an examination of the medical records of 217 victims who
were recently stabbed with hypodermic syringes have shown
“no evidence” that they have contracted “diseases related to
radioactive substance, anthrax, toxic chemical, microorgan-
ism, hepatitis A, hepatitis B or AIDS”, so says Director of
Disease Control and Biological Security at the Academy of
Military Medical Sciences Qian Jun. Xinhua news agency re-
ports that local hospitals have now dealt with 531 people claim-
ing to have been victims of the stabbings, which began some
three weeks previously. However, only 106 of these people
have displayed physical signs of being stabbed; it is thought
that the remaining cases may be the result of mass hysteria.
Two days later, four suspects allegedly caught at the scene
after stabbing a woman in the neck in Urumqi on 3 September
are prosecuted for “spreading false dangerous substances”,
so reports Xinhua. Previously, another four suspects were
prosecuted for endangering public security.
Six days later, China Daily reports the attacks as having
now spread to other cities in the Xinjiang region.
Seven days later, three native Uighurs are sentenced for
their roles in the attacks. Xinhua reports that Yilipan Yilihamu
was sentenced to up to fifteen years imprisonment for “spread-
ing false dangerous substances” when he stabbed a woman
in the buttock on 28 August, while Muhutaerjiang Turdi was
sentenced to ten years, and Aimannisha Guli to seven years
imprisonment for robbing a taxi driver on 29 August by threat-
ening him with a syringe. These three convictions bring to five
the number of people convicted of attacks in which syringes
were used.
Nine days later, UPI news agency reports Qian Jun as
saying that no dangerous radioactive or biological substances
have been found in blood samples taken from victims of the
attacks. “Although no radioactive or toxic substances were
found, some patients showed various levels of anxiety and
depression and have been recommended for psychological
counselling,” says Qian.
7 September The American Chemical Society
has today recorded the 50,000,000th new chemical substance
into the CAS Registry.
7-8 September In Montreux, Switzerland, there is an in-
ternational bioterrorism response and co-ordination tabletop
exercise for officials from numerous international and regional
organizations and national governments. Exercise ‘Black ICE
II’, which is co-hosted by Switzerland and the USA, builds on
the lessons learned since the first Black ICE exercise held in
Montreux some three years previously. The exercise is based
around a scenario in which terrorists carry out an attack with
pneumonic plague. Participants identify capabilities, needs,
and issues to be addressed in order to ensure an effective
international response to such an attack. Attending the exer-
cise are representatives from the BWC Implementation Sup-
port Unit, the International Civil Aviation Organization, NATO,
INTERPOL, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Organiza-
tion of the American States, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the World Food
Programme, and the World Health Organization. Experts from
India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland, and the
USA as well as from the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Council Secretariat also participate.
7-11 September In Kuopio, Finland, there is an in-
ternational training course on assistance and protection, which
is organized jointly by the government of Finland and the
OPCW.
7-11 September In Spanish Town, Jamaica, a re-
gional emergency chemical-response training course for par-
ticipants from countries of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) takes place. The purpose of the course – which
is organized by the OPCW in cooperation with and with the
financial support of the UK Ministry of Defence and the Office
of the Prime Minister of Jamaica – is to enhance individual,
national, and regional expertise that can be utilised by the
OPCW in the Caribbean region in the context of action under-
taken under Article X of the CWC.
7-18 September In Helsinki, Finland, there is a course on
the enhancement of laboratory skills in using liquid chroma-
tography-mass spectrometry to analyse chemicals related to
the CWC [see also 5-16 May 08]. The course, which is organ-
ized by the Finnish Institute for Verification of the CWC
(VERIFIN) with the support of the OPCW, is aimed at labora-
tories that are active or plan to become active in the analysis
of chemicals related to the CWC, and for those that are par-
ticipating or intend to participate in OPCW proficiency testing.
8 September The Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights (PCHR), based in Gaza City, releases Targeted Civil-
ians: Report on the Israeli Military Offensive against the Gaza
Strip 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009. Specifically, re-
garding the use of white phosphorus by Israeli forces [see
also 22 Apr], the report states: “In Gaza City, PCHR docu-
mented two distinctive cases during which IOF [Israeli Occu-
pation Forces] used white phosphorous against UNRWA
[United Nations Relief and Works Agency] warehouses and
the building of the PRCS [Palestinian Red Crescent Society]
in Gaza City. According to investigations conducted by PCHR,
on 15 January, IOF bombarded UNRWA warehouses with at
least three white Phosphorous bombs, wounding three per-
sons and setting fire to the warehouses, burning large quanti-
ties of supplies… PCHR also documented the use of white
phosphorous in the northern Gaza Strip. For example, on 17
January 2009, the UNRWA school in Beit Lahiya was attacked
with conventional and white phosphorous shells. At the time
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of the attack the school was being used as a shelter for dis-
placed persons. Mohammed, 4, and Bilal, 5, al-Ashqar were
killed in the attack… On 4 January, IOF attacked the Abu
Halima household in Beit Lahia using conventional and white
phosphorous shells. Sa’ad Allah Abu Halima and four of his
children were killed in the attack.” According to PCHR, the
report is “the outcome of efforts made by all units at PCHR at
the levels of observation, documentation, investigation and
filing”. It is “intended to professionally and objectively express
PCHR’s account of the latest Israeli offensive against the Gaza
Strip”.
8 September In the US Senate, Director of the
National Vaccine Program Office, Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Bruce Gellin provides an overview of
the role of HHS with regard to developing medical counter-
measures for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
threats, during his testimony before the Appropriations, Health
and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Sub-
committee on Labor.
9-10 September In Costa Rica, a regional United
Nations workshop on implementing Security Council resolu-
tion 1540 [see 28 Apr 04] for Central American countries takes
place in San José [see also 29 Apr – 1 May]. Among those
invited to participate are officials from Belize, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. Up for discussion is
improving the exchange of information and export controls,
having regard to resolution 1540.
9 September The US Government Accountabil-
ity Office transmits to Congress Emergency Preparedness:
Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for Moderni-
zation and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System.
The report examines the current status of the Emergency Alert
System; the progress made by the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) in implementing an integrated alert
and warning system; and the challenges involved in imple-
menting an integrated alert and warning system. The report
sets out a series of recommendations, including that FEMA
develop strategic goals and processes for deployment of the
new Integrated Public Alert and Warning System and that it
report periodically thereon.
9-10 September At OPCW headquarters, a challenge-in-
spection exercise takes place. As no notice of the exercise
was given, it enabled the Secretariat to test its preparedness
in relation to the requirements of the CWC, as well as the
Secretariat’s internal procedures. Following the exercise,
OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter says: “I believe that
the exercise demonstrated that the Secretariat is indeed able
to act promptly to a request for a challenge inspection. At the
same time, on the basis of critically evaluating the results,
action is already under way to further refine our internal proce-
dures and preparedness to conduct a challenge inspection.”
13 September In the USA, a researcher from the
University of Chicago dies during his work on a vaccine against
the plague. A subsequent post mortem on Malcolm Casadaban
shows his blood as having an enervated strain of Yersinia
pestis, with no other signs of the cause of death present. The
New York Times reports local health officials as saying antibi-
otics were made available to about a hundred people in
Casadaban’s personal and professional circles. None of those
provided with antibiotics have, however, shown any symp-
toms of contracting the plague. The Chicago Tribune reports
Chicago City Public Health Department spokesman Tim
Hadac as saying: “There is no evidence at all of [a] spread.”
Meanwhile, spokesman for the University of Chicago Medical
Center John Easton is quoted as saying that the bacteria
Casadaban was working with, which were developed as a vac-
cine against the plague in the late 1960s, do not present a
danger. The Tribune reports that investigators are looking into
whether Casadaban had a genetic predisposition that made
him susceptible to the bacteria.
14 September In Pochep, Russia, at a meeting of
the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament, Director
for the Implementation of Convention Commitments, Interfax-
AVN military news agency quotes Ministry of Industry and
Trade Viktor Kholstov as saying that as of 1 September 2009
Russia had destroyed 15,200 tonnes of the 18,000 tonnes of
toxic agents that it is scheduled to destroy by 31 December
2009. [See also 7 Aug]
14 September In Poland, an Iraqi scientist who
worked on a top-secret Iraqi project to develop chemical weap-
ons during the 1980s is currently working for the Polish mili-
tary intelligence service (WSI), so reports Russia Today, quot-
ing a report in the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita. Identi-
fied by Rzeczpospolita as Dr Z, the scientist who with the
help of the WSI has now changed his name, reportedly moved
to Poland with his family in 2004. Previously, he studied and
received his doctorate in chemistry in Poland. He has alleg-
edly passed o the WSI information relating to the locations of
secret research facilities and reserves of chemical material.
According to Rzeczpospolita, the US Central Intelligence
Agency was unsuccessful in attempting to entice the scien-
tist from Poland. He is reportedly one of several Iraqi military
researchers now living in Poland.
14-18 September In Tshwane, South Africa, there is
the fifth regional course on assistance and protection for Afri-
can CWC parties.
15 September In the US Senate, there is a con-
gressional briefing on a new report by the National Research
Council Committee on a New Biology for the 21st Century:
Ensuring the United States Leads the Coming Biology Revo-
lution. The report was compiled in response to a request made
in July 2008 by the National Institutes of Health, National Sci-
ence Foundation and Department of Energy to examine the
current state of biological research in the USA and recom-
mend how research can exploit recent technological and sci-
entific advances.
15 September In San Francisco, in a speech at
the Commonwealth Club, US Director of National Intelligence
Dennis Blair announces the release of the 2009 National Intel-
ligence Strategy, which “lays out the strategic environment,
sets priorities and objectives, and guides current and future
decisions on budgets, acquisitions, and operations.” The eight-
een-page document states: “The United States faces a com-
plex and rapidly changing national security environment in which
nation states, highly capable non-state actors, and other
transnational forces will continue to compete with and chal-
lenge US national interests… Adversaries are likely to use
asymmetric means and technology (either new or applied in a
novel way) to counter US interests at home and abroad.” While
noting that “state actors” such as Iran, North Korea, China,
and Russia remain significant threats, the document refers to
the number of more diffuse risks where the role of homeland
security intelligence will be critically relevant. It sets out six
“mission objectives”, including deterring WMD proliferation.
On WMD proliferation it says: “The intelligence community
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(IC) must support five enduring policy objectives for counter-
ing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery: dis-
suade, prevent, roll back, deter, and manage consequences…
The IC will work with partners inside and outside the US gov-
ernment to improve capabilities needed to support action across
all five WMD objectives. The IC must continue enhancing its
capabilities in the following areas: […] identify opportunities
and levers that the United States and its allies can use to
discourage interest in WMD; […] increase support to
policymakers in preventing WMD proliferation by enhancing
capabilities that contribute to US government efforts to pre-
vent the flow of WMD-related materials, technologies, funds,
and expertise; […] identify opportunities and levers that the
United States and its allies can use to end or roll back WMD
or capabilities that raise serious concerns; […] improve capa-
bilities to understand adversaries’ WMD plans, intentions, and
doctrines and to deny the impact of their capabilities; […]
reinforce US Government efforts to mitigate or manage the
consequences of WMD use by supporting the characteriza-
tion of adversaries’ WMD capabilities and the development of
countermeasures against WMD use, and by improving the
ability to support timely attribution of WMD used against the
United States, its allies, or friends.”
17 September Washington Post journalist David
Hoffman publishes a story in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
that reports the existence outside Russia of a unique collec-
tion of papers originating in the defence industrial department
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union during 1974-90. The papers are those of Vitaly
Katayev, who had worked on the staff of the Central Commit-
tee as a deputy to Politburo member Lev Zaikov, who over-
saw the USSR’s military-industrial complex. Katayev had died
in 2001, the several hundred papers and notebooks that form
the collection now being held at Stanford University, in the
Hoover Institution Library and Archives. Hoffman quotes
Katayev’s account of a meeting of a Politburo commission on
27 July 1989. The first agenda item had been “About meas-
ures for modernizing the organization of work on special prob-
lems”, meaning biological weapons. Besides Zaikov the other
16 participants included the USSR Foreign Minister, the head
of the KGB and the Chief of the General Staff. They discussed
practical implications of the impending Chemical Weapons
Convention that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had been
actively promoting. Of concern now was the potential empow-
erment of international inspectors to conduct challenge inspec-
tions at Biopreparat or other bioweapons facilities. Hoffman
observes that the discussion “suggests that the threat of in-
trusive verification was taken seriously by the same group of
men who had violated the weak BWC”. The richness of the
Katayev papers on diverse aspects of Soviet military prepar-
edness, already evident from publications in the scholarly lit-
erature, is confirmed a week later when Doubleday publishes
Hoffman’s book The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold
War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy.
[Editorial note: A particular value of the (relatively few) BW-
related papers in the Katayev collection is that, being mostly
memoranda for the Central Committee or records of discus-
sions within it, they display the development of actual Soviet
BW policy, thus providing a hitherto largely unavailable con-
text for the accounts of clandestine Soviet bioweapons activi-
ties furnished by Vladimir Pasechnik [see 17 Dec 02] and
later by Kanatjan Alibekov [see 6 May 99] and then Igor
Domaradsky [see 15 Oct 97]. The CBW content of the Katayev
papers had gone unremarked until now. In his book, Hoffman’s
acknowledgements include thanks to Milton Leitenberg and
Ray Zilinskas, who have now been working for a decade and
more on a detailed study of the Soviet BW programme. It was
Leitenberg who told Hoffman about the Katayev collection at
Stanford.]
Seven weeks later, again writing in the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists but this time solely on the Soviet BW programme,
Hoffman refers to another paper in the Katayev collection — a
letter written by Lev Zaikov to USSR President Gorbachev
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in May 1990, on the day
after Britain and the USA had presented formal complaints to
the USSR about its biological weapons programme. Zaikov
wrote in his letter: “Any possible leak of information by
Pasechnik [see 24 Sep 04], who is a narrow specialist, will
not cause major damage in revealing our scientific and tech-
nical achievements in this field, but might prove a basis for
Western countries to question the Soviet Union’s compliance
with the Biological Weapons Convention.” Further detail on
this episode appears on pages 345-49 of Hoffman’s book.
17 September In Sacramento, California, a federal
court convicts a man on three counts of posting more than a
hundred anthrax hoax letters and two counts of posting threat-
ening communications last year. Marc Keyser was arrested
after several newspapers, other media outlets, businesses
and the Modesto district office of Representative George
Radanovich received the letters [see 29 Oct 08]. According to
the Associated Press, Keyser faces up to five years impris-
onment and a $250,000 fine for each count.
18 September In Shanghai, China, a WMD Com-
modity Identification Training (WMD-CIT) workshop organized
by the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
and the Chinese General Administration of Customs – in co-
operation with the China Arms Control and Disarmament As-
sociation and the University of Georgia Center for Interna-
tional Trade and Security – concludes. The event, which was
attended by Chinese customs managers and other front-line
officers, focused on effective ways of recognizing and inspect-
ing WMD-related goods. It was followed by discussions on a
Chinese-based curriculum at the Shanghai Customs College.
The NNSA, which was established by Congress in 2000, de-
scribes itself as “a semi-autonomous agency within the US
Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national se-
curity through the military application of nuclear science in
the nation’s national security enterprise.”
18 September In Shopian, Kashmir, India, ten
days after the body of Muhammad Hussain Zargar – a mem-
ber of the Majlis-e-Mushavarat Consultative Council – was
found in an orchard, police announce that a report by the Foren-
sic Science Laboratory has shown the cause of death to have
been organo-phosphorous poisoning. Speaking to Rising Kash-
mir, SSP Shopian Shahid Mehraj says: “Now we will launch
investigation to find out circumstances that forced [Muhammad
Hussain Zargar] to consume poison.” Rising Kashmir quotes
unidentified “sources” as saying that a preliminary report of
the post mortem by a team of doctors from the Government
Medical College Srinagar states that there were minor injuries
on Zargar’s body, whilst reserving their opinion on the cause.
18 September The Australian parliament has
passed a law that grants the health ministry broader authority
in responding to an attack involving biological weapons or other
outbreaks of disease, so reports the Australian Daily Telegraph
Under the bill, government agencies would be required to re-
port missing or stolen biological materials such as anthrax,
smallpox and plague to law enforcement and government offi-
cials. It would also permit the use of reasonable force in search-
ing private properties and confiscating material possibly linked
to illegal activities.
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19 September The Tokyo District Court clears a
former president of Pacific Consultants International (PCI) for
breach of trust in relation to charge of having misused
government funds for destroying chemical weapons abandoned
in China by the Japanese Imperial Army. However, Shota Morita
– who was arrested last year together with three other former
employees of the consultancy firm [see 23 Apr 08] – is
sentenced to one year imprisonment, suspended for two years,
for tax evasion. [See also 24 Mar]
19 September In the Ukraine, the head of
investigations into criminal cases at the office of the Prosecutor
General Larysa Cherednichenko has said that high-ranking
officials from the presidential secretariat and family members
of President Victor Yushchenko falsified evidence in the case
relating to his poisoning, so reports the Kiev Segodnya.
Cherednichenko says that having reached this conclusion after
working in the parliamentary permanent investigations
commission, she reported it to Prosecutor General Oleksandr
Medvedko. In her report to Medvedko, Cherednichenko
accuses some officials close to Yushchenko, led by his wife
Kateryna, of interfering with the investigation, and trying to
hide the “artificiality” of the fact of the poisoning. Segodnya
quotes the report as saying: “As [Davyd] Zhvaniya [see 8 Aug
08] said, the victim had blood samples taken from him in
September-October 2004 with help from an Austrian doctor.
However, the samples were not studied in Ukraine or another
European country. They were secretly taken to the US, where
they were enriched with dioxin and were later taken to the UK
with help from the US special services. Those blood samples
were sent by the administration of the Austrian clinic
Rudolfinerhous to expert establishments, which found dioxin”.
Segodnya reports having obtained information that
Cherednichenko was warned that she would be dismissed from
her office immediately after she wrote her report on 26 August.
She reportedly turned down the offer of two positions and has
contested her dismissal in court. [See also 7 Aug]
21 September The US Government Accountability
Office releases High Containment Laboratories: National
Strategy for Oversight is Needed. The report examines the
increase in the number of high-containment laboratories in the
USA; which federal agency is responsible for tracking such
expansion and determining the associated aggregate risks;
lessons learned from incidents occurring at such laboratories;
and actions taken by the regulatory agencies. It states: “Four
highly publicized incidents in high-containment laboratories,
as well as evidence in scientific literature, demonstrate that
(1) while laboratory accidents are rare, they do occur, primarily
due to human error or systems (management and technical
operations) failure, including the failure of safety equipment
and procedures, (2) insiders can pose a risk, and (3) it is difficult
to control inventories of biological agents with currently
available technologies. Taken as a whole, these incidents
demonstrate failures of systems and procedures meant to
maintain biosafety and biosecurity in high-containment
laboratories.” The report recommends that the National Security
Advisor – in consultation with the National Intelligence Council
and the secretaries of health, agriculture, defence, and
homeland security – create a single entity to oversee the growth
of high-containment laboratories. The advisor would determine
the number, location, and mission of the laboratories needed
to effectively counter biological threats. The advisor would
also analyse the risks associated with the laboratories’
expansion and determine how much oversight is needed. The
agency would then develop national standards for designing,
building, commissioning and operating the laboratories.
According to the report, the number of registered BSL-3
laboratories rose from 415 in 2004 to 1,362 by 2008.
22 September In the US Senate, the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security holds a
hearing on Strengthening Security and Oversight at Biological
Research Laboratories. Testifying before the first panel – on
the executive branch’s current efforts to strengthen and im-
prove biosecurity and biosafety at laboratories, including per-
sonnel reliability, physical and perimeter security, and inven-
tory control – are Daniel D Roberts, Assistant Director Crimi-
nal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Brandt Pasco, Compliance Assurance Program
Manager, Department of Homeland Security; and Jean D Reed,
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
and Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. Those tes-
tifying before the second panel – which hears evidence from
outside experts – include Chairman of the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism Bob Graham [see also 29 Jun]; and Nancy Kingsbury,
Managing Director of Applied Research and Methods, Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, who discusses the report re-
leased by the GAO the previous day [see 21 Sep].
22 September The US Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee holds a hearing to consider
legislation introduced by Chairman of the Committee, Joseph
Lieberman to implement the recommendations of the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism [see 2 Dec 08]. Under the proposed
legislation the Department of Homeland Security would have
authority to set security standards at federal and private
laboratories that handle select agents. Testifying before the
Committee are Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Commission
Bob Graham and Jim Talent [see also 22 Sep]. Also testifying
is Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations,
Government Accountability Office, Gregory D Kutz.
22 September In the US House of Representa-
tives, Nancy Kingsbury, the Managing Director of Applied
Research and Methods at the Government Accountability
Office, testifies before the Energy and Commerce Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations on the need for a na-
tional strategy regarding the oversight of high-containment
laboratories. Her testimony is a repeat of that which she gave
earlier in the day before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Terrorism and Homeland Security [see 22 Sep]. Also tes-
tifying before the committee is Co-Chair of the American So-
ciety for Microbiology Ronald Atlas.
22 September From the US National Academies,
the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council
release Sustaining Global Surveillance and Response to
Emerging Zoonotic Diseases. The report was compiled in re-
sponse to the US Agency for International Development re-
questing advice on how to improve and sustain global capac-
ity for surveillance and response to emerging zoonotic dis-
eases. In this regard, the report recommends that the USA
should take the lead in working with global health organiza-
tions with a view to establishing a global surveillance system
that better integrates the human and animal health sectors.
22 September From Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the
Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center publishes a breakdown of the administration’s FY 2010
budget request for civilian biodefence activities. According to
the study, the total amount requested is $6.05 billion, which
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represents an increase of $330.9 million over the amount
request for FY 2009. Of the total, $1.09 billion would be
committed to biodefence programmes, while $4.96 billion would
be applied to various activities, including basic science
research, enhancing public health preparedness and improving
disease surveillance. According to the study, the Department
of Defense would receive nearly $686.8 million in funding for
biodefence activities, an increase of $63 million from the
previous year. Meanwhile, Medical Biological Defense activities
would receive $441.5 million, an increase of $93.9 million;
and both the Biological Threat Reduction and the Biological
Warfare Defense programmes would receive decreases in
funding of $33.3 million and $15.5 million respectively. The
proposed budget would allocate the Department of State a
total of $36.8 million for civilian biodefence initiatives, an
increase of $5.9 million,. The Office of Biological Weapons
Affairs – which comes under the Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation – would receive $2.2 million
in funding for its specific task of dealing with biological threat
reduction. The study states that the total requested for the
Department of Homeland Security is $396.1 million,
representing an increase of $28.9 million. Under the proposed
budget, funding for the Metropolitan Medical Response System
would be terminated and replaced with the Medical Surge Grant
Program, which would be funded at a “similar level” of $40
million. The BioWatch programme meanwhile would receive
$94.5 million, representing a decrease of $17.1 million from
the previous year. The Department of Health and Human
Services Department would, meanwhile, receive around $4.5
billion for biodefence programmes, representing an increase
of $215 million. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
would receive an increase of $14 million for “upgrading state
and local capacity” to support preparedness efforts, an increase
of $26 million for its Strategic National Stockpile Program,
and a $30 million increase to $305 million for advanced
research and development of medical countermeasures. The
Department of Agriculture would be granted a total of $233
million, which represents an increase of $15 million over the
previous year. The article notes that the budget is a “departure”
from previous budgets in that no funding is proposed for the
Department’s food defence and agricultural defence initiatives.
Instead, a similar amount of funding for biodefence-related
activities would be allocated among programmes under the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Food Safety
and Inspection Service and the National Institute of Food and
Agriculture. The study notes that under the new system, the
budget is “much less transparent” and makes it more difficult
to discern biodefence funding. [See also 26 Feb and 28 Apr]
22 September In Denver, Colorado, a federal court
rejects a request by the Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment that the Pueblo chemdemil facility be forced
to complete the destruction of its stockpile of chemical weap-
ons by the 2017 deadline set by Congress [see 31 Jul] on the
grounds that the state has no legal authority with regard to
setting any such deadline. A Department press release states
that the ruling, by District Judge Richard Matsch, relates to
2,600 tons of mustard agent in assembled munitions stored
at the depot.
Three months later, the Department files an appeal against
the ruling. [See also 26 Aug]
24 September In Wales, an Army Explosive Ord-
nance Disposal Regiment conduct a controlled detonation of
a bomb containing sulphur mustard at Whiteford Sands near
Swansea. The Ministry of Defence subsequently announces
that two personnel involved in the operation were briefly
hospitalized three days after the operation. BBC News Online
quotes an unidentified spokesman from the Ministry as say-
ing: “I would emphasise that there is no risk to anyone who
visited other beaches in the Gower area… We can confirm
that two members of the […] Regiment appear to have been
exposed to sulphur mustard while disabling a piece of British
military ordnance from the inter-war years found by a member
of the public at a beach in Whiteford Sands, Swansea… Nei-
ther of the individuals have been seriously harmed. Both have
received treatment and are being monitored at their unit.” Ac-
cording to the Western Mail, the Royal Air Force conducted
bombing drills on the beach during the Second World War,
which included drills involving the use of munitions containing
sulphur mustard. According to The Press Association, ex-
perts from the Ministry concluded that a small quantity of the
agent may have been released during the disposal operation.
Three months later, the National Public Health Service for
Wales says that the beach where the bomb was discovered
has been decontaminated and is now once again open to the
public. It adds that there have been no reports of any member
of the public developing symptoms from exposure to sulphur
mustard.
24-25 September In Istanbul, Turkey, there is a CWC
sub-regional seminar on Chemical Industry: Related Issues in
the Mediterranean Basin. Attending the seminar, which is
organized by the OPCW, are participants from the following
fourteen CWC parties: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, France, Greece, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, Spain, Turkey and Yemen. Representatives
of a number of Turkish authorities also participate, as well as
Egypt, a non-party. The aim of the seminar is to inform
representatives of the chemical industry about the provisions
of the CWC and the issues and challenges for the industry in
complying therewith. The seminar also provides an opportunity
to inform CWC parties about new initiatives being undertaken
by the Technical Secretariat on a range of Article VI issues,
including enhancement of the inspection regime for Other
Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs) producing unscheduled
discrete organic chemicals containing phosphorus, sulphur or
fluorine. In his opening speech, OPCW Director-General
Rogelio Pfirter notes that the OPCW has now conducted 1,670
industrial inspections in more than 80 countries worldwide.
25 September At OPCW headquarters, the tenth
annual associate programme concludes, having commenced
ten weeks previously [see 20 Jul].
25-27 September At Wiston House in the UK, there
is a Wilton Park Conference on Preventing and Mitigating the
Next Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons [See also 26-
28 Sep 08]. There are 45 participants from 16 countries (Aus-
tralia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Italy, Ja-
pan, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Tajikistan,
the UAE, the UK and the USA) and four international organi-
zations (the EU, the ICRC, the OPCW and the UN). The
predistributed synopsis of the agenda reads: “How can the
‘next use’ of chemical or biological weapons be prevented?
What are the implications of globally-proliferated dual-use ca-
pabilities and how can sound risk-assessment can be imple-
mented? How can global buy-in to the prevention enterprise
be achieved? What can we learn from past instances of use,
by different actors? How can the problems of attribution and
accreditation be confronted? Are the current CBW regimes up
to the job and how can they maintain relevance? The presen-
tations are by Ralf Trapp, Robert Kadlec, Jean Pascal Zanders,
David R Franz, Jeanne Guillemin, Katsuhisa Furukawa, Jez
Littlewood, Clive Rowland, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Jenifer
Smith, Charles Duelfer, Amy Smithson, Larry Kerr, Piers Millett
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and Michael Moodie. The presentations by Littlewood and
Rowland are in Session 4, ‘Perceptions of Utility’ and are chiefly
concerned with incapacitating-agent weapons.
28 September The US Department of Justice Of-
fice of the Inspector General (OIG) releases The Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordi-
nator Program. In the report, Inspector General Glenn Fine
states that many inside the programme were not able to iden-
tify “the top specific WMD threats and vulnerabilities that faced
their particular field division”, and that the FBI also had not
established adequate training programs to educate its ana-
lysts on the subject or established “specific qualification” that
the WMD coordinators should have. Furthermore, it says that
coordinators were not directly involved in the WMD threat as-
sessments used by field offices. The report states: “For the
FBI to operate a continuous process for providing an ongoing
flow of WMD intelligence, we believe that close interaction
between WMD coordinators and intelligence analysts is es-
sential… Although WMD coordinators and intelligence ana-
lysts had received various types of WMD training, the training
they received was not necessarily aligned with the threats
and vulnerabilities that these personnel faced at the field divi-
sion-level. We believe this was, in part, due to WMD coordi-
nators not being involved in the field division WMD domain
assessment, as well as the FBI not adequately tracking the
training received by its WMD field division personnel.” The
report sets out a total of thirteen recommendations, which
include implementing procedures to help increase WMD coor-
dinators’ domain awareness; ensuring that WMD coordinators
and intelligence analysts are sharing WMD-related informa-
tion; and providing the necessary training to ensure that WMD
coordinators and intelligence analysts have the skills neces-
sary to address domain needs.” The FBI responds to the re-
port thus: “While the inspector general’s report acknowledges
a number of actions the FBI had taken prior to the audit, the
bureau will continue to work with the [OIG] to identify any
additional areas that could be strengthened or improved.”
29 September The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit rejects an appeal by eight
service members who challenged a finding by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) that the mandatory anthrax vac-
cine was effective. The claimants had argued that a study on
humans in the 1950s that included only a limited number of
inhalation cases was not sufficient to prove the efficacy of
the vaccine. In upholding a previous decision by the District
Court for the District of Columbia [see 29 Feb 08], the court
rules thus: “Once again, we are presented with a scientific
judgment by the FDA to which we owe considerable defer-
ence. And once again, the plaintiffs fail to proffer any scien-
tific evidence to rebut it. Our conclusion must therefore be
[that] the FDA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in resting a
finding of effectiveness on the results of the Brachman Study.”
The Associated Press quotes the claimants’ lawyer John
Michels as saying that no decision has been made on whether
to lodge another appeal. [See also 25 Feb]
29 September In San Francisco, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson says
that the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) should
be updated as many of the toxic substances covered by it are
no longer used or produced, while others now considered to
be harmful are not regulated. Speaking at the Commonwealth
Club, Jackson says: “[O]ver the years, not only has TSCA
fallen behind the industry it’s supposed to regulate – it’s been
proven an inadequate tool for providing the protection against
chemical risks that the public rightfully expects… Since 1976,
EPA has issued regulations to control only five existing chemi-
cals determined to present an unreasonable risk. Five from a
total universe of almost 80,000 existing chemicals… Today
I’m announcing clear Administration principles to guide Con-
gress in writing a new chemical risk management law that will
fix the weaknesses in TSCA… First, we need to review all
chemicals against safety standards that are based solely on
considerations of risk – not economics or other factors – and
we must set these standards at levels that are protective of
human health and the environment. Second, safety stand-
ards cannot be applied without adequate information, and re-
sponsibility for providing that information should rest on in-
dustry… Third, both EPA and industry must include special
consideration for exposures and effects on groups with higher
vulnerabilities – particularly children… Fourth, when chemi-
cals fall short of the safety standard, EPA must have clear
authority to take action. We need flexibility to consider a range
of factors – but must also have the ability to move quickly. In
all cases, EPA and chemical producers must act on priority
chemicals in a timely manner, with firm deadlines to maintain
accountability… Fifth, we must encourage innovation in green
chemistry, and support research, education, recognition, and
other strategies that will lead us down the road to safer and
more sustainable chemicals and processes… Finally, we need
to make sure that EPA’s safety assessments are properly
resourced, with industry contributing its fair share of the costs
of implementing new requirements.”
29-30 September In Warsaw, Poland, there is another
[see 3-4 Dec 07] Interpol ‘Black Death’ tabletop exercise, the
scenario of which is the intentional release of the plague. The
exercise is designed to assist senior law enforcement offi-
cials, health care professionals and experts from international
organizations in identifying any critical co-operation and coor-
dination issues that could prevent a quick and successful re-
sponse to a plague attack. It brings together twenty-seven
participants from Belarus, Czech Republic, Finland, Poland,
Slovakia and Ukraine, as well as fifteen participants from in-
ternational organizations such as Europol, the United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs, the World Health Organiza-
tion, the European Centre for Disease Control, the European
Commission, and the Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
29-30 September In Viña del Mar, Chile, there is a
regional training course for customs authorities on technical
aspects of the CWC transfers regime. The course – which is
organized by the OPCW, funded by the government of Spain
and hosted by the government of Chile – brings together par-
ticipants from the following twenty-two CWC parties in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Uruguay. The course provides participants with informa-
tion on the provisions of the transfers regime under the Con-
vention, in order to improve the ability of CWC parties to monitor
transfers of scheduled chemicals.
30 September-2 October At UN headquarters, there is a con-
ference on the Comprehensive Review on the Status of Im-
plementation of [Security Council] Resolution 1540 [see 28
Apr 04]. The aim of the conference is to assess the evolution
of risks and threats, address specific critical issues, and iden-
tify possible new approaches for implementing resolution 1540.
Delegates from a total of thirty-five countries and nineteen
groups, including the OPCW and IAEA participate in the con-
ference. 1540 Committee Chairman Jorge Urbina says the
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Committee plans to compile a report on collaborative anti-
WMD strategies before the end of 2009. A report submitted
by Urbina to the Council some six months previously on the
modalities for considering a comprehensive review, in accord-
ance with Security Council resolution 1810 (2008), recom-
mended that the review should be a process to assess the
evolution of risks and threats, address specific critical issues
that had not yet been resolved and identify possible new ap-
proaches for the implementation of the resolution. It also rec-
ommended that the review be based on a two- to four-day
open-ended meeting of the Committee to be held in October
to November with the participation of all United Nations mem-
bers, as well as related intergovernmental and regional or-
ganizations. A number of background papers are prepared for
the conference by 1540 Committee experts according to the
document on modalities for the consideration of a conference
to undertake a comprehensive review (S/2009/170). The Com-
mittee points out that the papers which are prepared by a
group of experts at the request of the Committee do not nec-
essarily represent the views of the Committee.
30 September The US National Research Council
Committee on Laboratory Security and Personnel Reliability
Assurance Systems for Laboratories Conducting Research
on Biological Select Agents and Toxins releases Responsible
Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins. The re-
port relates to an executive order issued by former President
George Bush, which amongst other things, requested addi-
tional input from the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity and the National Research Council [see 9 Jan].
The 161-page report addresses existing regulations and over-
sight to safeguard against the “deliberate use” of select agents
and examines both physical security and personnel reliability
at laboratories. The report identifies the following six princi-
ples that should guide consideration of biological select agents
and toxins (BSAT) research, on the basis of which it offers its
conclusions and list of nine recommendations: “research on
biological select agents and toxins is essential to the national
interest”; “research with biological select agents and toxins
introduces potential security and safety concerns”; “the Se-
lect Agent Program should focus on those biological agents
and toxins that might be used as biothreat agents”; “policies
and practices for work with biological select agents and tox-
ins should promote both science and security”; “not all labora-
tories and not all agents are the same”; and “misuse of bio-
logical materials is taboo in every scientific community”. As
regards the classification of select agents, the report states:
“The list of select agents and toxins should be stratified in
risk groups according to the potential use of the agent as a
biothreat agent, with regulatory requirements and procedures
calibrated against such stratification. Importantly, mechanisms
for timely inclusion or removal of an agent or toxin from the
list are necessary and should be developed.” The report also
recommends that facilities take a full inventory of their select
agents, but warns against relying on such methods to ensure
security. In this regard, it notes: “Because biological agents
have an ability to replicate, accountability is best achieved by
controlling access to archived stocks and working materials.
Requirements for counting the number of vials or other such
measures of the quantity of biological select agents (other
than when an agent is transported from one laboratory site to
another) should not be employed because they are both unre-
liable and counter-productive, yielding a false sense of secu-
rity.” The report recommends that “the current Security Risk
Assessment screening process should be maintained”. The
process relies on databases of criminals, immigrations and
terrorists maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigations
and the Homeland Security Department to determine if an in-
dividual should be given clearance to work in a biological fa-
cility. However, the report notes that “the appeal process should
be expanded beyond the simple check for factual errors to
include an opportunity to consider the circumstances surround-
ing otherwise disqualifying factors”. As regards the Select
Agent Program, it states: “[B]ecause of confusion within the
community about how physical security requirements should
be implemented […] the Select Agent Program should define
minimum cross-agency physical security requirements, which
recognize that facilities have unique risk-based security needs
and associated design components, to assist facilities in
meeting their regulatory obligations.” [See also 29 Apr]
October The Danish Institute for International
Studies releases Denmark and Modern Non-proliferation
Assistance and Disarmament. The ‘policy brief’ sets out how
Denmark could expand its expertise with a view to developing
a “niche non-proliferation and disarmament programme”. The
brief sets out ten recommendations, which include: continue
funding Green Cross outreach offices in support of chemical
weapons destruction projects in Russia; take the lead on a
project to develop a chemical risk assessment methodology;
await results of the Global Partner-ship review and funding
decisions by the members of [the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and
Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev] to discern the
potential for long-term funding; establish a Danish ‘niched’
programme in the area of biological non-proliferation; and
establish a targeted chemical and biological non-proliferation
education programme.
October In the UK, the Verification Research,
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) releases Regula-
tory Guidelines for National Implementation of the 1972 Bio-
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and Related
Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 [see
28 Apr 04]. The guidelines aim to provide “guidance for States
when they are engaged in the process of preparing any regu-
latory and administrative measures that may be necessary to
supplement their primary legislation for national implementa-
tion of the [BWC] as well as the biological weapons-related
provisions of […] resolution 1540”. In this regard, they com-
prise “suggestions, tips and links to examples of best prac-
tices” as opposed to a set of “model regulations”.
October In the USA, the JASON defense advisory
panel publishes Rare Events, which examines the ability of
the USA to anticipate catastrophic terrorist events, including
the use of WMD, in the near absence of historical records
from which to develop predictive models. The report, which
was requested by the Department of Defense, makes the fol-
lowing general conclusions: “Experience from the natural sci-
ences and engineering provide guidelines for how to charac-
terize certain aspects of the risks involved, but are of limited
value or applicability at the present time. Social science ap-
proaches pursued to date are far less well developed, and not
even at the point at which their utility can be evaluated, as
currently applied. No reliable metrics of accuracy have yet
been identified… Collaborative experiments are of limited value
because they are based on an as-yet-unproven assumption
that lack of communication and collaboration is the key choke
point in anticipating [terrorist] WMD threats. No clear objec-
tives or metrics have, so far, been identified for collaborative
experiments…. Area expertise and real-world experience ap-
pear to be highly valuable in addressing the problem at hand.
Some of this expertise is available in academia, but not ex-
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clusively so… There is a clear need to establish a solid, rigor-
ous, long-term foundation for applied research, development,
and operations. This research will be rooted in social sciences
and involve academics… There is danger in premature model
building and the use of such models, to the exclusion of care-
ful data collection.” The report makes a series of targeted
recommendations that the Department should consider adopt-
ing to improve its modelling and capabilities for attempting to
predict a catastrophic event. JASON is an independent group
of scientists which advises the government on matters of
science and technology. [See also Mar 08]
1 October At UN headquarters, there is a seminar
on Resolution 1540: At the Crossroads, which takes place on
the sidelines of the ongoing conference on the Comprehen-
sive Review on the Status of Implementation of [Security
Council] Resolution 1540 [see 30 Sep – 1 Oct]. The seminar
is sponsored by the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs and co-organized by the Stanley Foundation, the Arab
Institute for Security Studies, the Fondation pour la Recher-
che Stratégique, the Henry L Stimson Center, the Institute for
Security Studies, the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foun-
dation, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), the Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre (VERTIC) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security.
Its purpose is to assist non-governmental organizations,
academia and the industry in contributing towards the review
of the resolution. The seminar is opened by United Nations
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte.
Members of the 1540 Committee itself as well as experts and
representatives of invited organizations make presentations
and submit papers. Among the presentations is one on the
Harvard Sussex Draft Convention for international
criminalization of CBW armament and use.
2 October In the, UK, a man pleads not guilty at New-
castle Crown Court to a series of offences, including posses-
sion of a chemical weapon, namely ricin, contrary to the Chemi-
cal Weapons Act. Ian Davison also denies a charge of pos-
sessing a prohibited weapon, namely a spray canister capable
of discharging an obnoxious liquid or gas. Both Ian Davison and
his son Nicky, who also appears in court, deny two counts of
possessing information likely to be used by a person commit-
ting or preparing an act of terrorism. These charges relate to
their possession of a copy of the ‘Poor Man’s James Bond’,
which contained information about the production of explosives
and improvised devices, and of ‘The Anarchist Cookbook’. Both
Ian and Nicky Davison were arrested after traces of ricin were
found during a raid on Ian Davison’s house, which followed in-
vestigations by the authorities into extreme rightwing activity
[see 2 Jun 09]. Ian Davison is remanded in custody, while Nicky
Davison’s conditional bail is extended.
5 October In South Korea, Defence Minister Kim Tae
Young submits to the National Assembly a report stating that
North Korea possesses thirteen pathogens that could be used
as biological weapons, and between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of
chemical weapons. In the case of biological weapons, the
report states that North Korea is believed to possesses an-
thrax, typhoid fever, dysentery, cholera, plague, Brucella,
tularaemia, epidemic typhus, smallpox, epidemic hemorrhagic
fever, yellow fever, botulinum toxin, and “yellow rain toxin”
The chemical agents it possesses are believed to include
mustard gas, phosgene, sarin and tabun. [See also 18 Jun]
5 October In the UK, the Security Service MI5 inad-
vertently prevented an effort by al-Qaeda in 2000 to acquire
material that could have been used to commit acts of
bioterrorism, according to Cambridge University historian
Christopher Andrew in his newly published book The Defense
of the Realm, the first authorized history of MI5. Andrew says
Pakistani microbiologist Rauf Ahmad was found carrying sus-
picious materials and equipment in his luggage after attend-
ing a conference on pathogens in the UK. According to US
intelligence officials, Ahmad had previously made contact with
al-Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri [see 28 Jul 08].
According to Andrew, al-Qaeda remains determined to carry
out acts of terrorism using chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons. The 1,000-page book was commissioned by MI5 to
mark its 100th anniversary.
Meanwhile, The (London) Independent details a series of
events in the history of both MI5 and the Secret Intelligence
Service MI6, including the acquisition by ‘Q Department’ at
MI6 of an odourless shellfish toxin from the government’s
chemical and biological weapons laboratory at Porton Down,
with a view to developing a method of assassinating Egyptian
President Nasser following his nationalization of the Suez
Canal. The team responsible for the task, led by Frank Quinn,
acquired a dozen boxes of Egyptian Knopje chocolates, for
which Nasser had a particular predilection. Quinn reportedly
developed a method to heat the base of the chocolates so
that they became detached, thus enabling injection of the toxin.
Though a box of the contaminated chocolates was completed,
they were not used. When UK Prime Minister Anthony Eden
subsequently rejected a plot to pump nerve gas into Nasser’s
air conditioning system, Quinn suggested a plan conceived
by the US Central Intelligence Agency involving the use a
packet of cigarettes containing a poisoned dart. Dr Ladell, a
scientist at Porton Down who was nicknamed ‘The Sorcerer’,
had reportedly tested the dart on sheep. In his report, Ladell
wrote: “[The animal] begins to buckle at the knees and it starts
to roll its eyes, froths at the mouth… Slowly the animal sinks
to the ground, its life draining away.” Quinn, however, feared
that the dart could be traced. This plan too was never put into
practice.
5 October The US Congressional Research Service
releases Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses. On chemi-
cal and biological weapons the report states: “Official US re-
ports and testimony continue to state that Iran is seeking a
self-sufficient chemical weapons infrastructure, and that it ‘may
have already’ stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and nerve
agents – and the bombs and shells to deliver them. This raises
questions about Iran’s compliance with its obligations under
the [CWC]... These officials and reports also say that Iran
‘probably maintain[s] an offensive [biological weapons] BW
program ... and probably has the capability to produce at least
small quantities of BW agents’ [see 3 Mar 08].” The report
also states: “Iran purportedly has acted as an intermediary
with North Korea to supply Syria with various forms of WMD
and missile technology [see 26 Nov 07].”
5 October US Deputy Assistant to the Department
of Homeland Security Secretary Robert Hooks says that the
time taken to regularly inspect filters installed in around thirty
cities under the Biowatch programme could prevent adequate
warning of a biological weapons attack, so reports USA To-
day. Hooks is quoted as saying that as the filters can be
checked only as often as every twenty-four hours, authorities
could be left with little time to verify an attack, identify its
origin and distribute medication before fatalities arise. He adds
that an ideal sensor would act as a “lab in a box”, by autono-
mously identifying a dangerous agent and raising an alert within
six hours. [See also 7 May]
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6 October The US Army Chemical Materials Agency
announces that it has completed the chemdemil of two million
chemical agent-filled munitions since entry into force of the
CWC [see 29 Apr 97]. Agency spokesman Greg Mahall says
that around 226,000 chemical-filled munitions were destroyed
prior to the CWC entering into force and that another 1.2 mil-
lion weapons remain to be destroyed.
6 October The Washington Post reports on develop-
ments in the clean-up of old chemical munitions in the Spring
Valley neighbourhood of northwest Washington DC, where field
trials had taken place during 1917-18 as part of the Army
Chemical Warfare Service project at American University. The
report states that “bacteria” had been tested thre at that time
as well as poisonous gases and other toxic materials for use
in bombs, shells and grenades. A US Army historian specu-
lates that this was actually a reference to ricin, saying that
ricin was the only toxin or biological agent that he knew had
been studied as a weapon — as a fill for 75-mm artillery shell
— by the Army during World War I. Intelligence of German
research on ricin had been the stimulus.
6 October In Washington DC, there is a conference
on Prevention of Biothreats: A Look Ahead. The event brings
together more than 150 administration officials, policy ana-
lysts, scientists, health leaders, congressional staff members,
and members of the media to discuss ways of countering the
threat from biological weapons. The conference is organized
by the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh,
hosted by the Center in collaboration with the Commission on
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
and Terrorism, and funded by the Alfred P Sloan Foundation.
7 October The US Government Accountability Office
transmits to Congress Homeland Defense: Planning,
Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD’s Response
to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
High-Yield Explosive Incidents. The report identifies the ex-
tent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive inci-
dents (CBRNE) consequence management plans and capa-
bilities are integrated with other federal plans; how DOD has
planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE conse-
quence management assistance; to what extent DOD’s
CBRNE consequence management response forces (CCMRF)
are prepared for their mission; and the extent to which DOD
has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for
specialized CBRNE capabilities. The conclusion of the report
is as follows: “Until all CBRNE plans that are being developed
under the Integrated Planning System are complete, it will be
difficult for DOD to know whether its considerable body of
operational plans will adequately address anticipated gaps in
the capabilities needed to respond to multiple, near-simulta-
neous, CBRNE incidents. DOD will also need to overcome
challenges related to sourcing its CBRNE Consequence Man-
agement Response Forces, including issues regarding coor-
dinating with states about the availability and deployment sta-
tus of National Guard units, integrating Guard and Reserve
units with active duty forces, and ensuring that forces charged
with dual missions are properly trained to function effectively
when called on for consequence management response…
Because each of the CCMRFs are comprised of units that are
geographically dispersed, from both the Active and Reserve
Components, and from all of the military services, it must
have opportunities to train as a complete force before assum-
ing the mission and to demonstrate its capability to success-
fully conduct the mission, including the ability to deploy rap-
idly. For the mission to succeed, it is critical to ensure that
each unit can meet its designated response time. Because
DOD has not developed complete and approved requirements
for the CCMRF mission and fully defined and monitored fund-
ing responsibilities, it lacks full visibility across the depart-
ment for this mission. Without an overarching approach to
develop full and complete mission requirements, an approach
and mechanisms in place to fully support those requirements,
and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements
have been identified and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry
out this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and
effectively could be in jeopardy.” The report sets out a series
of recommendations for the DOD to adopt in order to rectify
the “absence of completed plans under the Integrated Plan-
ning System or other specific guidance on DOD’s expected
contribution to the federal response to a domestic CBRNE-
related incident.”
8 October China is strengthening its surveillance
activities after detecting the presence of sarin along its border
with North Korea, in Liaoning province, in November 2008 and
February 2009, so reports the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, citing
unidentified Chinese military sources. The Chinese special
operations forces reportedly found 0.015-0.03 micrograms of
the gas per cubic metre whilst conducting regular surveys
along the border. At the time there were reportedly strong winds
blowing from the North Korean side of the border. The sources
are quoted as saying that the Chinese authorities suspect the
release as having resulted from some experiments or acci-
dents within North Korea.
8 October In Tehran, Iran, a revolutionary court has
handed down the first death sentence against a man accused
of involvement in the protests following the recent disputed
presidential election – whose indictment also included receiv-
ing instructions on how to construct a chemical weapon from
a fellow member of an Iranian group in exile – so reports The
(London) Guardian. Mohammad Reza Ali-Zamani had report-
edly confessed to working for the group – the Iran Monarchy
Committee, considered by the Iranian authorities to be a ter-
rorist organization – during a series of public mass trials that
commenced in August. Prosecutors alleged, amongst other
things, that he plotted political assassinations with US mili-
tary officials in Iraq before returning to Iran “aiming at causing
disruption during and after the election”.
12 October At UN headquarters, President of the
sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly Ali Abdussalam
Treki receives a letter from a group of seven medical doctors
and academics setting out reports relating to the birth of de-
formed babies in Fallujah, Iraq [see 8 Nov 05, Fallujah]. The
letter states: “In September 2009, Fallujah General Hospital
had 170 new born babies, 24 per cent of whom were dead
within the first seven days, a staggering 75 per cent of the
dead babies were classified as deformed. This can be com-
pared with data from the month of August in 2002 where there
were 530 new born babies of whom six were dead within the
first seven days and only one birth defect was reported…
[W]hat is more alarming is that doctors in Fallujah have said,
‘a significant number of babies that do survive begin to de-
velop severe disabilities at a later stage’… We request from
the United Nations General Assembly the following: 1. To
acknowledge that there is a serious problem regarding the
unprecedented number of birth defects and cancer cases in
Iraq specifically in Fallujah, Basra, Baghdad and Al-Najaf. 2.
To set up an independent committee to conduct a full investi-
gation into the problem of the increased number of birth de-
fects and cancers in Iraq. 3. To implement the cleaning up of
toxic materials used by the occupying forces including De-
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pleted Uranium, and White Phosphorus. 4. To prevent chil-
dren and adults entering contaminated areas to minimize ex-
posure to these hazards. 5. To investigate whether war crimes,
or crimes against humanity, have been committed.” The seven
signatories are Nawal Majeed Al-Sammarai, David Halpin,
Malak Hamdan, Chris Burns-Cox, Haithem Alshaibani, Yasmin
Alibhai-Brown and Nicholas Wood.
13 October In Charleston, South Carolina, a man who
had been charged with threatening to kill President George W
Bush, pleads guilty in a federal court to a series of charges,
including plotting to use biological weapons to attack other
government officials. The Associated Press reports that
Steven Cucuzzella, who was arrested earlier this year, had
been charged with making a threat against the president, but
the charge was eventually dropped. He now faces up to ten
years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.
13 October In Oklahoma City, Ted Cieslak, the Depart-
ment of Defense’s liaison officer to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, gives a lecture on Biowarfare and Bio-
terrorism: A Primer at the Oklahoma University of Public Health.
13-16 October At OPCW headquarters, the Executive
Council convenes for its fifty-eighth [see 14-17 Jul] session,
which is again chaired by Jorge Lomónaco Tonda, Permanent
Representative of Mexico
The following delegations make statements during the gen-
eral debate: Cuba (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
and China), Sweden (on behalf of the European Union and
associated countries), South Africa (on behalf of the African
Group), China, Russia, the UK, Pakistan, Brazil, India, Saudi
Arabia, Japan, Ukraine, Libya, the USA, Iran, Indonesia (ob-
server), Nigeria, South Korea, and Iraq (observer).
The Council notes a status report by Director-General
Rogelio Pfirter on the progress made by those parties that
have been granted extensions of deadlines for chemdemil.
The report states: “As at 30 September 2009, the aggregate
amount of Category 1 chemical weapons destroyed by [South
Korea], Albania, India, [Russia], and the [USA] was approxi-
mately 35,892 metric tonnes, or approximately 51.70 per cent
of the declared quantity of this category of chemical weap-
ons. [South Korea], Albania, and India had completed the
destruction of all their Category 1 chemical weapons, while
[Libya] had yet to commence destroying the Category 1 chemi-
cal weapons it had declared…. Since the last status report
submitted by the Director-General [on 16 April 2009, the ag-
gregate amount of Category 2 chemical weapons destroyed
to date remained unchanged – 915.575 [metric tonnes], or
51.84 per cent, of the total amount declared. Albania, India,
[Russia], and the [USA] completed the destruction of all their
declared Category 2 chemical weapons, whereas [Libya] de-
stroyed 39 per cent of the amount it had declared… [Libya]
has destroyed all of its Category 3 chemical weapons, as well
as 551 [metric tonnes], or 39 per cent, of its Category 2 chemi-
cal weapons. It also completed the reloading of mustard and
two chemical weapons precursors at the Ruwagha Chemical
Reloading System at the end of April 2009, as the preparatory
stage for transportation to the Rabta chemical weapons de-
struction facility… As at 30 September 2009, [Russia] had
destroyed 16,024 [metric tonnes] of its Category 1 chemical
weapons, or 40.10 per cent, of the aggregate amount de-
clared… [Russia] has also destroyed all of its declared Cat-
egory 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons… As at 30 Sep-
tember 2009, the [USA] had destroyed 18,200 [metric tonnes]
of Category 1 chemical weapons, or 65.54 per cent, of its
declared stockpile. It had also destroyed 0.010 [metric tonnes]
of Category 2 chemical weapons, following the unplanned re-
covery and destruction of three munitions filled with chloropi-
crin. The [USA] has destroyed all of its declared Category 3
chemical weapons.”
The Council notes that part of the status report regarding a
request by Libya for an extension of its chemdemil deadlines
[see 14-17 Jul]. The report states: “[Libya] has submitted a re-
quest for extension of the intermediate and final deadlines for
the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile,
as follows: phase 1 (1 per cent), to be completed by 1 Novem-
ber 2010; phase 2 (20 per cent), to be completed by 15 Decem-
ber 2010; phase 3 (45 per cent), to be completed by 31 January
2011; and phase 4 (100 per cent), to be completed by 15 May
2011. It has further called upon the Council to consider its ex-
tension request and to adopt a recommendation on that request,
to be forwarded to the Conference for consideration at its four-
teenth session.” The Council considers the request and approves
a recommendation that the matter be considered by the Confer-
ence of States Parties at its fourteenth session.
The Council notes the opening statement of Director-Gen-
eral Rogelio Pfirter regarding implementation of Article VII of
the Convention. Since the last annual report on the status of
implementation submitted to the Council at its fifty-fourth ses-
sion [see 14-17 Oct 08], five more CWC parties have desig-
nated or established national authorities, i.e. Bahamas,
Comoros, Congo, Dominican Republic and Iraq. The total
number of parties that have fulfilled their obligations to desig-
nate national authorities now stands at 97 per cent. The number
of parties that have adopted legislation “covering all key ar-
eas” of the CWC increased by four since the last report on the
status of implementation, which corresponds to 46 per cent of
the total. Another forty-two parties have laws in place that
cover various key aspects.
The Council considers and notes national papers by Libya,
Russia and the USA on the status of their destruction activi-
ties. It also considers and notes a national paper by China
entitled ‘Report on the Status of the Chemical Weapons Aban-
doned by Japan in China’ and a national paper by Japan enti-
tled ‘The Report on the Current Status of the ACW Projects in
China (Reporting Period: from 1 April to 30 June 2009)’.
The Council decides to establish a facilitation to develop
guidelines, which would in future be read together with the
Convention, for the security and destruction of chemical weap-
ons that come into the possession and/or control of a CWC
parties in situations not foreseen by the Convention, including
conflict situations and otherwise.
The Council requests its chair “to engage in informal
consultations with interested delegations on how and when to
initiate discussion by the Council on issues related to meeting
the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical
weapons and to keep the Council informed of these
consultations”.
The Council considers notes by Chairman Lomónaco Tonda
regarding the withdrawal by Algeria, Finland, Germany, Indo-
nesia, Switzerland, and the UK of their candidates for the ap-
pointment to the position of Director-General. The Council rec-
ommends that the Conference at its fourteenth session ap-
point Ahmet Üzümcü as OPCW Director-General for a term of
office beginning on 25 July 2010 and ending on 24 July 2014.
An OPCW press release describes Ahmet Üzümcü as “a ca-
reer diplomat with extensive multilateral experience in politi-
cal-military affairs and disarmament and proliferation issues”.
He is currently the Permanent Representative of Turkey to
the United Nations Office at Geneva. [Note: There had been
much constructive farsightedness in the presentation that
Ambassador Üzümcü had made to the Executive Council
during the selection process [see 14-17 Jul]. For example, on
the issue of the time-limited tenure policy for OPCW staff, he
had spoken of its specific benefits but had added: “Neverthe-
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less, it might be advisable to retain a core staff to ensure
continuity. The individual performance of the staff and the
need of the organization should determine the composition
and the percentage of this group.” And he had never once
used the expression ‘weapon of mass destruction’.]
14 October Russian Head of the International Coop-
eration Office for Chemical Weapons Storage and Disposal
Department Sergei Serbin says Russia has now destroyed a
total of 16,705 metric tons, or nearly forty-two per cent, of its
chemical weapons stockpile. Speaking during a press confer-
ence near the Shchuchye chemdemil facility, Serbin says:
“The disposal is proceeding as planned… The yearly target
for Russia has been accomplished by 77 per cent. As for the
Shchuchye facility, it has destroyed 86 percent of the yearly
target.” He adds that nearly 776 of the 5,450 metric tons of
sarin nerve agent stored at the Shchuchye facility have now
been destroyed. [See also 14 Sep]
14 October In Brussels, there is a Security and De-
fence Agenda (SDA) roundtable on raising Biopreparedness
Levels in Europe. Among those leading the discussion are
World Health Organization Assistant Secretary-General
Susanne Weber-Mosdorf and former US White House Senior
Director Biological Defense Policy Robert Kadlec. The SDA
report on the roundtable is published some two months later.
16 October At UN headquarters, OPCW Director
General Rogelio Pfirter addresses the General Assembly
Committee on Disarmament and International Security during
its thematic debate on WMD. In his address to the Committee,
Pfirter commends Russia and the USA for their commitment
to chemdemil, but notes the short time remaining for them to
complete their destruction activities. Pfirter says that to date
Russia has destroyed 16,024 metric tons of its Category I
chemical weapons, or 40.1 per cent of its declared aggregate
amount. The USA, he says, has destroyed 18,200 metric tons,
or 65.54 per cent of its chemical weapons. He notes that the
OPWC Executive Council is considering a proposal that would
require the Council Chairman to engage in information
consultations with all interested delegations on the feasibility of
revised deadlines [see 13-16 Oct]. Pfirter says that since entry
into force of the CWC [see 29 Apr 97], the OPCW has conducted
3,812 inspections in the territories of 81 CWC parties; however,
5,576 facilities remained liable for inspection. The number of
inspections, he says, should be increased. According to Pfirter,
reinforcing the verification regime is necessary for maintaining
confidence in the CWC. [See also 13-16 Oct]
16 October In New York, there is a seminar on mat-
ters pertaining to chemical weapons dumped at sea. The semi-
nar, which takes place on the sidelines of the meeting of the
General Assembly Committee on Disarmament and Interna-
tional Security [see 16 Oct], is organized by the government
of Lithuania. It brings together representatives from the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, experts from the
OPCW, the Committee on Disarmament and International
Security, and representatives from non-governmental organi-
zations. In a press release, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs states that the previous day – during a meeting with
UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio de
Queiroz Duarte – Lithuanian permanent representative to the
OPCW Vaidotas Verba said that in 2010 Lithuania would
present a resolution on sea-dumped chemical weapons to the
Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Ac-
cording to the press release, Duarte assured Lithuania’s rep-
resentatives that the Office for Disarmament Affairs supported
the initiative.
Three days later, in Washington DC, speaking at a semi-
nar in the offices of Global Green USA, Verba says the main
object of the resolution would be “to encourage dialogue be-
tween the countries affected”.
19 October The Seoul Choson Ilbo reports that a da-
tabase belonging to the South Korean army command was
hacked into on 5 March 2009, resulting in the loss of around
two thousand national secrets, including information on how
to respond to chemical accidents and on around seven hun-
dred South Korean toxic chemicals manufacturers. The Na-
tional Institute of Environmental Research, which created the
Chemical Accident Response Information System, reportedly
terminated its Internet connection to the army command a
day after the attack, having been tipped off by the South Ko-
rean intelligence service. The chemicals monitored by the
System include acetone, alcohol, paint thinner and other or-
ganic solvents, sulphuric acid, hydrochloric acid and benzene,
and heavy metals including lead, mercury and cadmium.
Chosun Ilbo cites the November edition of its sister maga-
zine, Monthly Chosun, which states it obtained the informa-
tion from the office of the prime minister. Meanwhile, Yonhap
news agency reports the password to the database as having
been leaked after the computer of an army colonel became
infected with a virus whilst he was visiting an Internet portal
site. The agency quotes an unidentified military official as
saying that South Korea does not rule out the possibility of
North Korea having been involved in the attack.
19 October The US Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) announces having commenced “a half-billion dollar
grant program” on ways “to reduce, eliminate and counter bio-
logical, chemical, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion” threats to the USA. The DTRA says it is looking for “white-
paper proposals” from accredited colleges and universities,
as well as from commercial businesses and non-profit organi-
zations. Individual grants under the Fundamental Research to
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction programme are ex-
pected to range from $150,000 to $300,000 per annum.
20-21 October In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, there is a work-
shop on the BWC, which is jointly organized by the govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia and the BWC Implementation Support
Unit. Participating in the workshop are governmental officials
and technical experts from Saudi Arabia and the other Mem-
ber States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, i.e. Bahrain, Ku-
wait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir-
ates. Amongst others, the Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre (VERTIC), London also plays a leading
role in the event. The workshop addresses a number of themes,
including the potential biological weapons threat to humans,
animals, plants, food safety and the economy in the Gulf
states; actions taken by the international community in re-
sponse to such threats, including the BWC and UN Security
Council resolution 1540 [see 28 Apr 04]; approaches to effec-
tive national implementation of the BWC; and recent scien-
tific and technological developments relevant to the biological
weapons threat and options for the effective oversight thereof.
Presentations are made by Piers Millett of the Implementa-
tion Support Unit on ‘The Biological Weapons Threat’, and
‘Scientific and Technological Developments’; Richard Lennane
of the Implementation Support Unit on ‘Responding to the
Threat: the BWC and SCR 1540’, and ‘Assistance, Coopera-
tion and Coordination’; Scott Spence of VERTIC on ‘National
Implementation of the BWC and SCR 1540’, and ‘National
Implementation Measures Project’; Angela Woodward of
VERTIC on ‘Confidence-building Measures’; and Richard
Lennane and Angela Woodward on ‘Regional Perspectives:
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The BWC in the Middle East’. In addition, a number of presen-
tations are made by Saudi governmental officials around the
general theme of ‘National Perspectives in Saudi Arabia’.
21 October In the USA, the Commission on the Pre-
vention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism releases The Clock is Ticking: A Progress Report
on America’s Preparedness to Prevent Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. The 27-page interim
report is a precursor to a ‘report card’ that the Commission is
scheduled to release in January 2010, which will grade the
Administration and Congress on their progress in implement-
ing the recommendations set out in the Commission’s earlier
report World at Risk [see 2 Dec 08]. Amongst other things,
the report states: “The Commission believes the US govern-
ment needs to move more aggressively to limit the effects of
a biological attack. While the President did appoint a WMD
Coordinator, the Commission strongly recommends that a
senior political appointee with extensive biodefense and pub-
lic health background be assigned to the National Security
Council staff… The Obama Administration’s request for [Bio-
medical Advanced Research and Development Authority] in
FY 2010 was only $305 million. That is insufficient by a factor
of 10 [see also 22 Sep]… The nation also needs to invest in
rapid, point-of-care diagnostic tests […] Most importantly,
point-of-care diagnostic tests would improve the nation’s abil-
ity to treat people by providing a more timely and accurate
diagnosis.” During a panel discussion at George Washington
University, Commission Chairman Bob Graham says: “We
hope [the interim report] will be a wake-up call to action so
that our final report will be as both accurate and as positive for
the American people in terms of what their government is do-
ing for their security.”
26 October In Wiltshire, UK, scientists at DTSL Porton
Down are developing a type of paint capable of absorbing
chemical biological and radiological agents so as to provide
protection to personnel operating inside and around a treated
vehicle, so reports the Salisbury Journal. Steven Mitchell, the
scientist leading the research, says the paint is being devel-
oped from strippable coatings that are currently used to pro-
vide temporary camouflage for vehicles, and that reactive
coatings are being studied that contain catalysts and possi-
ble enzymes in order to create self-decontaminating coatings.
Mitchell says: “Ultimately, what we’d like to create is a coat-
ing that changes colour to indicate its been contaminated,
decontaminates itself, then returns to the original colour when
it’s clean… This is a long-term but not an unreasonable ulti-
mate objective.” Meanwhile, BBC News Online quotes Mitchell
as saying: “There are a number of advantages to this technol-
ogy. One is its flexibility; it is easy to apply and easy to re-
move. You can change your colour or your signature in thea-
tre in a relatively straightforward manner… [Y]ou could apply
it with a paint brush, or you could apply it with a roller… That’s
important for potential use in theatre because you might not
have a sophisticated paint spray system available.”
26 October In the UK, the University of Bradford Non-
lethal Weapons Research Project publishes Dangerous Am-
biguities: Regulation of Riot Control Agents and Incapacitants
under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The report, written
by Michael Crowley, examines how riot control agents (RCAs)
and incapacitants – and related means of dispersal and deliv-
ery – are regulated under the CWC. It also assesses through
case studies, how effectively the Convention’s reporting, veri-
fication and compliance mechanisms have been applied to
these chemical agents and means of delivery. The report
states: “[A]lthough RCAs are defined under the CWC, the
scope and nature of their permissible use in situations of armed
conflict and in law enforcement operations are ambiguously
regulated, due in part to the Convention’s failure to describe
and demarcate ‘method of warfare’ and ‘law enforcement’…
[T]here has been a failure by the OPCW oversight and policy
making organs to effectively monitor implementation of the
Convention with regard to RCAs and incapacitants and to take
action where reports of possible breaches of the Convention
have become public… Whilst the international governmental
community has been unable or unwilling to address the ambi-
guities and weaknesses in the CWC regulatory regime, a
number of countries have permitted activities that may under-
mine (and potentially breach) the Convention and/or may be
in contravention of relevant international law. The areas of
concern highlighted by this report include: the reported mis-
use of riot control agents by law enforcement officials, mili-
tary personnel and private military company employees; the
development and use of incapacitants; and the manufacture
of certain munitions containing chemical agents.” A unique
feature of the report is its detailed and documented overview
of RCA abuse by law-enforcement and other officials, includ-
ing gross violations of human rights. The report also describes
a major shift that is apparently taking place in the UK govern-
ment’s interpretation of the law-enforcement provisions of the
CWC. The report concludes by setting out a number of policy
recommendations relating to riot control agents and
incapacitants for consideration by CWC parties, including that
concerned parties “create informal intergovernmental mecha-
nisms seeking to clarify ambiguities and obscurities in the
CWC and to address the perceived limitations of OPCW struc-
tures and mechanisms”. Subsequently, Global Security
Newswire quotes a “US official with knowledge of the issue”,
speaking on condition of anonymity, as saying that attempt-
ing to define “law enforcement” would be an extremely sensi-
tive topic for debate that would quickly extend beyond mat-
ters covered by the CWC. The official is also quoted as say-
ing “We certainly wouldn’t have put that at the top of the list of
the things to discuss at the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
The official adds that the USA was not opposed to discussing
incapacitants, but that those pressing the issue had been
“poorly prepared” at the last CWC Review Conference.
26 October The US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) says that “to make a complete judgment about whether
the anthrax drug raxibacumab should be licensed for market-
ing is not possible”. The FDA makes the announcement fol-
lowing concerns about the reliability of some of the data col-
lected on how the experimental anthrax treatment is absorbed
by the human body, delivered throughout the body and me-
tabolized. Although studies on monkeys and rabbits exposed
to anthrax indicated the drug was a safe countermeasure to
infection, the FDA says more information is needed to make
an assessment on the size of a human dose of the drug. It
says that it will decide if the manufacturer, Human Genome
Sciences Inc, needs to run additional animal or human stud-
ies of the drug after having completed an investigation of the
data and after having received advice from a panel of outside
experts. The drug, known commercially as ABthrax, was de-
veloped under Project BioShield [see 21 Jul 04].
27 October In Haifa, Israel, the Rambam Hospital has
in recent days opened a new emergency facility that provides
protection from missiles and chemical weapons, so reports
Arutz Sheva. The hospital reportedly came under fire by
Hezbollah during Israel’s offensive against the organization
three years previously [see 14 Jul 06]. The director of the
hospital, Rafi Beyar, says the new facility is the first stage of
a plan that includes the establishment of a secure three-quarters
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of an acre underground hospital for 1,730 patients, a children’s
hospital and facilities for cancer care and for cardiac treatment,
and a tower for clinical research.
27 October US Department of Homeland Security
Secretary Janet Napolitano announces the release of proposed
new safety guidelines to protect first responders operating in
major cities following an anthrax attack. Measures include
individual protective gear as well as decontamination and clean-
ing protocols. The public has one month to comment on the
guidelines.
27-28 October In Rabat, Morocco, there is the seventh
[see 11-13 Nov 08] regional meeting of the African CWC na-
tional authorities. The purpose of the meeting – which is or-
ganized by the government of Morocco and the OPCW – is to
provide the opportunity for national authority representatives
to exchange experiences, develop contacts and discuss ac-
tivities to be undertaken in Africa that will further enhance
sub-regional and regional cooperation. Fifty participants from
the following thirty-six CWC parties attend the meeting: Alge-
ria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Níger, Nigeria, Sao Tome
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Af-
rica, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
27-30 October In Singapore, there is a Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative (PSI) maritime exercise – Deep Sabre II [see
15-18 Aug 05] – at Changi Naval Base. Participating in the
exercise are representatives from the following eighteen PSI
members: Argentina, Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the
United Arab Emirates and the USA. In addition, representa-
tives of three non-members – Malaysia, India and Pakistan –
attend as observers. In total, more than two thousand person-
nel participate in, or observe, the exercise, whilst eighteen
vessels and eight aircraft are called into action.
28-30 October In Hanoi, Viet Nam, there is the seventh
[see 4-6 Nov 08] regional meeting of CWC national authorities
in Asia. Participating in the meeting, which is hosted by the
government of Viet Nam, are more than fifty representatives
from the following thirty CWC parties: Australia, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, South
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, the
USA, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam and Yemen. In addition, a repre-
sentative from Myanmar, a non-party, also attends the meet-
ing. During the meeting participants exchange views on en-
hancing regional and sub-regional cooperation, identify areas
for possible cooperation, and hold bilateral meetings with OPCW
Technical Secretariat staff on national implementation issues.
28-30 October In The Hague, 350 international experts
convene for the second annual CBRNe World Conference and
Exhibition. In his keynote speech, OPCW Director-General
Rogelio Pfirter provides an overview of OPCW collaborative
activities with a variety of stakeholders globally and at the na-
tional level aimed at ensuring full implementation of the CWC.
29 October In Cleveland, Australia, a veterinarian who
was involved in the first known Hendra outbreak that claimed
the life of a horse trainer in 1994 says that the US Department
of Homeland Security is funding research into the Hendra and
Nipah viruses for fear that they could be used as biological
weapons. Speaking during a Queensland Horse Council con-
ference on the Hendra virus, which is attended by horse own-
ers and bat carers in Cleveland, Peter Reid says: “There is no
effective treatment or vaccine for Hendra or Nipah and the
mortality rate is high… Bats are quite accessible and in the
wrong hands it can pose quite a threat.”
30 October South Korea and the USA have agreed
that the US military would take charge of securing or destroy-
ing North Korean weapons of mass destruction and marine
amphibious assaults in the event of internal instability within
North Korea, according to the commander of the ROK-US
Combined Forces Command (CFC). Making his comments
during a seminar, General Walter Sharp says that the arrange-
ment – which is part of the newly-developed bilateral Opera-
tional Plan (OPLAN) 5029, which outlines specific courses of
action to cope with various levels of internal turmoil in the
North, such as a mass inflow of North Korean refugees, a civil
war provoked by revolt or coup, South Korean hostages being
held in North Korea and natural disasters – will continue even
after South Korea assumes operational control of its troops
from the USA on 17 April 2012. Subsequently, Defense News
quotes an unidentified South Korean CFC commander as say-
ing: “There are various case-by-case scenarios in the opera-
tional plan… Both troops will conduct contingency operations
jointly or independently in accordance with emerging situa-
tions. That is, the US military will take charge of WMD elimi-
nation works if needed.” Defense News, however, quotes
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff as neither confirming nor
denying the existence of the plan, saying only that it has a
conceptual plan (CONPLAN) on North Korean contingency
situations.
Ten days later, a commentary on OPLAN 5029 by the North
Korean Workers’ Party Rodong Sinmun, which is also carried
by the official KCNA news agency, reads thus: “The warlike
forces classified ‘the emergency situation’ into ‘a regime
change’ in the dignified DPRK, ‘the spread of WMDs’ and non-
sensical ‘rebellion’, etc. Their concoction of such farcical
events which can never happen in the DPRK is an unpardon-
able provocation to it… Those forces went the lengths of simu-
lating all sorts of nonsensical events and citing them as pre-
texts for mounting pre-emptive attacks on the DPRK.”
30 October In Manila, Philippines, Canadian Ambas-
sador to the Philippines Robert Desjardins and Philippine Un-
dersecretary for Public Safety, Department of Interior and Local
Government Marius Corpus sign a Memorandum of Under-
standing under which Canada will donate the Philippines P10
million of CBRN event response equipment for use by fire
brigades based in Cebu, Davao and Manila. These three cit-
ies are where the Canadian government has been conducting
its international first responder training courses. On the courses,
Desjardins says: “All good things must come to an end and
after four years of direct training, it is time to eventually move
on and move out… We have trained a dozen trainers. This is
an example of knowledge transmitted and multiplied
exponentially.” Jennette Jusayan, chief of the Bureau of Fire
Protection Public Information Office points out that this is the
second time that the Canadian government has donated such
equipment [see 30 Jul 08].
30 October The UK Ministry of Defence has denied
that any contamination occurred as a result of the testing of
an anthrax bomb in the Burry estuary – on the Gower penin-
sula in Wales – in 1942, so reports BBC News Online. In
response to concerns about water quality and the death of
February 2010                                                                page 59                                                                    CBWCB 86
cockles in the estuary, an unidentified MoD spokesman is
quoted as saying: “The Gower coast was often used for muni-
tion testing during WWII. However, a bacterial weapon was
only tested once, in 1942, when a 30-lb bomb charged with
anthrax spores was dropped from a Blenheim aircraft at 5000
feet. There was no residual contamination of the site as it was
washed by the incoming tide. No other biological weapons
trial was done at Penclawdd and no other species of bacteria
were used.” The Member of Parliament for Llanelli, Nia Griffith,
has now written to the MoD asking for further details on the
test. According to BBC News Online, the testing of the bomb
first emerged in an article written by Llanelli historian Gerald
Grant [but see 20 Jul 99].
30 October The US Government Accountability Office
(GAO) transmits to Congress Supply Chain Security: Feasi-
bility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Con-
gress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan
100 Percent of US-Bound Containers. The report assesses
the progress made by Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
– within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – to im-
plement the requirement in the 9/11 Commission Act that 100
per cent of US-bound cargo containers be scanned by 2012
and its consequent implementation of the Secure Freight Ini-
tiative (SFI). The report states that that whilst CBP has been
able to scan a majority of the US-bound cargo containers at
the comparatively low volume ports, it has not achieved sus-
tained scanning rates above five percent at the comparatively
larger ports. It concludes thus: Challenges in scanning US-
bound cargo containers […] have raised questions about the
feasibility of scanning 100 per cent of US-bound cargo con-
tainers. While CBP officials have stated that they may not be
able to overcome these challenges based on the experiences
of the SFI program to date, the agency has not conducted an
analysis of the feasibility of implementing 100 per cent scan-
ning… DHS and CBP officials have acknowledged that they
will likely not be able to achieve 100 per cent scanning of US-
bound cargo containers by 2012, and expressed concerns over
the feasibility, costs, and security benefits associated with
the requirement. However, without conducting feasibility and
cost-benefit analyses, DHS and CBP will not be able to fully
evaluate various alternatives for implementing the 100 per cent
scanning requirement or other alternatives that enhance cargo
container security in a cost-efficient manner.” The report rec-
ommends therefore that CBP complete a feasibility analysis,
cost estimates, and a cost-benefit analysis, and provide these
results to Congress.
30 October In Oregon, the Department of Environmen-
tal Quality (DEQ) announces that a court has issued a sum-
mary judgment against the environmental organization GASP
which had requested a court order preventing the Umatilla
chemdemil facility from incinerating its bulk containers of
mustard agent on the grounds that mercury could also be
present. Multnomah County Circuit Judge Michael Marcus rules
that incineration is currently the best method for destroying
mustard agent at the facility and that filters in use at disposal
plant “were the best applicable technology”. Marcus also re-
jects arguments that the plant was operating illegally, given
the status of state environmental permits, and supports the
State’s decision to permit a temporary experimental programme
to incinerate mustard agent containers.
2 November In Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov rejects yet another request by UK Foreign Min-
ister David Miliband that Russia extradite Andrei Lugovoi [see
21 May 08] to the UK in connection with the poisoning of
Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium-210 [see 11
Nov 06]. At a joint press conference following a meeting of
the two ministers, Miliband says: “We did discuss this issue
in some detail. I emphasised the importance we continue to
attach to the request made by our independent prosecuting
authorities in respect of the murder of Mr Litvinenko.” In re-
sponse, however, Lavrov says: “Our position hasn’t changed.
Our British colleagues understand that.” He says that Rus-
sia’s constitution prevents the extradition to the UK of Lugovoi,
a former agent with the Federal Security Service, and that
Russia would be prepared to prosecute him, although thus far
UK prosecutors have failed to present “sufficient” evidence to
make this possible. Miliband, however, says that the Crown
Prosecution Service has already handed “full” and “substan-
tial” information to its Russian counterparts [see 22 May 07].
As regards the Russian constitution preventing Lugovoi’s ex-
tradition, Lavrov says: “I believe our British colleagues under-
stand their demand – that we amend our constitution – is ab-
solutely unrealistic.” Miliband’s visit, which is aimed at focus-
ing on issues of “common ground”, marks the first visit to
Russia by a UK foreign secretary for five years.
The next day, in an interview with The (London) Times,
Lugovoi says he is innocent of any involvement in the death
of Litvinenko and claims that Litvinenko had tried to recruit
him to work for MI6 when the two met in London in 2006.
Lugovoi says: “My message to David Miliband is that he should
acknowledge that Litvinenko was part of British special serv-
ices. But he is silent about that. The rest is just lies.”
2 November The US Department of Homeland Secu-
rity Office of Inspector General releases a redacted version of
CBP’s [Customs and Border Protection’s] Ability to Detect
Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Contain-
ers. The report by Inspector General Richard L Skinner “ad-
dresses the tools, information, and guidance that the US Cus-
toms and Border Protection officers use to examine high-risk
containers that potentially contain biological and chemical
weapons”. It states: “US Customs and Border Protection has
taken steps to mitigate the threat of nuclear and radiological
weapons in maritime cargo containers, but could do more to
mitigate the threats posed by biological and chemical weap-
ons. Customs and Border Protection officials said that new
devices are currently being developed and tested that could
help officers rapidly detect and identify biological and chemi-
cal threats during cargo inspections. However, Customs and
Border Protection has not conducted a formal risk assess-
ment to determine which pathways, including maritime cargo,
pose the highest risk of biological and chemical weapons en-
tering the Nation. Conducting a formal risk assessment of the
various pathways would help ensure that Customs and Bor-
der Protection allocates its detection technology development
resources to threat pathways that pose the highest risk to
national security… In addition, Customs and Border Protec-
tion needs updated policies and procedures on how inspec-
tions for such threats are to be conducted. Currently, operat-
ing procedures do not require that [REDACTED] nor do they
describe [REDACTED] conduct the inspections. Without up-
dated policies to focus cargo inspections, biological and chemi-
cal threats may go undetected… Customs and Border Pro-
tection concurred with our recommendations to complete a
risk assessment and update its policies and procedures for
inspecting cargo containers for biological and chemical
threats.” The report was compiled in accordance with the re-
quirement set out in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transpor-
tation Security Act 2004, which calls for an annual evaluation
of the current cargo targeting and inspection systems for con-
tainerized cargo.
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3 November In Ukraine, where a flu epidemic has for
some weeks been gripping the country in the run-up to presi-
dential elections, rumours are to be heard that biological-war-
fare experiments are the cause of the epidemic. Prime Minis-
ter (and presidential candidate) Yulia Timoshenko later says
that, as of 8 November, the number of new cases of the so far
unidentified strain of flu has dropped to 32,448 from 127,252
five days previously. According to Bloomberg, the number of
confirmed cases now stands at 969,247 and the number of
deaths at 155; swine flu has been confirmed in 65 cases, 14 of
which were fatal. Earlier in the month, a team of experts from
the World Health Organization (WHO) arrived in Ukraine to in-
vestigate the outbreak [see also 25 Apr Geneva]. At a joint
press conference with Timoshenko, the head of the Ukrainian
WHO mission, Jukka Pukkila, says it is too early to draw any
conclusions. The situation in Ukraine, he says, is “similar to
what we see in other countries,” adding that the epidemic may
“go on for several weeks or maybe even couple of months”.
3 November In Washington DC, there is a summit of
US and European Union leaders on ways of enhancing coop-
eration to address bilateral, regional and global challenges,
including non-proliferation and disarmament. A declaration on
non-proliferation and disarmament, annexed to a joint decla-
ration issued at the end of the summit, states: “We support
[United Nations Security Council resolution 1540] [see 28 Apr
04], welcome its recent comprehensive review, and will con-
tinue our consultations to better coordinate third country as-
sistance that promotes adherence to the obligations imposed
by 1540 as we work together towards full implementation of
the Resolution, including in such areas as export controls and
regional centers to promote cooperative efforts. We call on all
states to implement the measures included in the Resolution
and urge all states and regional and international organiza-
tions to cooperate with the Committee established by that
Resolution…We will continue to work toward universalisation
and full implementation of the [CWC] and we support, to this
end, the work of the [OPCW]. We will also work for the univer-
salisation and full implementation of the [BTWC] and we en-
courage, in this regard, the work of the Implementation Sup-
port Unit. We continue to support the intersessional Program
of Work, including efforts to improve the ability of all nations
to recognize and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease.
We will continue to work together to find ways to address the
evolution of the biological weapon threat, and to promote com-
pliance with the BTWC by greater transparency and effective
implementation.”
4 November The OPCW Technical Secretariat posts
on its website a 14-page document entitled Summary of Veri-
fication Activities in 2007. It contains unusually detailed offi-
cial information about the Verification Division’s activities dur-
ing calendar year 2007. A covering Note by the Director-Gen-
eral portrays this webposting as a new initiative designed to
improve transparency. The release had been preceded by
several months of informal consultation by the Secretariat and
the chair of the OPCW Executive Council with a number of
CWC states parties.
4 November The US Senate approves the appointment
of Tara O’Toole as Under Secretary for the Science and Tech-
nology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security
[see 6 May].
4 November In Washington DC, the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee approves a bill
intended, amongst other things, to improve security at US
biological research facilities. The Weapons of Mass Destruction
Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009 classifies the list
of select agents and toxins into three tiers, and makes the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for
establishing high security standards for laboratories that handle
select agents. The Department of Health and Human Services
Department, meanwhile, would oversee sites in the remaining
two tiers. The bill also instructs the Director of National
Intelligence to improve US intelligence capabilities relating to
WMD and terrorism and authorizes the establishment of a
National Bioforensics Analysis Center to identify perpetrators
of biological attacks. It also requires that a national strategy
be established for dispensing medication to the public via the
US Postal Service in the event of a biological attack. In
addition, it would authorize US technical assistance to
countries seeking help to bolster security at their laboratories.
5 November At UN headquarters, after two days of
debate, the General Assembly endorses the findings and rec-
ommendations set out in the report of the United Nations Fact
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, which also addressed
the use by Israeli forces of white phosphorus [see also 8 Sep].
The resolution calls for independent investigations of alleged
war crimes to be established by both the Palestinian Author-
ity and Israel within three months. It also requests Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon to transmit the report to the Security
Council and to report back to the Assembly in three months
on implementation “with a view to considering further action, if
necessary, by the relevant United Nations organs and bod-
ies”. In total 114 member states vote in favour of the resolu-
tion, 18 vote against, and 44 abstain. The four-member Fact
Finding Mission was headed by former judge of the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Justice Richard Goldstone. It had been established
on 3 April 2009, at the behest of the President of the Human
Rights Council, “to investigate all violations of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law that might
have been committed at any time in the context of the military
operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from
27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, dur-
ing or after”. Besides identifying apparently illegal behaviour
by Hamas, the 475-page report concluded that the use by
Israeli forces – in a number of instances – of white phospho-
rus violated both the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 and
customary international law. On the issue of white phospho-
rus, it states: “The Mission has recounted [in its report] a
number of incidents where it has particular concern about the
choice to use white phosphorous. These incidents have been
addressed in detail elsewhere and include the incidents at the
UNRWA compound in Gaza City, the attacks on al-Quds and
al-Wafa hospitals, also in Gaza City, and the use of white
phosphorous in the attack on the Abu Halima family to the
north of al-Atatra and in Khuz’a… The Mission [has] made
clear that the risks [white phosphorous] posed to the civilian
population and civilian objects in the area under attack were
excessive in relation to the specific military advantages
sought… The Mission finds that the Israeli armed forces were
systematically reckless in determining to use white phospho-
rous in built-up areas and in particular in and around areas of
particular importance to civilian health and safety… In addi-
tion to the reckless use of white phosphorous, the Mission
must emphasize that it is concerned not only with the inordi-
nate risks the Israeli armed forces took in using it, but also
the damage it caused in fact. In speaking with medical ex-
perts and practitioners, it was impressed by the severity and
sometimes untreatable nature of the burns caused by the sub-
stance… While accepting that white phosphorous is not at
this stage proscribed under international law, the Mission con-
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siders that the repeated misuse of the substance by the Is-
raeli armed forces during this operation calls into question the
wisdom of allowing its continued use without some further
degree of control. The Mission understands the need to use
obscurants and illuminants for various reasons during military
operations and especially in screening troops from observa-
tion or enemy fire. There are, however, other screening and
illuminating means which are free from the toxicities, volatilities
and hazards that are inherent in the chemical white phospho-
rous. The use of white phosphorous in any from in and around
areas dedicated to the health and safety of civilians has been
shown to carry very substantial risks. The Mission therefore
believes that serious consideration should be given to ban-
ning the use of white phosphorous in built-up areas.” [See
also 22 Apr]
5 November The US Department of Veterans Affairs
has been notifying veterans of the Viet Nam War – and those
stationed in the demilitarized zone in Korea during the late
1960s – that Cell B leukemias, Parkinson’s disease and
ischemic heart disease have been added to the list of illnesses
presumed to be linked to exposure to Agent Orange, so re-
ports the Wisconsin Daily Tribune. According to Wood County
Veterans Service Officer Rock Larson, the purpose of extend-
ing the list is to simplify and expedite the application process
for benefit payments.
5 November In the USA, the National Research Council
Committee on Disposal of Legacy Nerve Agent GA and Lewisite
Stocks at Deseret Chemical Depot transmits its report to the
Chemical Materials Agency. In assessing the disposal of stocks
of legacy nerve agent GA and lewisite, the Committee specifi-
cally reviewed information provided to it on the fifty per cent
design of the Area Ten Liquid Incinerator facility.
5-6 November At OPCW headquarters in The Hague, the
Temporary Working Group on Sampling and Analysis under
the auspices of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board con-
venes for its fourth meeting. It discusses: sample preparation
for aqueous solutions of degradation products; emerging tech-
niques having possible applications for on-site analysis as
well as for analysis of toxins; and criteria for trace analysis in
investigations of alleged use.
6 November In Japan, the Supreme Court rejects ap-
peals by two former members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult against
their death sentences for, amongst other things, their roles in
the sarin attack on the Tokyo underground railway network
[see 20 Mar 95]. Toru Toyoda and Kenichi Hirose were among
five cult members who physically released the agent, and were
specifically charged with carrying the sarin into the trains on
the Hibiya and Marunouchi lines in plastic bags, which they
then punctured with umbrellas. The death penalties were
handed down by the Tokyo District [see 17 Jul 00] and subse-
quently upheld by the Tokyo High Court [see 28 Jul 04]. In his
ruling, presiding judge Justice Yukio Takeuchi says that the
attack constituted “organized and premeditated acts of indis-
criminate mass murder” and that the crime was “extremely
cruel and inhumane”. He adds that the death penalty is the
right sentence notwithstanding that the two committed the crime
under the instructions of higher cult members. If, as is ex-
pected, the Supreme Court does not reverse its decision on
technical grounds, it would bring the number of former mem-
bers of the cult awaiting execution for their involvement in
dispersing sarin in the Tokyo attack and other related crimes
to eight [see 17 Jul], including its founder Chizuo Matsumoto,
also known as Shoko Asahara [see 15 Jul]. Ikuo Hayashi,
who was also convicted for his involvement in the crime was
sentenced to life imprisonment owing to him having surren-
dered himself to the authorities.
6 November In the Netherlands, Dutch Foreign Minis-
ter Maxime Verhagen and Justice Minister Ernst Ballin have
transmitted a letter to parliament setting out their support for a
Belgian proposal to amend the 1998 Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court – when its 110 signatory states meet
later this month in The Hague – so as to include the use of
chemical and biological weapons as constituting war crimes,
so reports Deutsche Presse-Agentur. During a meeting some
ten months previously, the parties to the Statute failed to reach
a consensus on the new text, which is due to be signed in
Uganda on 31 May 2010. As of 28 September 2009, the fol-
lowing parties to the Statute had indicated their support for all
or some of the amendments: Austria, Argentina, Belgium,
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Germany, Ire-
land, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Samoa, Slovenia
and Switzerland.
6 November US President Barack Obama orders the
extension for one year of Executive Order 12938 [see 14 Nov
04], and its subsequent amendments, under which a “national
emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States posed by the proliferation of [WMD] and the
means of delivering such weapons” was declared. [See also 3
Jul 03]
6 November The US House of Representatives passes
a bill that would make permanent the temporary authority given
to the Department of Homeland Security in 2006 to oversee
security at chemical facilities [see 4 Oct 06]. The Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards would also increase the De-
partment’s authority in requiring companies to substitute cer-
tain chemicals that could be used by terrorists with alterna-
tives, and would codify the authority of the government to
regulate security at public water treatment facilities.
6 November In Paraguay, 217 members of the
indigenous Ava Guarani community are sprayed with what
would appear to be some form of pesticide after refusing to
leave their land in the east of the country, which local soy
growers say belongs to them.
Three days later, Paraguayan Minister of Health Esperanza
Martinez says that those affected suffered vomiting, diarrhoea,
headaches and nausea; however, although one person is in a
serious condition, the remainder are recovering. In a statement,
Martinez says: “For us, it’s very clear that this is an acute
community-wide intoxication caused in a premeditated manner
by an unknown substance… But it is very clear because all of
the similar symptoms occurred after this incident.”
8 November The Australian Department of Defence has
confirmed the discovery in August of a number of shells
containing mustard gas at a former US military weapons depot,
so reports the Australian Sunday Mail. The discovery of the
144 105mm Howitzer shells was made by a coal mining
company which was conducting a survey of the depot near
Columboola, between Chinchilla and Miles The Toowoomba
Chronicle quotes an unidentified spokesman for the Department
as saying: “Defence technicians attended to the items and
using specialist equipment were able to confirm that at least
three of these munitions contained a Mustard agent.”
Two days later, the Toowoomba Chronicle reports that the
shells will first be checked by United Nations weapons
inspectors before they are removed for further analysis. The
Chronicle says it is believed that the shells will be destroyed
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by June 2010. Meanwhile, Colin Trinder of the Department of
Defence is quoted as saying: “There is no way of triggering
[the shells] because there are no fuses in them.”
9 November In Yemen, during ongoing cross-border
attacks, Saudi fighter jets have in recent days repeatedly
bombed the villages in the areas of al-Malahaid and the border
region of Jabal al-Dukhan with white phosphorus, says a
spokesman for the Yemeni Houthi Shia fighters. Speaking on
the Iranian Arabic-language news channel al-Alam, Mohammad
Abdessalam rejects Saudi claims that its offensive is targeted
against Houthi positions on Saudi territory. According to
Abdessalam, Yemeni villages are the main target, and he says
that dozens of civilians have died as a result.
9 November In New York, the Uzbek, French and
Austrian missions to the United Nations receive envelopes
containing an unidentified white powder.
The next day, the German and UK missions to the United
Nations also receive envelopes containing the powder. The
New York Times reports the police as stating that the substance
contained in the three envelopes sent the previous day was
flour. All five letters were postmarked from Dallas, police say.
The police also say that the note inside the envelope received
by the German mission read ‘Al Qaeda FBI in America’, which
is similar to notes found in the three envelopes received the
previous day.
Two days later, the Russian mission to the United Nations
becomes the sixth mission to receive an envelope containing
the powder.
9 November The Emperor of Japan bestows The Order
of the Rising Sun on a biochemistry professor from Colorado
State University for his contribution towards identifying the
members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult as being behind the sarin
gas attacks in Japan in the 1990s. Following the attacks in
Matsumoto [see 28 Jun 94] and on the Tokyo underground
railway network [see 20 Mar 95]. Anthony Tu assisted
investigators by applying his knowledge of chemicals produced
from the degradation of sarin in soil to identify the facility where
the sarin had been produced. In 2002, Tu published a book on
the subject Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in Tokyo Subway and
Matsumoto City.
9-11 November At OPCW headquarters, the
Scientific Advisory Board convenes for its fourteenth [see 30
Mar – 01 Apr] session. Having previously decided that
nanomaterials were not currently known to have an intrinsic
toxicity that would make them attractive for use in chemical
weapons, and therefore that the risk they posed to the CWC
was low, the SAB now discusses the question of applications
of nanomaterials to improve protective countermeasures against
chemical weapons. It decides to continue to maintain a close
watch on developments in nanotechnology and nanomaterials.
9-13 November In Ankara, Turkey, there is a
training workshop on weapons of mass destruction terrorism,
which is organized by the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence
Against Terrorism. Among those making presentations is John
Hart of SIPRI, who gives two lectures on the historical aspects
of chemical and biological warfare.
11 November In Germany, the lawyer of a Rus-
sian businessman, who was named in a Russian investiga-
tion into the death of Alexander Litvinenko [see 11 Nov 06] is
notified by the prosecutor’s office in Hamburg that charges against
him for smuggling nuclear materials are being dropped. Dmitry
Kovtun [see 21 May 08] was among the three people to meet
with Litvinenko in his London hotel on the day he was reportedly
poisoned. Russia Today quotes Kovtun as saying that it is now
only a matter of time before the UK authorities clear his former
business partner Andrei Lugovoi of involvement in Litvinenko’s
death [see 2 Nov]. Kovtun says: “The decision of the German
prosecutor’s office is not only the first step toward full rehabilita-
tion of me and Andrei Lugovoi, it has also taken a cornerstone
out of the charges against Andrei Lugovoi in England that will
also collapse as the Berlin Wall did.”
11 November In the UK, researchers at the gov-
ernment’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)
at Porton Down have developed an antidote against ricin which
is now ready to move into production, so reports BBC News
Online. Jane Holley, the principal scientist in biomedical sci-
ences at DSTL, says: “In the past there has been lots of re-
search carried out using different methods. But this is the first
[anti-toxin] that has been moved into production… It is antici-
pated that a product will be available for use in the next cou-
ple of years.” Holley adds that full licensing is likely to take
about five years. According to BBC News, the antidote, which
the researchers had worked on for eight years, can protect
against death up to twenty-four hours after exposure. Although
it was initially intended for use by the military, researchers at
DSTL are investigating the antidote’s potential use in a civil-
ian environment. [See also 6 May]
11 November In the USA, PBS television broad-
casts ‘Airmen and Headhunters’ as part of its Secrets of the
Dead series. It makes mention of Dyak tribesmen in Borneo
using poisoned-dart blowpipes against the Japanese army
patrols during 1944-45.
11-12 November In Tokyo, there is the first South-East and
East Asia regional seminar on the CWC and chemical-proc-
ess safety management. The aim of the seminar is to intro-
duce CWC parties in the region, whose economies are either
developing or are in transition, to new approaches and best
practices that can be adopted in relation to safety manage-
ment. Participating in the seminar are CWC national authori-
ties, chemical-industry associations, and representatives of
small and medium-sized chemical industries in the region.
12 November The Council of the European Union
approves the European Union CBRN Action Plan adopted
some six months previously by the European Commission
[see 24 Jun]. The Council “invites the Commission to report
back to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation
of the EU CBRN Action Plan and to submit a comprehensive
progress report for the first time by the end of 2011 and calls
on the Member States to assist the Commission in this task
through providing the necessary information on implementa-
tion of the EU CBRN Action Plan at the national level”.
12 November From the UK, the journal Nature
reports on a three-year study funded by the European Com-
mission to determine policy for Europe-wide BSL-4 require-
ments with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication. The
study, which is the first phase of a project called ‘European
Research Infrastructure on Highly Pathogenic Agents’
(ERINHA), also aims to introduce Europe-wide guidelines on
best safety and security practices, and facilitate researchers
in moving between EU member states to make use of facili-
ties It is part of broader European Strategy Forum on Re-
search Infrastructures, which was established to coordinate
Europe’s large research infrastructures.
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12 November The US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) says it now estimates that around 3,900
people have died from the H1N1 virus in the USA during the
past six months, based on a new system of counting that
relies on more precise figures having provided by ten states.
According to BBC News Online, the latest figures show that
about 22 million people contracted the virus in the past six
months, around 98,000 of whom were hospitalized. The
previous estimated death toll was 672. In a statement, Dr
Anne Schuchat of the CDC says: “This is just the first six
months and I am expecting all of these numbers, unfortunately,
to continue to rise… [Although still imprecise, the new
statistics provide] a bigger picture of what has been going on
in the first six months of the pandemic.” Meanwhile, BBC News
Online quotes figures from the World Health Organization
as showing that a week previously the global death toll
from the virus passed the 6,000 mark. [See also 3 Nov
Ukraine]
13 November At UN headquarters, the chairmen
of the three committees established by Security Council reso-
lutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 [see 28 Apr 04] brief the Security
Council on progress made by the committees during the pre-
vious six months. Chairman of the 1540 Committee Jorge
Urbina says the Committee is conducting a comprehensive
review as requested by the Council in resolution 1810 [see 25
Apr 08] and hopes to report on the outcome by 31 January
2010. Urbina says that the review process has, through vari-
ous fora, offered UN members and relevant intergovernmen-
tal organizations an opportunity to share experiences with re-
gard to implementation of resolution 1540. Representatives of
industry, academia and non-governmental organizations have
also had the opportunity to provide input. Urbina says that the
Committee and its expert group has actively participated in
twenty workshops and other meetings on resolution 1540. The
Committee is also intensifying efforts to develop its clearing-
house function for channelling assistance to UN members.
[See also 30 Sep – 2 Oct]
13-14 November In Como, Italy, there is workshop and
roundtable on Biosecurity, Biosafety and Dual-Use Risks:
Trends, Challenges and Innovative Solutions. The event is
organized by the International Working Group – Landau Net-
work-Centro Volta, Como, Italy, in cooperation with the Brad-
ford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford,
UK. The event brings together representatives of international
governmental organizations, scientists, academics and
policymakers to discuss issues relating to biosecurity,
biosafety and dual-use materials.
14 November In Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emir-
ates, an Interpol training course on prevention and detection
of bioterrorist threats for first responders and officials from
emergency management authorities in the Middle East and
North Africa region commences. The week-long course, ‘Train
the Trainers on preventing Bioterrorism’ – which is hosted by
the United Arab Emirates Ministry of the Interior – includes
practical exercises on dealing with a suspect arriving in a coun-
try, issues relating to a suspect who needs to be interviewed,
and procedures on how to search suspicious packages. An
introduction to personal protective equipment is also provided.
Participating in the course are representatives from eleven
countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. [See
also 19-21 Mar 07]
14 November The US Public Health Service has
funded an investigation whose findings, so New Scientist now
reports, show that the Pepper-Spray active ingredient capsai-
cin can increase the lethality of cocaine. The findings have
been published in Forensic Toxicology.
16 November The US Department of Homeland
Security, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, has been equipping Transportation Security Administra-
tion officers to patrol US railways with hand-held sensors that
can detect traces of biological and radiological materials in
luggage, so reports the New York Post. The checks are car-
ried out with a view to preventing a possible act of bioterrorism
against a major US city. According to the Post, similar tech-
nology is used by the New York Police Department to monitor
the city’s bridges, subways, tunnels and streets.
16-18 November In Warsaw, Poland, the Polish
Academy of Sciences and the US National Academies host
an international workshop to assess current programmes
around the world that relate to dual-use technology and asso-
ciated problems.
17 November In Pakistan, an organization affiliated
to the Taliban threatens to poison water sources and reservoirs
in retaliation for the military launching an offensive against it in
South Waziristan region. The News daily quotes unidentified
“official sources” as saying that a letter sent by Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan to senior officials in Rawalpindi and Chaklala says
that it has “procured 200 litres of poisonous materials that would
be used to contaminate water sources and reservoirs in
Rawalpindi and Chaklala”. According to PTI news agency, the
military claims that more than five hundred Taliban fighters have
been killed since the operation was launched against them in
South Waziristan a month previously.
17 November The US Institute of Medicine re-
leases Crisis Standards of Care: Summary of a Workshop
Series, which summarizes discussion that took place at four
workshops hosted by the Forum on Medical and Public Health
Preparedness for Catastrophic Events between March and
May 2009. The aim of each workshop was to learn lessons
from work undertaken to develop state, regional, and local
crisis standards of care policies and protocols; to identify ar-
eas requiring further development, research, and considera-
tion; and to facilitate communication and collaboration among
neighbouring jurisdictions.
18 November In Indonesia, where a year-long out-
break of rabies in Bali has claimed 17 lives, the Molecular
Biology Laboratory of the University of Udayana School of
Medicine has determined that the virus responsible has char-
acteristics similar to those of rabies virus sampled elsewhere
in Indonesia, thus making international bioterrorism an unlikely
explanation.
18 November In Russia, the Maradykovsky
chemdemil facility has completed destruction of its stockpile
of 4,866 munitions containing 232.6 metric tons of sarin nerve
agent, so reports Interfax news agency [see also 29 Jul].
Interfax quotes a statement by the government for the region
of Kirov as saying: “The facility has completed the construc-
tion of a line for the destruction of mustard-lewisite mixture. In
late November, hook-up and commissioning work will start at
the line, testing the technology for destroying this toxic sub-
stance first in neutral and then in real media.”
18-26 November In The Hague, the Assembly of
States Parties to the International Criminal Court (the ICC)
convenes for its Eighth Session. This serves, inter alia, as
the preparatory meeting for the first Review Conference of the
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Rome Statute that established the ICC, which is to be held in
Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010. Among the
resolutions adopted by the Assembly is one that had originally
been proposed by Belgium that the Review Conference should
consider including within the definition of war crimes in Article
8 paragraph 2(e) of the Statute “employing poison or poisoned
weapons” and “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices”. If this
amendment were to be adopted, employment of the specified
toxic weapons would become a war crime not only in the
situation of international armed conflict, as at present [see 30
Jun 00 New York], but also in non-international armed conflict
as well. Another adopted resolution, also proposed by Belgium,
requires the Ninth Session of the Assembly (New York, 6-10
December 2010) to consider further expanding the lists of war
crimes in Article 8 paragraphs 2(b) and 2(e) to include “the
employment of: Agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and
means of delivery as defined by the Biological Weapons
Convention; Chemical weapons as defined by the Chemical
Weapons Convention.”
19 November In Washington state, USA, a man
serving a ten-year prison sentence for producing ricin from
castor beans with the intent to poison his wife, has requested
that his conviction be overturned on the grounds that one of
the prosecution’s expert witnesses was later fired for
misconduct in other criminal cases, so reports The (Spokane)
Spokesman-Review. Kenneth Olsen was originally sentenced
to nearly fourteen years imprisonment [see 28 Oct 03],
however, although the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal upheld his
conviction, it did remand and reduce his sentence. A key
witness against Olsen was Arnold Melnikoff, then head of the
Washington State Patrol crime laboratory, where some of the
evidence against Olsen was sent for testing. Some months
prior to Olsen’s trial, however, Melnikoff’s earlier testimony
as a key witness in a rape trial was found to have been based
on questionable science. The conviction for rape was
overturned and the man released after having served fifteen
years imprisonment. According to the Spokesman-Review, in
his appeal, Olsen contends that his legal team was not
adequately briefed on investigations into Melnikoff’s
professional conduct, which resulted in Melnikoff losing his
job in 2004. The appeal also contends that one juror at the
trial had already come to the conclusion that Olsen was guilty
prior to the trial actually commencing.
20 November In Pretoria, South Africa, the US
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the South
African Department of Trade and Industry conduct the first
bilateral ‘train-the-trainer’ WMD Commodity Identification Train-
ing instructor workshop. During the workshop, US and South
African interagency officials, including NNSA and a multi-Na-
tional Laboratory training team, and the South African Rev-
enue Service and South African Department of Energy dis-
cuss global best practices to help front line inspectors iden-
tify WMD and WMD-related goods crossing international bor-
ders. The workshop covers such topics as processes relating
to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons development, as
well as missile development, and an in-depth overview of re-
lated materials and equipment. In a press release, the NNSA
states that the WMD Commodity Identification Training Pro-
gram was developed by NNSA’s International Nonprolifera-
tion Export Control Program, which together with the US De-
partment of State’s Export Control and Related Border Secu-
rity Program has, since 11 September 2001, collaborated with
more than sixty countries to strengthen implementation of
WMD-related export controls, and has trained more than 12,000
customs and export control officials worldwide. The NNSA,
which was established by Congress in 2000, describes itself
as “a semi-autonomous agency within the US Department of
Energy responsible for enhancing national security through
the military application of nuclear science in the nation’s na-
tional security enterprise.” [See also 18 Sep]
20 November In the USA, the Director of the
Center for Biosecurity, Thomas Inglesby, announces that the
Center has resigned its membership of the Alliance for
Biosecurity. The announcement comes two weeks after the
former Director of the Center, Tara O’Toole, was confirmed as
Under-Secretary for Science and Technology at the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security [see 4 Nov].
23 November In Tehran, on the second day of a
series of drills lasting five days, the Iranian military practices
dealing with the aftermath a chemical attack, which includes
such matters as decontamination procedures.
24 November In London, the Iraq Inquiry Commit-
tee conducts its first day of public hearings. The Committee –
which was established by the government earlier in the year
[see 25 Mar] – will examine the case the government made
for invading Iraq in 2003, the planning for the invasion, and
the failure to prepare for reconstruction of Iraq. It will consider
the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009.
The Committee is chaired by Sir John Chilcot, who is joined
by Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Martin Gilbert, Sir Roderic Lyne
and Baroness Usha Prashar. In his opening statement, Chilcot
says: “We want to establish a clear understanding of the vari-
ous core elements of the UK’s involvement in Iraq, and how
these developed over time… We will learn the reasons why
particular policies or courses of action were adopted, and what
consideration was given to alternative approaches… The Com-
mittee and I are […] determined to conduct as much of our
proceedings in public as possible… These public hearings
[…] form only one part of our work. Over the past months we
have requested and received mountains of written material
from Government departments involved in Iraq during 2001-
09. We have spent many hours combing through these offi-
cial records – and will continue to do this in the months ahead…
[We] are not, just hearing from the ‘official’ representatives.
We value hearing a broad spectrum of views from a wide range
of people and organisations… We’ve already made a start on
this by holding: five meetings with the families of those who
were killed or are missing in Iraq; preliminary meetings with
Iraq veterans; and two seminars with a range of experts [see
5 Nov]. We hope to have further seminars early next year…
Our first round of public hearings begins today and runs until
early February 2010. We will then take a break from public
hearings, returning to our analysis of written material. We will
hold some private hearings: to take evidence on matters which
if disclosed in public would cause harm to the public interest,
or where there are other genuine reasons why a witness would
have difficulty being frank in public. There will be a further
round of public hearings in the middle of 2010. We expect to
invite back some previous witnesses and, where relevant, call
some new ones… [P]eople should not jump to conclusions if
they do not hear everything they expect to in the first round of
hearings: there will be more to follow… Once we have col-
lected all the evidence we need, we will be in a position to
draw conclusions and make recommendations. We plan to
report by the end of 2010… [W]e are not a court or an inquest
or a statutory inquiry; and our processes will reflect that differ-
ence. No-one is on trial. We cannot determine guilt or inno-
cence. Only a court can do that. But I make a commitment
here that once we get to our final report, we will not shy away
from making criticisms where they are warranted.”
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25-26 November At OPCW headquarters in The
Hague, a workshop on Matters Related to Other Chemical
Production Facilities (OCPF) takes place, made possible by
funding from Canada and the UK. The workshop brings to-
gether 107 participants from 72 CWC parties, including repre-
sentatives of national authorities, OPCW delegations and in-
dustry experts. The purpose of the workshop is to enhance
participants’ understanding of the technical aspects of the
OCPF verification regime by looking at past experience,
present practice, and future challenges with a view to ensur-
ing the effective implementation of the relevant provisions of
the Convention, as well as the full achievement of its goals in
the area of non-proliferation and confidence building. On the
second day, participants visit two OCPF sites in Rotterdam
and Amsterdam, as well as the OPCW laboratory in Rijswijk.
26 November Russia has now “completed the
destruction of 17,998.205 [metric] tons, or 45.03 per cent of
its chemical weapon stockpiles”, a month ahead of the dead-
line set by the CWC, according to a press release by the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [see also 7 Aug]. The press
release adds that Russia is committed to the chemdemil of
its entire declared stockpile “within a timeframe established
by the Convention”. [See also 16 Oct]
27 November The US Department of Health and
Human Services publishes for public comment a set of
guidelines setting out how providers of synthetic double-
stranded DNA sequences should do business – how they
should screen customers who might possibly be evil-doers
intent on making biological weapons. The guidelines, published
in the Federal Register, require that companies screen both
customers and their orders using a standard set of procedures
including automated steps to detect sequences that encode
specific features of select agents and toxins. Should a search
arouse concerns, the matter “should be further investigated
by the provider”, the guidance says. For example, providers
should contact customers to ascertain the proposed end-use
of the order and the scientific legitimacy of their work. Amongst
other things, the guidelines recommend that companies involved
in the manufacture of synthetic DNA screen both their clients
and the DNA sequences that they request, thus allowing
customers to establish the identity and institutional affiliation of
customers; and that companies identify clients who place several
orders of the same sequence within a short time frame, who
attempt to pay by cash, or who request that the product be
mislabelled. Foreign clients, the guidelines say, should be
screened against terrorist databases and other lists of concern.
27 November From Oregon, TrineDay publishes
A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA’s
Secret Cold War Experiments, a book by journalist H P Albarelli
Jr about the US Army CBW scientist, Frank Olson [see 24
Jun 04], who fell to his death from a New York hotel window in
1953 [see 11 Jul 94]. Olson had been working in the Special
Operations Division (SOD) of Fort Detrick, and had thereby
becoming involved in a variety of clandestine-weapons projects
for the CIA. A striking feature of the book is its claim that the
sudden outbreak of disease that affected some 250 people in
the small French town of Pont St Esprit in the Gard in August
1951 – a disease described at the time as mass insanity or
ergot poisoning, and attributed to consumption of contaminated
bread— was actually the consequence of a covert LSD-aerosol
experiment run by the SOD.
27-29 November In The Hague, the eleventh [see 28-
30 Nov 08] annual meeting of CWC national authorities takes
place. The meeting is designed as a forum for personnel from
national authorities who are involved with the national imple-
mentation of the CWC. Attending the meeting are 172 partici-
pants from 117 CWC parties representing the regional groups
as follows: Africa, 33; Asia, 31; Eastern Europe, 17; Latin America
and the Caribbean, 17; Western Europe and all other regional
groups, 19. The Pacific Islands Forum also participates in the
meeting. The thematic focus of the meeting is the sharing of
experiences in national implementation of the CWC.
29 November The (London) Times reports docu-
ments compiled by the US Department of State in 1992 –
which were based on information acquired by the Central In-
telligence Agency to bolster the case against Libya for the
1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 – as implicating Abdelbaset
Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi in, amongst other things, procuring
chemical weapons for the Libyan government. The documents
assert that al-Megrahi, who was convicted for his role in the
Lockerbie bombing [see 21 Dec 88], had a “deep involvement
in Libya’s most sensitive, high-priority procurement operations”
and that “an al-Megrahi subordinate operating in Germany in
1988 played an important role in acquiring and shipping chemi-
cal weapons precursors to Libya. Al-Megrahi is also linked to
a senior manager of Libya’s chemical weapons development
programme.” However, the Times quotes al-Megrahi’s attor-
ney in Scotland, Tony Kelly, as saying: “If there was any evi-
dence backing any of this up, I am absolutely certain it would
have been introduced at trial – and it wasn’t… I think you’re
just left with it being unsubstantiated […] intelligence rumours.”
In August 2009, al-Megrahi, who is terminally ill with cancer,
was released from prison by the Scottish authorities on com-
passionate grounds. The Times quotes an unidentified spokes-
man for the US State Department as saying: “We maintain
our position that Megrahi should have served out the entirety
of his sentence in Scotland for his part in the bombing of Pan
Am flight 103.”
30 November In The Hague, the Assistant to the
US Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Bio-
logical Defense Programs, Andrew Weber, describes to the
OPCW Conference of the States Parties the present status of
the US chemdemil programme: “We have met our 1 percent,
20 percent, and 45 percent treaty milestones. To date, we
have destroyed 67.6 percent of our Category 1 chemical weap-
ons, which includes 85.3 percent of our chemical rockets, the
destruction of 96.6 percent of our nerve agent and destruction
of all of our binary chemical weapons. We have destroyed all
of our Category 3 chemical weapons. We have destroyed all
of our former chemical weapons production facilities. We have
completed destruction operations at three of our facilities. We
have four destruction facilities currently operating at a cost of
over one billion dollars and two additional sites under con-
struction. To date, we have provided an estimated 20.5 billion
dollars for the destruction of chemical weapons in the United
States of America. Over the years, we have successfully
addressed a wide range of safety and environmental concerns
raised by local citizens living near our storage and destruction
facilities and by state and local authorities. We have made
every effort to ensure that our chemical weapons are destroyed
consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention; safely,
without harm to workers, people living near the facilities, or
the environment; verifiably, under the eyes of OPCW inspec-
tors; and as rapidly as feasible. […]
Let me assure you that the Obama administration is fully
committed to examining all possible options for accelerating
our chemical weapons destruction activities even further, con-
sistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention and its appli-
cable safety, technical, and environmental requirements. In
2006, the United States reported that it expected to have only
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66 percent of its stockpile destroyed by 2012. This is how-
ever a milestone we have now reached. We will continue to
seek ways to accelerate the program. […] The United States
understands our obligations under the Convention, and we are
fully committed to meeting the Convention’s objectives, in-
cluding verified destruction of 100 percent of our stockpile as
rapidly and as safely as possible.” [Note: According to current
planning and funding for the destruction programme [see 28
Apr and 31 Jul], completion is not in fact expected for another
decade at least, though Weber does not say this. The 2023
date that some are projecting for 100 percent destruction would
miss the CWC deadline, as now understood, by eleven years.]
Weber notes the assistance that the United States has
provided to the chemdemil programmes of other countries in-
cluding the Russian Federation, which he congratulates on
having achieved its 45 percent destruction deadline. He says
that the USA “has contributed over a billion dollars to coop-
erative threat reduction programs aimed at furthering the goals
of the Chemical Weapons Convention”. He observes, too, that
the USA “contributed over 45 million dollars to assist the Re-
public of Albania in eliminating 16.6 metric tons of chemical
weapons agents at Qaf Molle, destroying 100 percent of its
stockpile in a verified manner”.
30 November-4 December In The Hague, there is the
fourteenth [see 2-5 Dec 08] session of the Conference of the
States Parties to the CWC, which is chaired by Ambassador
Vaidotas Verba of Lithuania.
Participating in the Conference are the following 122 States
Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Ar-
menia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico,
Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, the UK,
the USA, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, and Zam-
bia. Attending as observers are Israel – which has signed but
not ratified the Convention – and Myanmar, which is a non-
party. Eight international organizations, specialized agencies,
and other international bodies attend as observers, while thirty
non-governmental organizations also observe proceedings.
The following delegations make statements during the gen-
eral debate: Sweden (on behalf of the European Union and
associated countries), Cuba (on behalf of the Non-Aligned
Movement and China), Argentina, South Africa (on behalf of
the Africa Group), India, the USA, Russia, Yemen, Mexico,
Singapore, Japan, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, New
Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Lebanon,
Philippines, Israel (observer), Australia, Nigeria, Indonesia,
Peru, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam, United Arab Emirates,
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Serbia, Norway, Republic of Korea,
Ecuador, Colombia, Iran, Guatemala, Qatar, Chile, Bahrain,
San Marino, Libya, Zambia, Iraq, Kenya, Mongolia, and Costa
Rica (on behalf of GRULAC and on its own behalf).
The Conference considers and notes a report on the sta-
tus of implementation of Article VII of the CWC as at 19 Au-
gust 2009 and adopts a decision on the matter.
The Conference considers and notes a report by Director-
General Rogelio Pfirter on the progress made by those CWC
parties that have been granted extensions of deadlines for the
destruction of their Category 1 chemical weapons.
The Conference notes with concern that the final extended
destruction deadline of 29 April 2012 may not be fully met.
While noting that significant progress has been made, the
Conference also notes that as of 1 December 2009 over 48
per cent of chemical weapons stockpiles remain to be de-
stroyed. In this regard, the Conference urges all possessor
parties to “take every necessary measure with a view to en-
suring their compliance with the final extended destruction
deadline”.
The Conference considers and adopts a decision on the
extension of intermediate and final deadlines for the destruc-
tion by Libya of its Category 1 chemical weapons [see also
13-16 Oct].
The Conference considers and adopts a decision on the
guidelines regarding low-concentration limits for declarations
of Schedule 2A and 2A* chemicals.
The Conference considers and approves the report of the
OPCW on the implementation of the Convention in 2008.
The Conference notes the annual report by Director-Gen-
eral Rogelio Pfirter on the implementation of the universality
action plan during the period 19 November 2008 to 11 Sep-
tember 2009, and considers and adopts a decision on the
universality of the CWC and the further implementation of the
action plan.
The Conference appoints Ahmet Üzümcü as the OPCW
Director-General for a term of office beginning on 25 July 2010
and ending on 24 July 2014 [see also 13-16 Oct].
During his address to the Conference, US Representative
to the Executive Council Robert Mikulak says: “[The verifica-
tion] regime [for Other Chemical Production Facilities] was
created by the negotiators of the Convention to capture a whole
set of industrial facilities which were not Schedule 1, 2 or 3
facilities but which still potentially posed a significant risk.
Some of these facilities could be suitable for producing chemi-
cal weapons or even contain embedded chemical weapons
production mobilization capability. The framers of the Con-
vention understood this risk and did their best to create a
verification regime for this category of industrial facilities. The
regime is neither perfect nor complete, and it now falls to us
to complete and perfect it. We should all look beyond inspec-
tion numbers and work together to achieve a regime that is
focused on those facilities which pose the greatest risk. This
should be one of the key tasks for the Executive Council in
the coming year.”
This session of the Conference is the last that Director-
General Rogelio Pfirter will be addressing, so he had con-
cluded his opening statement reporting on the work of the
Technical Secretariat with additional words of his own that did
“not necessarily reflect the Secretariat’s institutional views”.
He had selected three topics. The first was the “complex chal-
lenge” that the issue of destruction deadlines presented for
the OPCW, “above all, politically”. He applauded the recent
decision of the Executive Council to initiate “a process of re-
flection” [see 13-16 Oct], observing that the “ultimate suc-
cess of the treaty should not be tied to any particular date”;
and he reiterated the 2008 Secretariat suggestion that mem-
ber states might wish to hold a special meeting on the issue
“much closer to 2012”. His second topic was the importance
of enhancing the OCPF regime in order to “ensure the non-
proliferation of chemical weapons”: expansion of the number
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of OCPF inspections would be required, and this might be
achieved through a “sharing of the burden” between the Sec-
retariat and National Authorities. On his third topic he spoke
as follows: “One other matter I wish to refer to is my percep-
tion about the need for the OPCW, at some stage in the not
too distant future, to take stock of the growing interest on the
part of some governments and civil society, in developments
related to matters where the Convention might be—perhaps
purposely—ambiguous or have lacunae, and which might im-
pact on the ultimate effectiveness of the ban on chemical
weapons. Incapacitants or non-lethal weapons is one such
area when it comes to the exact types and quantities of chemi-
cals and their permitted use. The Scientific Advisory Board
could help shed some light on this matter and the Third Re-
view Conference might offer the appropriate context for an
initial formal look into it.”
On the first day of the Conference, the Russian ITAR-TASS
news agency together with the Russian Ministry of Industry
and Trade and the Russian Embassy to the Netherlands open
a photographic exhibition on chemical disarmament in Rus-
sia. The exhibition displays fifty-five pictures from all seven
chemdemil facilities.
1 December In India, the Chief Minister of Madhya
Pradesh state Shivraj Singh Chouhan rejects claims made in
a recent report that the former Union Carbide pesticide plant
at Bhopal continues to discharge toxic chemicals into drinking
water, adding that the water is “100 per cent clean”, so reports
BBC News Online. Speaking to the BBC ahead of the 25th
anniversary of the industrial disaster, Chouhan says that clean
water is supplied by tanker to those communities without piped
water. According to the BBC, however, many residents say
that supplies are infrequent and insufficient, forcing them to
continue relying on contaminated ground water. The BBC
quotes a report by the UK-based charity the Bhopal Medical
Appeal and the Sambhavna Clinic in Bhopal as saying: “[T]here
are still high levels of toxic chemicals in the drinking water
supply in 15 communities near the old Union Carbide pesticide
plant… [The water] in and around the Union Carbide factory
site in Bhopal still contains extremely unsafe levels of carbon
tetrachloride and other persistent organic pollutants, solvents,
nickel and other heavy metals… Not surprisingly the populations
in the areas surveyed have high rates of birth defects, rapidly
rising cancer rates, neurological damage, chaotic menstrual
cycles and mental illness.” Meanwhile, a statement issued by
Union Carbide, now a subsidiary of Dow Chemical Inc, reads
thus: “The groundwater issue at the Bhopal site is best addressed
by the state government of Madhya Pradesh, which owns the
site and is responsible for clean-up activities… Our understanding
is that the central and state governments have plans for site
clean-up and we’re hopeful they will follow through with their
remediation plans, including addressing concerns about
groundwater.” [See also 19 Jul 04]
1 December In Washington DC, US Department of
Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius an-
nounces that a review of the capability of the USA to produce
vaccines and treatments for biological weapons and other public
health threats will be completed by “early next year”. Speak-
ing at the American Medical Association Third National Con-
gress on Health System Readiness, she says: “We’ll look for
the fastest ways to move new technologies that will let us
quickly produce countermeasures that are more dependable
and robust… Today, we face a wider range of public health
threats than ever before in our history… It could be anthrax
delivered in an envelope. It could be a dirty bomb set off in a
subway car… But the countermeasure that saves the day
during a quick-hitting public health emergency can often take
years to discover, develop, manufacture and distribute… Like
a lot of countries, we’ve often failed to make the kind of long-
term investments in countermeasures we need to stay safe…
[A new system is needed] that is so dependable and compre-
hensive that it deters potential bioterrorism attacks and makes
our enemies say: ‘It’s not worth the effort’.”
1 December In the USA, News Channel 8 cites a recent
draft report by the US Army Corps of Engineers as stating
that between 1993 and 2001 the Corps unearthed at least 865
intact World War I-era munitions at Spring Valley, at least
eighty of which are listed as “chemical in nature” [see 27 Apr
02]. According to the report, three projectiles containing arsine,
a round containing mustard gas and another round containing
lewisite are scheduled to be destroyed in 2010 together with
another eighty-six munitions, some of which are reportedly
documented as constituting an “explosive hazard”. [See also
26 Jun 02 and 10 Jun]
2 December In Washington DC, testifying before the
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano says that she will request an extension of the
congressionally mandated 2012 deadline for checking all US-
bound cargo on ships for WMD materials. Napolitano says:
“In order to implement the 100 per cent scanning requirement
by the 2012 deadline, [DHS] would need significant resources
for greater manpower and technology, technologies that do
not currently exist, and the redesign of many ports… These
are all prohibitive challenges that will require the department
to seek the time extensions authorized by law… Expanding
screening with available technology would slow the flow of
commerce and drive up costs to consumers without bringing
significant security benefits.” Napolitano says that, in order to
meet the deadline, costs would have to increase to a minimum
of $168 billion for monitoring the nation’s 21,000 inbound
shipping routes. She says that a less comprehensive measure
could focus only on incoming containers from a small fraction
of the more than 700 ports connected to the country, adding
that the large majority of imported cargo comes from only 58
of those ports. Napolitano’s comments follow the release of a
report by the Government Accountability Office, which
recommended Customs and Border Protection conduct a
feasibility study and cost estimate analysis on meeting the
2012 deadline [see 30 Oct].
2 December In the US Senate, Government
Accountability Office Director of Natural Resources and
Environment John Stephenson testifies before the Committee
on Environment and Public Works on Chemical Regulation:
Observations on Improving the Toxic Substances Control Act.
His testimony, which is “based on prior GAO work”, addresses
the implementation by the Environmental Protection Agency
of the Toxic Substances Control Act and Integrated Risk
Information System. It also discusses options for acquiring
additional information on chemical risks, controlling such risks,
and sharing more of the information collected under the Toxic
Substances Control Act.
2-3 December In The Hague, 43 representatives of 29
non-governmental organizations around the world – in Africa,
Asia, the Middle East, East and West Europe, and North
America — assemble to debate and then agree by consensus
a founding document for the “Chemical Weapons Convention
Coalition”. A mission statement subsequently issued, appar-
ently still in draft form, by the nascent Coalition describes
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itself as “an independent, international body whose mission is
to support the aims of the Chemical WeaponsConvention
(CWC) and to supplement the efforts of the member states of
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), with focused civil society action aimed at achieving
full membership of the CWC, the safe and timely elimination
of all chemical weapons, preventing the misuse of chemicals
for hostile purposes, and promoting their peaceful use”. The
initiative has been led primarily by Global Green USA in the
person of one of its directors, Paul Walker. The founding meet-
ing has been conducted in the margins of the Fourteenth Ses-
sion of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties [see 30
Nov – 4 Dec], during which Director-General Rogelio Pfirter
commends the initiative and notes that the Technical Secre-
tariat was assisting the NGO meeting. US Representative
Robert Mikulak likewise welcomes the formation of the Coali-
tion, framing it within an area that he tells the Conference
“deserves greater attention”, namely “strengthening the Or-
ganization’s relationship with stakeholders and civil society,
including industry and nongovernmental organizations”.
5 December In the UK, six medical experts have
requested Attorney-General Baroness Scotland to give them
permission to request that the High Court order a new inquest,
or the resumption of the previous inquest, into the death of Dr
David Kelly [see 17 Jul 03] on the grounds that the conclusion
by the Hutton Inquiry [see 28 Jan 04] that the cause of death
was suicide is flawed, so reports the London Daily Mail. The
move follows reports some five months previously that a group
of thirteen doctors were to mount a legal challenge over the
matter [see 12 Jul]. The original coroner’s inquest was halted
by the then Lord Chancellor Lord Falconer on the grounds that
the Hutton Inquiry would fulfil “the function of an inquest”. In a
thirteen-page dossier prepared as the basis for the legal action,
medical lawyer Michael Powers QC, trauma surgeon David
Halpin, epidemiologist Andrew Rouse, surgeon Martin
Birnstingl, radiologist Stephen Frost, and specialist in internal
general medicine Chris Burns-Cox argue that the bleeding from
Dr Kelly’s ulnar artery in his left wrist is “highly unlikely” to
have caused his death. They claim the Hutton inquiry was
“totally inadequate” as a means of identifying the cause of Dr
Kelly’s death and are seeking to obtain Dr Kelly’s post mortem
report. They also say the Hutton Inquiry lacked the powers of
a full inquest because it did not hear evidence taken under
oath, it did not have the power to subpoena witnesses and it
did not have the power to summon a jury. Under Section 13 of
the 1988 Coroners Act, the High Court can order a new inquest,
or the resumption of a previous inquest, in “special cases”,
including cases where “it is necessary or desirable in the
interests of justice”.
Seven weeks later, the Daily Mail reports seeing a letter
from Assistant Head of Legal and Democratic Services at
Oxfordshire County Council Nick Graham to the group of
doctors which says that a year after he completed his inquiry,
Lord Hutton ordered that “records provided [which were] not
produced in evidence” remain classified for thirty years and
all medical reports remain classified for seventy years. The
following day, Lord Hutton issues a statement saying that he
has written to the Ministry of Justice to make it clear that he
has no objection to the doctors and their legal advisers from
seeing Dr Kelly’s medical records, including his post mortem
report. In his statement, Lord Hutton says: “I requested that
the post-mortem report […] should not be disclosed for 70
years as I was concerned that the publication of that report
[…] would cause [Dr Kelly’s] daughters and his wife further
and unnecessary distress… However, I consider that the
disclosure of the report to the doctors and their legal advisers
for the purpose of legal proceedings would not undermine the
protection which I wished to give Dr Kelly’s family, provided
that conditions were imposed restricting the use and publication
of the report to such proceedings.”
5-6 December In Geneva, there is the thirtieth workshop
of the Pugwash Study Group on the implementation of the
CWC and BWC, with the theme on this occasion being Pre-
paring for the Seventh BWC Review Conference.
5-11 December In Boston, USA, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate
conducts tests to sample the particle and gas concentrations
in more than twenty underground railway network stations, as
well as in underground trains, that are the responsibility of the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). A DHS
press release states that the study involves the release of
“common, harmless tracer gases used for indoor and outdoor
air testing; an inert particle tracer tagged with a biologically
inert, non-toxic organic dye used in medical imaging
applications; and a common optical brightener often used in
laundry detergents and paper manufacturing”. The study, it
says, will help scientists “understand the airflow characteristics
for smoke or unintentional spills of chemicals or fuels –
providing data that will help guide the design of next generation
detection systems and enable transportation systems to
strengthen evacuation, ventilation and other incident response
strategies”. Announcing the study three days previously, DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano says the study is “one of many
efforts the Department is undertaking across the country to
inform our emergency response planning in preparation for
chemical or biological terrorist attacks”. Meanwhile, the Boston
Globe quotes MBTA Police Chief Paul MacMillan as saying
that a second round of testing will be conducted in the summer
with a view to understanding seasonal differences in air flow.
6 December In the USA, The Salt Lake Tribune reports
Utah Representative Rob Bishop as calling for a congressional
hearing on a report he recently uncovered, which states that a
stretch of rural Arizona near the US-Mexico border “would be
an ideal area to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction”. The
report – Threat Assessment for Public Lands (2002-2003) –
was completed by the Department of the Interior in late 2002
and is marked as “sensitive”. It states that terrorists could
smuggle such weapons using “well-established smuggling
routes” over Interior-managed lands which “invite” such activity.
The Tribune quotes both the Department of the Interior and
the Department of Homeland Security as having said the report
is now outdated.
7 December In Geneva, in the margins of the ongoing
BWC Meeting of States Parties, the US National Academy of
Sciences, the University of Bradford, the National Defence
Medical College of Japan, and the Landau Network-Centro
Volta hold a seminar on International Cooperation, Biosecurity
and the Education of Life Scientists. The seminar is opened
by the current chairman of the Meeting of States Parties,
Ambassador Grinius of Canada.
7 December In Santiago, Chile, a judge orders the
arrest of six individuals for their roles in the death of former
Chilean president, Eduardo Frei Montalva. In the indictment,
Judge Alejandro Madrid says there is evidence that Frei was
poisoned with mustard gas and thallium in the months before
his death in January 1982. According to Madrid, Frei’s
poisoning at the Santa María Clinic weakened his immune
system and so made him unable to survive his stomach
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surgery. Those charged with murder are Dr Patricio Silva Garín,
CNI (secret police) agent Raul Lillo Gutierrez, and Frei’s
chauffeur Luis Alberto Becerra Arancibia. Dr Pedro Samuel
Valdivia is charged as an accomplice, whilst Dr Helmar
Rosenberg Gómez and Dr Sergio González Bombardier are
charged with having falsified the post mortem report. The
indictment states that during the post mortem several organs
were removed, apparently to conceal the presence of toxic
chemicals. Madrid refers to a number of other killings by state
agents, particularly those targeting prominent opponents
overseas. He says that because these “provoked an
international commotion”, the killing of Frei had to be
“imperceptible to all, with the exception of those who
intervened” directly. Speaking to reporters, Judge Madrid says
that Frei’s death “was due to the gradual introduction of non-
conventional toxic substances”. The (London) Guardian quotes
Alvaro Varela, a human rights lawyer working for the Frei
family, as saying: “Those charged today are not the only one…
There are more and we are headed in their direction.” [See
also 9 Jul 08]
7-10 December In Cairo, Egypt, there is a regional United
Nations workshop on implementing United Nations Security
Council resolution 1540 [see 28 Apr 04] [see also 9 Sep]. The
event has been organized by the UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs and is hosted by the Egyptian government, with financial
support being provided from the European Union and the
governments of Norway and the USA. Invitations have gone
to officials from the Republic of the Congo, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania
and Uganda, as well as to representatives of a number of
international, regional and sub-regional organizations. The
workshop aims to enhance national capacities for the
management of export-control processes at a practical level,
and to improve information- and experience-sharing between
participating countries. It is also expected to facilitate
assistance related to implementation of the resolution.
7-11 December In Geneva, States Parties to the BWC
convene for the third [see 1-5 Dec 08] of four annual meetings
in preparation for the 2011 Review Conference, in accordance
with the decision taken at the Sixth Review Conference [see
8 Dec 06]. The purpose of the meeting is to develop and
consolidate the work undertaken by the second meeting of
experts four months previously [see 24-28 Aug] on enhancing
international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological
sciences and technology for peaceful purposes; and promoting
capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance,
detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases:
(1) for BWC parties in need of assistance, identifying
requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2)
from BWC parties in a position to do so, and international
organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related
to these fields. The meeting is chaired by Ambassador Marius
Grinius of Canada.
The following one hundred BWC parties participate in the
meeting: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova,
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, the UK, the USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam
and Yemen. The following six non-parties that have signed
but not yet ratified the Convention participate without taking
part in the decision-making process: Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Haiti,
Myanmar, Syria and Tanzania. In addition, Angola and Israel,
which are neither parties nor signatories to the Convention,
participate as observers. Also attending the meeting as
observers are: the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute, the European Commission, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Interpol, the OPCW, and the
World Health Organization. Also granted observer status are
fourteen non-governmental organizations and research
institutes.
On the third day, US Under-Secretary of State Ellen
Tauscher announces the launch by the USA of National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which was signed
off by US President Barack Obama some two weeks
previously. In her address, she rejects any future support by
the USA for a verification protocol thus: “The Obama
Administration will not seek to revive negotiations on a
verification protocol to the Convention. We have carefully
reviewed previous efforts to develop a verification protocol
and have determined that a legally binding protocol would not
achieve meaningful verification or greater security… It is
extraordinarily difficult to verify compliance. The ease with
which a biological weapons program could be disguised within
legitimate activities and the rapid advances in biological
research make it very difficult to detect violations. We believe
that a protocol would not be able to keep pace with the rapidly
changing nature of the biological weapons threat... Instead,
we believe that confidence in BWC compliance should be
promoted by enhanced transparency about activities and
pursuing compliance diplomacy to address concerns.” With
regard to reducing biological threats the 23-page document
states: “Our Strategy is targeted to reduce biological threats
by: (1) improving global access to the life sciences to combat
infectious disease regardless of its cause; (2) establishing
and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life sciences;
and (3) instituting a suite of coordinated activities that
collectively will help influence, identify, inhibit, and/or interdict
those who seek to misuse the life sciences.” On the subject
of the BWC, the Strategy states: “The BWC is a uniquely
important venue through which we can promote and globally
advance our objectives for non-proliferation and risk
management of biological threats. The membership of the
BWC, however, is not universal and concerns remain that some
treaty partners may be developing biological weapons… We
will seek to utilize the BWC as our premiere forum for global
outreach and coordination on the full scope of risk management
activities by: promoting confidence in effective BWC
implementation and compliance by its States Parties, inter
alia, by promoting transparency about legitimate activities and
pursuing compliance diplomacy to address concerns;
promoting universal membership in the Convention; ensuring
that our participation in BWC meetings is broadly inclusive of
relevant departments and agencies and headed by an
appropriately senior representative; advancing a substantive
agenda that emphasizes topics and activities consistent with
the objectives of this Strategy with broad potential to enhance
global risk management; seeking to renew existing relationships
while building new, broader coalitions of ‘like-minded’ BWC
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States Parties; and encouraging stronger partnerships between
security and public health communities by focusing on activities
that improve global capabilities to counter infectious disease
in a manner that mitigates risks from natural, accidental, and
deliberate outbreaks.”
On the fourth day, Grinius introduces his report on
universalization. Grinius says that there are currently 163
parties to the BWC, while noting that no non-parties had thus
far joined the Convention during 2009. In this regard, however,
he says that eight non-parties – Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros,
Kiribati, Mozambique, Myanmar, Tuvalu and Tanzania – have
indicated that their processes for accession or ratification are
well advanced, and that a further four non-parties – Côte
d’Ivoire, Haiti, Namibia and Nepal – have indicated that such
processes have commenced. Grinius says that a reasonable
target would be for these twelve non-parties to join the BWC
by the time of the 2011 Review Conference.
Also on the fourth day, Head of the BWC Implementation
Support Unit Richard Lennane introduces his report on the
activities of the ISU. During the debate that follows some
delegations raise concerns about the number of Confidence-
Building Measures submitted not having been higher. India
states that it would submit its return, thereby bringing the total
number of submissions in 2009 to sixty-four. Sweden
announces that it intends to make resources available to the
ISU under the European Union Joint Action in support of the
BWC [see 10 Nov 08]; and Canada announces it will provide
$100,000 from its Global Partnership funds to support ISU
activities. [See also 8 Dec]
8 December In Amman, Jordan, within the past week
the Cassation Court has overturned the life sentences handed
down to eight individuals last year [see 21 May 08] for planning
a chemical attack on the US Embassy, the prime minister’s
office and the headquarters of Jordan’s intelligence service
[see 13 Apr 04], so reports The Jordan Times, quoting an
unidentified “senior judicial source”. At the first trial, the State
Security Court sentenced the eight individuals to death [see
15 Feb 06]; however the Cassation Court overturned the
sentences on appeal after the prosecutor had been found to
be a target of the failed plot [see 6 May 07]. The State Security
Court rejected the ruling, but commuted the death sentences
to life imprisonment in accordance with an amended law
relating to the illegal possession of weapons and explosives.
The source is quoted by the Times as saying that the State
Security Court “will study the Cassation Court’s decision and
decide whether to insist on its previous ruling or comply with
the higher court’s decision”.
8 December In Brussels, the Council of the European
Union adopts its latest [see 26 Jun] six-monthly progress report
on the implementation of the EU Strategy Against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which covers
activities carried out during the second half of 2009. Amongst
other things, the report states: “Active implementation of the
[BTWC] Joint Action in support of the World Health
Organisation in the area of bio-safety and bio-security [was
launched in August] [see 14 Apr 08]; the implementation of an
assistance project to a specific country has started… The
implementation of Joint Action in support of the BTWC [was
launched in August] [see 10 Nov 08]… The EU has continued
to successfully insert a WMD clause in third-country
agreements, including with the Republic of Korea, Iraq,
Indonesia and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement with Syria, which contains a WMD
clause, entered into force… The Instrument for Stability
established in 2006, allows for the financing of certain WMD
related projects pertaining to its component ‘CBRN risk
mitigation’ [see also 8 Apr]. A new Indicative programme for
the period 2009-2011 has been adopted. It devotes EUR 123
millions to projects in this area including export controls. The
Annual Action Programme 2009 will be adopted late 2009 for
an amount of EUR 32 million. Innovative actions, such as
support for the Multilateral Nuclear Assurances and the creation
of CBRN Centres of Excellence, have been included.
8 December In Geneva, on the sidelines of the ongoing
BWC Meeting of States Parties [see 7-11 Dec], ? the European
Union holds a lunchtime seminar to launch Guide to
Participating in the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) of
the Biological Weapons Convention. The guide was prepared
by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs with the
support of the European Union under its Joint Action in support
of the BWC [see 10 Nov 08]. Its purpose is to provide practical
advice and guidance to officials responsible for preparing CBM.
The guide includes: background information on the CBM process;
general advice for preparing to participate in the CBM; and detailed
guidance on gathering the specific information required for each
form. It also includes some suggestions for providing information
in addition to that required by the CBM forms.
8 December In London, speaking before the Iraq Inquiry
Committee, which commenced its public hearings some two
weeks previously [see 24 Nov], the former head of MI6 says
that the intelligence services were not asked to “firm up” the
government’s dossier on Iraqi WMD [see 24 Sep 02]. John
Scarlett, who at the time was the head of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, says: “There was absolutely no conscious intention
to manipulate the language or to obfuscate or to create any
misunderstanding on what this might refer to.” Scarlett,
however, does acknowledge that the document should have
stated more clearly that it was addressing battlefield weapons
as opposed to missiles. With regard to the allegation that Iraq
had the capability to strike UK targets with missiles carrying
WMD within 45 minutes of an order to do so, Scarlett says:
“Close attention was paid […] to the recent important and
valuable intelligence, which was described as reliable and
authoritative, and the assessments staff were instructed to
firm up the judgment on possession in particular in the light of
that intelligence.”
A week later, in an interview with The (London) Independent,
Brian Jones – the former head of the nuclear, chemical and
biological branch of the Defence Intelligence Staff – says that
Scarlett misled the inquiry when he said that intelligence that
Iraq had the ability to launch missiles carrying WMD within 45
minutes was “reliable and authoritative”. Jones says: “Having
said there was the intelligence to show Iraq had WMD, there
was no indication in what [Scarlett] said about what is now
very well known, that those additional pieces of new intelligence
were all caveated… Information was coming from untried
sources - that is absolutely clear… The description Scarlett
gave [the inquiry] for the secondary source, who passed the
information on, was ‘reliable and authoritative’… If he is passing
on information from someone who has never reported before
then that is a nonsense.”
8 December In the UK, a member of parliament
publishes The Failure of British Political and Military Leader-
ship, which claims that intelligence relied on by the government
when it made the claim that Iraq could launch a chemical
attack on UK targets within 45 minutes of an order to do so,
originated from a taxi driver in Iraq. In the report, Adam
Holloway – who is a member of the House of Commons
Defence Committee and a former officer in the Grenadier
Guards and journalist – says the government ignored advice
that the claim was not credible when writing the dossier spelling
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out the case for the Iraq War [see 24 Sep 02]. In the report,
Holloway says: “Under pressure from Downing Street to find
anything to back up the WMD case, British Intelligence was
squeezing their agents in Iraq for information. One agent did
come up with something - the ‘45 minutes’ or something about
missiles allegedly discussed in a high level Iraqi political
meeting. But the provenance of this information was never
questioned in detail until after the Iraq invasion, when it became
apparent that something was wrong. In the end it turned out
that the information was not credible, it had originated from an
émigré taxi driver on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, who had
remembered an overheard conversation in the back of his cab
a full two years earlier. Indeed, in the intelligence analyst’s
footnote to the report, it was flagged up that part of the report
probably describing some missiles that the Iraqi Government
allegedly possessed was demonstrably untrue. They verifiably
did not exist… Despite this glaring factual inaccuracy […] the
report was treated as reliable... It seems that someone, perhaps
in Downing Street, found it rather inconvenient and ignored it
lest it interfere with our reasons for going to war… Why did the
people at the very top of the wider intelligence community not
make the case more forcefully to the Blair Government that
they were misusing an intelligence report on WMD in Iraq, and
ignoring the analyst’s comments that indicated parts of it were
demonstrably wrong? As one who understands put it, ‘You get
in the Prime Minister’s office. His highest priority is your own
chance to get ahead. He looks you in face. You think: ‘I want to
stay here, I want to please him, and I want to be on his plane’…
Top leaders will always get the intelligence they want’.”
8 December The US Congress, in its conference report
on the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010, approves the
transfer of $304 million from the Project Bioshield Special
Reserve Fund to the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, and $305 million to the DHHS Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority. The Fund will now have
around $2.4 billion available through FY2013 to “procure and
stockpile emergency countermeasures”. Some six months
previously, a proposal by President Obama to draw on the
Fund to finance production of the H1N1 flu vaccine was met
with stiff resistance in Congress and by industry [see 8 Jun].
9 December In Russia, the Maradykovsky chemdemil
facility has commenced the destruction of mixtures of lewisite
and mustard agents, so reports RIA Novosti news agency.
Mikhail Manin, a “regional official”, is quoted as saying that
“two and a half [metric] tons of this dangerous substance has
been destroyed by now”, and that a total of 150.1 metric tons
of mustard-lewisite mixtures, contained in 277 units of
ammunition, is set to be eliminated at the facility. Previously,
the facility completed the destruction of its stockpile of sarin
[see 18 Nov]. [See also 26 Nov]
9 December In Geneva, during the ongoing BWC
Meeting of States Parties [see 7-11 Dec], there is seminar
organized by Canada, the UK and the USA on Biological
Aspects of the G-8 Global Partnership Programme. Canadian
Global Partnership Biological Program Officer John Griffin,
US Department of State Global Partnership Coordinator
Stephen Lynagh, and UK Deputy Permanent Representative
in Geneva Jo Adamson describe relevant activities in each of
their countries. The current chairman of the Meeting of States
Parties, Ambassador Grinius of Canada also speaks.
Later in the day, the Permanent Mission of Romania
together with BWC Implementation Support Unit hold a seminar
on Scientific Research and Exchange: Potential Impact on
Non-Proliferation Measures for Biological Agents.
10 December The Japanese Supreme Court
upholds the death sentence of Yoshihiro Inoue, who was
previously convicted for his role in the sarin attack on the
Tokyo underground railway network [see 20 Mar 95]. Of the
thirteen former members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult to have
been sentenced to death for their roles in the attack, Inoue is
the ninth to have his death sentence upheld by the Supreme
Court [see 6 Nov]. Appeals against the sentences of the
remaining four Aum members are pending. Presiding Judge
Seishi Kanetsuki says in his ruling that Inoue “played an
essential and significant role on his initiative” in the attack.
10 December In Geneva, on the sidelines of the
BWC Meeting of States Parties [see 7-11 Dec], the Verification
Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) convenes
a seminar on Regulatory Guidelines for National Implementation.
10-11 December In Warsaw, Poland, the annual
NATO conference on weapons of mass destruction, arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation takes place. It is
the first such conference to take place since NATO adopted
its comprehensive policy on threats posed by WMD [see 31
Aug]. The event brings together 170 senior officials representing
more than 40 NATO and partner nations, including from the
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, the Gulf Cooperation Council and from the Asia-
Pacific region. Among those addressing the conference is
OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter.
11 December In Geneva, on the sidelines of the
final day of the BWC Meeting of States Parties [see 7-11
Dec], the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute convenes a seminar on Biosecurity Risks
and Assessment.
11 December The US Department of Health and
Human Services Office of the Inspector-General releases a
report that a failure by food facilities to provide the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) with necessary information “may
hamper the FDA’s ability to contact food facilities in an
emergency”. The report says that almost half of the 130
facilities surveyed by it had failed to register accurate
information with the FDA in accordance with the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act 2002,
aimed at making it easier to trace contaminated food entering
the food chain back to its source. The report further states
that over half of facility managers were unaware of the
requirements regarding registration. It recommends that the
FDA “improve the accuracy of the information in the registry”;
consider seeking statutory authority to impose civil penalties
through administrative proceedings against facilities that do
not comply with the registry requirements; consider making
some of the optional fields within the registry mandatory; and
work with the food industry to increase facilities’ awareness
of the registry requirements. [See also 26 Mar]
13 December In the UK, in an interview broadcast
by the British Broadcasting Corporation, former UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair says that he “would still have thought it
right to remove” Saddam Hussein as leader of Iraq even if he
had known at the time that Iraq possessed no WMD capability.
Blair adds, that in such a case “obviously you would have had
to use and deploy different arguments, about the nature of the
threat”.
14 December OPCW Director-General Rogelio
Pfirter says he wants to avoid any politicization of the debate
as to the status of incapacitants under the CWC. In an interview
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with Arms Control Today, he says: “This issue first and
foremost needs to be well informed from the scientific point of
view, and that is why I am suggesting the [Scientific Advisory
Board] be the first one, if the organization so considers, to
look into this matter, and then at the next review conference,
if sufficient information has been produced by that date, the
member states will look into it.”
15 December In the UK, The Royal Society
releases Making the UK Safer: A Five Year Review [see 21
Apr 04]. The report reviews the UK government’s progress
against some of the main recommendations made five years
previously regarding the improvement of the UK’s capability
to respond to a chemical or biological incident and to minimize
its impact. It states: “The major recommendation of the 2004
Royal Society report was: ‘The UK Government should
establish a new centre to coordinate and direct the work
required to improve the UK’s capability and to minimise the
impact of any civilian chemical or biological incident’. While
significant progress has been made in the past five years,
concerns remain over the central coordination and direction of
the work required to improve the UK’s capability for detection
and response to chemical and biological incidents… There is
close cooperation between UK and US government
departments in a number of chemical and biological detection
and decontamination research areas… The large amount of
funding from the US does raise a potential weakness if this
source of funding was to decrease in the future… More effort
might be made by the government to assist UK universities in
securing European funding for research on chemical and
biological detection and decontamination through the European
Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme… Progress
[relative to the recommendation in 2004 that the government
‘undertake a detailed review of the various options for the
decontamination of people, buildings, vehicles and the wider
environment’ following an incident] has been limited. Sampling
protocols and standards for decontamination are a long way
from being fully mature, and there is still a problem of a lack
of evidence base for decontamination. Analytical procedures
such as trace analysis are needed to assess whether
decontamination and clean-up has been effective… Concerns
have been raised over the realism of past exercises carried
out to test the UK response to chemical and biological threats.
There is a need for more scenario based exercises to underpin
an ‘all risks’ generic response, which can be refined in a given
situation, as recognised by [the Office for Security and Counter
Terrorism]. The [Government Decontamination Service] is a
particular concern having only conducted desktop exercises.”
15 December In the USA, the joint National
Research Council and Institute of Medicine Committee on
Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance Systems: Biowatch
and the Public Health System releases BioWatch and Public
Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early
Detection of Biological Threats. The report assesses the
effectiveness and costs of surveillance through the Department
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) BioWatch programme, and
through the public health and health care systems. It examines
the comparative merits of these approaches, looks at the costs
and identifies ways in which surveillance could be enhanced.
In this regard, it lists a series of recommendations that the
DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, and
others should adopt. [See also 5 Oct]
15 December In Washington DC, Trust for
America’s Health releases its seventh annual [see 9 Dec 08]
report Ready or Not: Protecting the Public’s Health from
Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism. The report says that
20 states scored six or less out of 10 key indicators of public
health emergency preparedness; nearly two-thirds of states
scored seven or less; eight states tied for the highest score of
nine out of 10: Arkansas, Delaware, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vermont. Montana had
the lowest score at three out of 10. The report also makes the
following findings: 27 states cut funding for public health from
FY 2007-08 to 2008-09; 13 states have purchased less than
50 percent of their share of federally subsidized antiviral drugs
to stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic; 14 states
do not have the capacity in place to assure the timely pick-up
and delivery of laboratory samples on a 24-hour basis to the
Laboratory Response Network; 11 states and Washington DC
report not having enough laboratory staffing capacity to work
five 12-hour days for six to eight weeks in response to an
infectious disease outbreak.
16 December In Glasgow, a heroin addict dies in
hospital after having tested positive for anthrax, whilst another
addict who also tested positive is in a stable condition.
According to BBC News Online, police and health officials are
investigating whether contaminated heroin or a cutting utensil
may be to blame.
Two weeks later, BBC News Online reports that the number
of confirmed cases of anthrax infection among heroin addicts
across Scotland has now risen to six, of whom three have died.
Three weeks later, The (London) Guardian reports a UK-
wide alert as having been issued following the death of the
sixth addict.
Four weeks later, The Herald (Scotland) reports that the
number of deaths has risen to seven, with another fourteen
hospitalized. Meanwhile, Agence France-Presse quotes a
statement by the French health ministry as saying: “Since
December 6, there have been 15 confirmed cases of anthrax
among heroin users, 14 in Scotland and one in Germany…
Eight people died… The likeliest source is heroin contaminated
by anthrax spores.”
Five weeks later, BBC News Online reports that in Scotland
the number of confirmed cases of anthrax infection has risen
to seventeen, eight of which have died.
18 December The Yemeni Interior Ministry orders
the Coast Guard to prevent an Iranian boat carrying weapons
and anthrax-infected livestock from entering the country.
According to the Ministry, the livestock were previously tested
by Qatari authorities, which determined them to be carrying
the bacteria, and refused them entry.
18 December The US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) transmits to Congress Biosurveillance:
Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing. The report is one in
a series relating to the requirement in the 9/11 Commission
Act that GAO report on the state of biosurveillance and
resource use in federal, state, local, and tribal governments.
Specifically, it focuses on the actions taken by the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center to acquire resources to
accomplish its mission and to collaborate effectively with its
federal partners. The report makes two recommendations with
a view to helping the Center ensure that it effectively applies
practices to enhance and sustain collaboration, including the
provision of data, personnel, and other resources.
18 December US Senator Richard Lugar
announces that during October and November 2009 the
Cooperative Threat Reduction programme completed the
construction and equipping of a new biological agent monitoring
facility in Kazakhstan.
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23 December In Russia, three anti-submarine
warships and a patrol ship from the Russian Black Sea Fleet
practice “joint manoeuvring and radiation and biological
defence”, so reports Interfax-AVN military news agency,
quoting a report on the exercise by the Fleet.
23 December In The Hague, a man convicted for
complicity in violating the rules of war for having supplied Iraq
with chemicals that Iraq used to produce mustard agent and
that it subsequently used against its Kurdish population and
Iran [see 21 Nov 05] appears in court to face a claim by sixteen
Iraqi Kurds for compensation. Frans van Anraat was originally
sentenced to seventeen years imprisonment [see 2 Apr 07],
however, this was later reduced to sixteen-and-a-half years
by the Supreme Court [see also 30 Jun]. The Associated Press
quotes Liesbeth Zegveld, the lawyer representing the claimants,
as saying: “He [van Anraat] made quite a bit of profit selling
chemicals in the 1980s, but it’s very difficult to know how
much of that is left… We may have to wait and see how he
supports himself once he comes free.”
23 December In Arkansas, USA, the Pine Bluff
chemdemil facility passes the fifty per cent mark for destroying
its stockpile of mustard agent-filled ton containers. A press
release by the Chemical Materials Agency quotes Mark Greer,
the facility’s site project manager, as saying: “More than 2.8
million pounds of mustard agent have been safely destroyed…
The amount of agent already safely processed during the
mustard campaign is more than the combined amount
processed during our three previous campaigns.” Destruction
of the ton containers commenced a year previously [see 7
Dec 08]. It is the last remaining destruction operation to be
completed at the facility. Operations are scheduled to last
three years. Greer, however, is quoted as saying: “Currently
we are operating ahead of schedule. The early completion
estimate in the Transition Planning Guide predicts the end of
the ton container disposal campaign to be in December 2010.”
24 December The US Department of Health and
Human Services Office of the Inspector General releases
CDC’s CHEMPACK Project: Nerve Agent Antidote Storage.
The report relates to the establishment by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2004 of the
CHEMPACK project to stockpile drugs and medical supplies
to assist States in protecting against nerve agents. The
purpose of the report is to determine the extent to which: nerve
agent antidotes in the CHEMPACK project were stored at
temperatures required by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); the CDC implemented procedures to ensure the quality
of nerve agent antidotes in the CHEMPACK project; and nerve
agent antidotes in the CHEMPACK project appropriately
received extended expiration dates under the Shelf Life
Extension Program (SLEP). The report sets out the following
findings: “Almost one-quarter of CHEMPACK containers did
not have at least three daily temperature readings in accordance
with CDC procedures… CDC’s [temperature] storage
requirements for CHEMPACK drugs were not consistent with
FDA’s [Food and Drug Administration’s] storage requirements…
Nine percent of selected CHEMPACK containers were not stored
according to FDA’s [temperature] storage requirements for at
least 1 month… CDC did not consistently implement quality
system procedures in the CHEMPACK project… CDC’s
procedures allowed CHEMPACK drugs to inappropriately receive
extended expiration dates under SLEP.” The report concludes
by setting out a series of recommendations that the CDC adopt
to address the shortcomings identified.
28 December In London, a security alert is
triggered after staff working in the office of Communities
Minister Shahid Malik intercept a letter containing white powder.
Emergency procedures are activated, however, the powder is
subsequently found to be harmless. According to the London
Daily Telegraph, comments on the envelope suggest that it
was sent by someone on the extreme right.
30 December In Innsbruck, Austria, a court orders
the release of a man who had been on the run from US
authorities for over twenty years after being charged in the
USA with supplying Iran with 115 tonnes of a chemical that
Iran later used to produce mustard gas in the late 1980s,
pending a decision about his extradition. Peter Walaschek, a
German national, was arrested two days previously as he
checked into his hotel at an Alpine skiing resort in the Tyrol
region using a false Irish passport. According to Agence
France-Presse, the arrest resulted from a joint operation by
Austrian criminal police, local Tyrol police and US authorities.
Walaschek was previously arrested in Croatia in 1994 [see 11
Nov 94], but he fled to Germany after the court ruled that
under Croatian law it did not have the authority to detain him.
Reuters reports that Walaschek had pleaded guilty in a US
court in 1988 to shipping 115 tonnes of thiodiglycol to Iran;
however, he fled the USA while awaiting sentencing. Reuters
reports the court as stating that, for an extradition to be granted,
the crime of which a suspect is accused must also have been
a crime under Austrian law at the time it was committed.
However, an Austrian law banning trade in weapons of mass
destruction was not in force at the time in question. A
spokesman for the court, however, emphasizes that the court’s
decision relates only to the detention of Walaschek, not to the
extradition itself, which will be decided on in a separate
procedure.
30 December US President Barack Obama signs
an executive order under which the US Postal Service will be
responsible for delivering medication in the event of a biological
weapons attack [see 4 Nov]. Under the order, the Department
of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Homeland Security have six months to create a plan for the
Postal Service to distribute medicines, with “anthrax as the
primary threat consideration”. The plan must include provisions
for despatching medications to federal employees with essential
responsibilities during an attack.
This Chronology was compiled mostly by Nicholas Dragffy
from information supplied through HSP’s network of corre-
spondents and literature scanners.
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